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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE longstanding debate surrounding strict products liability
continues unabated.' Currently, Reporters for the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts have been appointed to draft the new black
letter rules and have already produced several preliminary
drafts.2 There can be no doubt that the exchanges will intensify
as the proponents of reform try to limit the scope of strict prod-
1. There has been a steady flow of legal commentary about strict products
liability since the late 1970s, including numerous law review symposium issues
dedicated solely to strict products liability concerns. See, e.g., Symposium, Sympo-
sium on CivilJustice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1245 (1993) [hereinafter CivilJustice
Reform]; Symposium, Punitive Damage Awards in Product Liability Litigation: Strong
Medicine or Poison Pill, 39 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994); Symposium, The Revi-
sion of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Occasion for Reform of Product
Liability Law?, 10 Toulo L. REV. 1 (1993); Symposium, Products Liability Law Sym-
posium, 17 SEroN HALL L. REV. 505 (1987); Symposium, Tort Reform Symposium,
24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795 (1987); Symposium, Tort Reform: Will it Advance Justice
in the Civil System?, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1211 (1987); Symposium, The Passage of Time:
The Implications For Product Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (1983); see also Sympo-
sium, Tort Reform Symposium Issue, 64 DENY. U. L. REV. 613 (1988); Symposium,
Rethinking Tort and Environmental Liability Laws: Needs and Objectives of the Late 20th
Century and Beyond, 24 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1987); Symposium, Issues in Tort Reform,
48 OHIo ST. L.J. 317 (1987).
2. SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Essay: Will a New Restate-
ment Help Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L. RV. 1257 (1993) [herein-
after Henderson & Twerski, Reflections] (discussing briefly how new restatement
of products liability law will clarify controversial issues in products liability
litigation).
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ucts liability, especially as it applies to design and warning de-
fects.3 The onset of the American Law Institute's project to
restate tort law in the Restatement (Third) of Torts will provide in-
creased incentives for further and more heated debate. As critics
of the current design defect doctrine assert their positions more
forcefully, one should step back from the debate in order to ex-
amine indispensable considerations that have not been given ade-
quate recognition, or that have been missing from the debate
altogether. 4
If the debate about the appropriate doctrine for determining
manufacturer liability for defectively designed products is to be
fully informed, participants must recognize the nature of corpo-
rate decision-making as it relates to product design. Legal com-
mentators have too often minimized the extent of corporate
3. Some judges and commentators would subject claims of design defects
to a negligence standard. See, e.g., Foley v. Clark Equip. Co., 523 A.2d 379, 391
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Christina M. Moylan, Coment, In Pursuit of the Appropriate
Standard of Liability for Defective Product Desigs, 42 Mx. L. Rxv. 453,455 (1990). In
their proposal for new black letter law and comments under § 402A, the recently
appointed Reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Torts have already expressed
their preference for imposing a negligence limitation on design defect liability.Henderson & Twerski, Reflections, supra note 2; see also James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A4 of the Restatmen.t (Second) of
Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 15 14-26 (1992) [hereinafter Henderson &Twerski, Proposed Revision]; c Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Deathof Strict Products Liability: the Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. Rxv. 1183 (1992)(arguing that negligence concepts have eroded strict products liabliity to such
extent that it is no longer "strict" in doctrinal sense of concept). In addition, themost extreme of the reformers-those who advocate a return to contract as thegoverning body of law to regulate relations between suppliers and users of prod-ucts-most likely will continue pressing their position in the continuing debate.
See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILIY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-OtENCES 18 (1988) [hereinafter HUBER, THE LEGAL REVOLUTION] ("Tehe answeris not to abandon co )tct.., but to modernize it."). In the best of all possiblemarketplaces, i.e., where consumers are fully informed of all product designrisks, the parties' choices are reflected in the contract terms and should arguablycontrol their respective rights and obligations. Because such a marketplace is avirtual impossibility, however, one cannot seriously contemplate replacing strictproduct liability with contract law. For a discussion of the disparity betweenmanufacturer and consumer knowledge of product design risks, see infra notes
41-79 and accompanying text. For a discussion of user knowledge in today's
marketplace, see infra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
4. The recently appointed Reporters of the new Restatement provide the
most forceful criticism of the current design defect doctrine, particularly in re-
gard to its potential impact. Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note
3, at 1526-46. Despite their understandable hesitancy toward discussing the
project in advance, the appointed Reporters have already set forth their black
letter proposal and comments for the new section 402A. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 402A (Council Draft No. 1, Sept. 17, 1993); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 402A (Council Draft 1A, Jan. 4, 1994); Henderson & Twer-
ski, Reflections, supra note 2, at 1257; Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision,
supra note 3, at 1514-26.
19931 1363
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knowledge concerning product design risks and the ability of cor-
porations to eliminate those risks. 5 They have consistently down-
played, ignored or failed to recognize corporate decision-making
in the design process-decision-making that consciously and
inappropriately exposes consumers to serious design risks.6
Courts, on the other hand, have been more willing than commen-
tators to recognize the disparity of information and power be-
tween manufacturers and product users. 7 The courts have
5. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability
Law, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 2193, 2198 (1989) ("To assume that the manufacturer
has perfect knowledge of the relevant risk is to beg just this question, and to
drive the law into treating all cases of imperfect information as if the defendant
had perfect information and the plaintiff had none."); David G. Owen, Problems
in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. Cn. L.
REV. 1, 16, 20-26 (1982) [hereinafter Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages]
(arguing that punishing manufacturers simply for being in business of manufac-
turing necessarily hazardous products is inappropriate); David G. Owen, The
Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Implications on Rules of Liability and Defense in Prod-
ucts Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REV. 769, 771 (1977) (arguing that it is possible to
determine blameworthiness of manufacturers to establish appropriate liability
standards); George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CAR-
Dozo L. REV. 2301, 2337 (1989) (arguing that founders of § 402A failed to ade-
quately constrain strict liability to manufacturing defect context); George L.
Priest, Modern Tort Law and its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1987) ("The
presumption that product- and service-providers are vastly superior to consum-
ers in the power to prevent injuries ... has generated many of the problems of
modem law .... "). But see David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 Mxcir. L. REV. 1258, 1258 (1976) [hereinafter Owen, Punitive Dam-
ages] ("Through the processes of design, testing, inspection and collection of
data on product safety performance in the field, the manufacturer has virtually
exclusive access to much of the information necessary for effective control of
dangers facing product consumers.").
6. For a discussion of commentators who have trivialized the importance of
corporate decision-making in reducing design risks, see supra note 5 and accom-
panying text.
7. Courts have recognized the disparity of both knowledge and power be-
tween manufacturers and consumers. See, e.g., Taggart v. Richards Medical Co.,
677 F. Supp. 1102, 1104 (D. Colo. 1988). In Taggart, the court shifted the risk-
benefit burden to defendants in design cases because:
the manufacturer is in the unique position of being better able to intro-
duce evidence and provide information necessary to balance risks and
benefits... [and is in] exclusive possession of information and knowl-
edge necessary to establish the utility and benefits of the product to the
public and the known risks of danger inherent in the product's design.
Id. (quoting William A. Trine, Products Liability: Unreasonably Dangerous Versus
Risk-Benefit Analysis, 36 TRIAL TALK 348, 355 (1987)); see also Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 886 (Alaska 1979) (shifting risk-benefit burden to
defendant in design cases because "this allocation puts the burden of producing
the relevant ... evidence on the party who has the most access to and is the most
familiar with such evidence"); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 881-82
(Ariz. 1985)(stating that in design defect case, knowledge of product's defect
imputed to manufacturer as of time of trial); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (explaining that in mod-
em mass markets handicrafts have been replaced by complicated manufacturing
1364 (Vol. 38: p. 1361
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employed that reality in shaping legal doctrine.8 Beyond the risk
information disparity, however, is the reality that corporate deci-
sion-makers frequently and consciously choose risky product de-
signs over safer ones when there is no cost or other justification
for doing so.9
As a consequence of the excessive amount of product design
injuries, courts can, and should, shape strict liability doctrine to
provide enhanced deterrence, especially in the design context.10
Courts and commentators generally agree that strict products lia-
bility creates incentives for manufacturers to ensure greater prod-
uct safety."1 Those same voices rarely acknowledge, however,
processes that "are ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the
general public (and so t]he consumer no longer has the means or skill enough to
investigate for himself the soundness of a product"); Rahmig v. Mosley Mach.
Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 81 (Neb. 1987) (requiring "that a plaintiff prove feasibility
[of a safer, alternative design], as part of the plaintiff's burden of proof in a case
based on strict liability for design defect, weighs down the plaintiff with the onus
to provide evidence of those matters which are usually within the knowledge of
the manufacturer"); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 821 (N.J.
1978) (adopting rule "that knowledge of the dangerous potentiality of a
machine design as reflected by the evidence at trial is imputable to the manufac-
turer"), overruled by Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140
(NJ. 1979); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 80, 83 (N.J.
1960) (comparing markets when consumers had more information to modem,
mass markets where consumers are faced with complicated products that they
have "neither the opportunity nor the capacity to inspect"); Voss v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 207-08 (N.Y. 1983) ("A manufacturer is held
liable regardless of his lack of actual knowledge of the condition of the product
because he is in the superior position to discover any design defects and alter
the design before making the product available to the public."); see also Thomas
A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1087
(1965) ("To put the matter bluntly, a large proportion of mass products are
consciously made as inferior as the traffic will bear and are advertised by con-
scious misrepresentation as far superior to their known quality.").
8. The courts have incorporated two procedural devices into design-risk
doctrine that implicitly recognize the information and power disparity between
corporations and product users. First, the courts have imputed knowledge of
the product's risks to manufacturers-this is consistent with the information and
power disparity. For a detailed discussion of the imputation of knowledge, see
infra notes 306-39 and accompanying text. Second, the courts have shifted the
risk-utility burden to manufacturers, which recognizes that the evidence needed
to meet such a burden is peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufacturer.
For a detailed discussion concerning the shift in the risk-utility burden, see infra
notes 392-96 and accompanying text.
9. For an examination of conscious corporate decisions relating to specific
product design risks, see infra notes 79-166 and accompanying text. For an anal-
ysis of the causes of this grossly culpable corporate decision-making, see infra
notes 167-252 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the aspects of corporate decision-making that man-
date greater deterrence through strict liability, see infra notes 253-91 and ac-
companying text.
11. For a discussion of the judicial belief that modern consumers need pro-
19931 1365
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that on balance deterrence of product injuries is preferable to
post-accident compensation. In the application of design defect
doctrine, there are numerous reasons why courts ought to regard
compensation as the default mechanism and provide sufficient in-
centives for manufacturers to give accident prevention the prior-
ity it deserves.1 2
This Article ultimately suggests that courts should employ
several procedural devices to create incentives for greater deter-
rence of product design injuries. These suggestions rest on two
premises: (1) courts ought to fully recognize the extent to which
manufacturers impose unjustified product design risks upon un-
suspecting consumers; 13 and (2) courts can achieve the necessary
greater deterrence through stricter process, thus avoiding the
creation of additional doctrinal problems.' 4
Part II of this Article examines the differences between a
manufacturing defect and a design defect in terms of knowledge
of product risks. 15 While consumers have little or no information
about either type of product risk,16 manufacturers do have knowl-
edge of design risks in all but the rarest of cases.17
tection from product defects, and that tort law, including strict product liability,
creates such protection, see infra notes 252-55, 292-94 and accompanying text.
Conversely, for a discussion of cases that suggest negligence may serve as a bet-
ter deterrent than strict liability, see infra note 295. For a discussion of commen-
tators arguing that strict products liability creates enhanced incentives for
product safety, see infra notes 283-87. For reference to a comment that ordinary
negligence creates greater deterrence than strict products liability, see infra note
295.
12. For a discussion of the position that successful lawsuits represent a fail-
ure of the tort system's deterrence mechanism, see infra notes 284, 296. For a
discussion of reasons why compensation ought to be regarded as the default
mechanism of the tort system, see infra notes 287-91 and accompanying text.
13. For a broad sampling of cases where manufacturers imposed product
design risks on product users who did not, and indeed could not, know of the
risks, see infra notes 82-166 and accompanying text.
14. For a catalog of some of the outstanding problems regarding § 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see Henderson & Twerski, Reflections, supra note
2, at 1262 n.27.
15. For a discussion of the difference between manufacturing and design
defects, see infra notes 31-78 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of why consumers lack information concerning design
risks, see infra notes 61-78. For a discussion regarding consumer lack of infor-
mation concerning manufacturing risks, see infra notes 31-40 and accompanying
text. If manufacturers are not normally aware of manufacturing risks, one can-
not expect that consumers are in a position to have knowledge of that risk infor-
mation either.
17. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: To-
ward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 503 (1993) [hereinafter Owen,
Moral Foundations] (arguing that in most cases of manufacturing defect there is
fault because manufacturers fail to take adequate care commensurate with their
1366 [Vol. 38: p. 1361
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Part III of this Article examines specific instances of corpo-
rate decision-making in the design process, and demonstrates
that manufacturers consciously choose risky designs over safer al-
ternatives with full knowledge that the alternatives may involve
no, or only minimal, additional costs.18 Part III continues by ex-
amining several reasons why corporations often reject design
safety: costs and marketing considerations;' 9 inherent, and some-
times irrational, resistance to safety;20 and lack of corporate ac-
countability. 21 This section concludes with an analysis of general
corporate nature and structure, including an examination of frag-
mented corporate decision-making and decision-making
rationalizations.
22
Part IV considers the need for deterrence against the back-
drop of marketplace realities and the possibilities for stricter pro-
cess. The realities of the marketplace are three-fold: (1)
consumers are exposed to far too many mass risks from defec-
tively designed products;23 (2) current levels of manufacturer ac-
countability for product design injuries are not sufficient;24 and
(3) compensation is the second best solution to product injuries
because few claims are pursued relative to the multitude of inju-
ries that occur, and because post-accident protection is really no
protection at all.2 5
knowledge of risks); Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revisions, supra note 3, at
1516 ("The manufacturer's very knowledge that a predictable number of flawed
products will enter the marketplace and cause injury lends to the harm an ele-
ment of deliberate infliction."). For a discussion of manufacturer knowledge of
design risk, see infra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of specific instances where manufacturers have chosen
risky designs over safer alternatives, see infra notes 82-166 and accompanying
text.
19. For a discussion of how costs and marketing considerations factor into a
corporation's decision to reject design safety, see infra notes 167-206 and ac-
companying text.
20. For a discussion concerning the manner in which a corporation's inher-
ent and irrational resistance to safety precautions affect its decisions to reject
design safety, see infra notes 207-20 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of how a lack of corporate accountability can affect a
corporation's decision to reject design safety, see infra notes 221-31 and accom-
panying text.
22. For a discussion of fragmented corporate decision-making, see infra
notes 232-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion of corporate decision-
making rationalizations, see infra notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the risks consumers face from defectively designed
products, see infra notes 253-67 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the lack of manufacturer accountability in the mar-
ketplace, see infra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of why compensation is not the best solution for
resolving product injuries, see infra notes 274-82 and accompanying text. For a
136719931
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The possibilities for greater deterrence are based on the
premise that strict products liability doctrine creates enhanced in-
centives for manufacturers to promote safety in product design.
Both courts and commentators generally agree with this prem-
ise.26 The empirical evidence, while not definitive, also gives rea-
sonably strong support to this assumption. 27
Finally, this Article suggests that there are three procedural
devices that courts can utilize to create deterrence incentives in
the product design process: (1) imputing knowledge of design
isks to manufacturers;28 (2) limiting the scope and application of
the state-of-the-art concept; 29 and (3) shifting the risk-utility bur-
den to the defendants i.e., the manufacturers.30 Employed intelli-
gently, these devices are likely to bring a needed measure of
injury prevention to product use. Numerous courts have demon-
strated the necessary awareness of manufacturer unaccountability
in product design, and have attempted to create incentives for
safety by applying these procedural devises in a thoughtful man-
ner. Others, however, have failed on both counts. Perhaps a
sharper awareness of the full extent of manufacturer culpability in
product design will persuade those courts to move in the direc-
tion of procedural strictness.
II. THE INFORMATION DISPARITY
A. Manufacturing Defects
The flaws in products resulting from the manufacturing pro-
cess may be classified as either materials defects or fabrication de-
fects.31 The former consist of the defects inherent in the
materials used to construct component parts that are integrated
into a finished product.3 2 Fabrication defects, on the other hand,
discussion of why post-accident protection really affords no protection, see infra
notes 283-91 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of courts and commentators arguing that strict liability
increases product safety, see infra notes 292-94, 296-97 and accompanying text.
27. For an examination of this empirical evidence, see infra notes 31-78 and
accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the imputation of knowledge theory, see infra notes
306:39 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of the state-of-the-art theory, see infra notes 340-91
and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of shifting the risk-utility burden, see infra notes 392-
467 and accompanying text.
31. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRODucTs LIABILITY AND SAFETY-CASES AND
MATERIALS 244 (2d ed. 1989) (distinguishing between materials defects and
fabrication defects).
32. See, e.g., Keeler v. Richards Mfg. Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1987)
1368 [Vol. 38: p. 1361
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are flaws resulting from mistakes that are made by persons or ma-
chinery working on the product during the various stages of
production."3
Corporations utilize quality control processes to detect de-
sign flaws and other irregularities before a product enters the
marketplace. Corporations implement these quality control
processes primarily by inspection procedures that consist of phys-
ical and other types of product examinations during the stages of
production. Inspection procedures, however, add a major incre-
ment of cost to most products.3 4 Consequently, corporations can
only inspect a small sampling of the products produced and the
individual components contained therein.3 5
Because manufacturing defects occur randomly,3 6 and in-
(involving surgical screw containing "debris" that made screw weaker than spec-
ified thereby causing screw to break while in plaintiff's hip); Pouncey v. Ford
Motor Co., 464 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972) (involving "inclusions" i.e., non-metal
impurities, existing in automobile radiator fan blade that weakened blade and
caused it to break apart); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y.
1916) (finding that spokes of automobile wheel were made of defective wood,
which caused wheel to crumble).
33. Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971) (involv-
ing manufacturer's failure to tighten nut sufficiently on car suspension system),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972); Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.
1959) (ruling that any one of several kinds of human errors in production could
result in failure to remove metal burr on ash tray that injured passenger's eye in
automobile accident).
34. For a detailed discussion of how quality control procedures such as in-
spection increase overall product costs, see Cowan, supra note 7, at 1087.
35. Because inspection costs are so high, there is constant pressure on
manufacturers to simplify inspection procedures. Cowan, supra note 7, at 1087.
Consequently, cost pressures exist to inspect a smaller, rather than a larger,
sampling of the product. Id. One should note, however, that even if a manufac-
turer were inclined for safety reasons-if not for financial reasons-to inspect
every item constituting a finished product, certain types of inspection would re-
quire the destruction of an entire product. See Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co., 464
F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding impurities in metal of automobile fan blade
would require removing metal from each blade in order to examine it micro-
scopically); Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 164 A.2d 773 (NJ. Super. Ct.
1960) (finding that individual ballbearings would have to be destroyed in order
to test their compliance with material specifications). Hence, inspection of every
component of every product is simply not possible. Cowan, supra note 7, at
1090.
36. For a discussion of fabrication and quality control in the manufacturing
process, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 53. "Randomly" can mean both
occurring with statistical unpredictability and also occurring in different forms,
i.e., with no predictability of the exact kind of manufacturing flaw that will ap-
pear in the finished product. With regard to the kind of flaw that occurs, a man-
ufacturer may gain knowledge of such flaws through the notice it receives from,
for example, lawsuits. Otherwise, a manufacturer fairly can be said to have no
knowledge of product flaws such as loose bolts or radiator fans constructed of
impure metal. See Pouncey, 464 F.2d at 957; Jenkins v. General Motors Corp.,
446 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971).
1993] 1369
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spection is necessarily limited to a sampling of the entire produc-
tion output,3 7 manufacturers only have actual knowledge of the
specific flaws discovered in the inspection process.38 Moreover,
manufacturers purposefully choose a level of quality control ade-
quate to reduce to an acceptable minimum the number of prod-
ucts not conforming to the producer's specifications.39 The
typical producer who implements a minimum quality control pro-
gram does not make a conscious choice about specific risks in spe-
cific products that it knows will cause user injury.40 Therefore,
one cannot assert that producers consciously choose to flood the
marketplace with entire product lines containing manufacturing
defects that will likely cause human injury. This is not necessarily
true, however, in the context of design defect.
B. DESIGN DEFECTS
1. Manufacturer Knowledge
Design defects contrast starkly with manufacturing defects in
terms of conscious decision-making. Manufacturers make pro-
duction choices for the purpose of making the end product con-
form to product specifications as closely as possible. To
37. For a discussion of the sampling procedures used to inspect products,
see Cowan, supra note 7, at 1090.
38. Manufacturers also have indirect knowledge of product risks generally.
They know that by choosing to inspect a limited sampling of final products,
rather than every item off the product line, a certain percentage of production
defects will not be detected in the inspection process. See generally Cowan, supra
note 7, at 1090-92. Moreover, they know that those flawed products will enter
the marketplace and in some cases cause injuries to humans. Id. Under negli-
gence theory, the manufacturer is liable only if its inspection, i.e., sampling,
choice is unreasonable. Id. at 1091. In the true sense of strict liability, however,
the defective product that enters the marketplace and causes personal injury cre-
ates liability regardless of whether the manufacturer's quality control choices
were reasonable. Id, at 1091-92.
39. Commentators have asserted that the purpose of quality control is to
maximize profits, not to create better quality. See Cowan, supra note 7, at 1090.
Even if this is true, however, producers still have an interest in the reputation of
their products-such as their reputation for quality and dependability.
40. Because manufacturers have an interest in selling all items produced in
a product line, their interests are best served by insuring that most of the items
meet their specifications. If items do not satisfy these specifications, buyers will
return them for an exchange. Hence, a minimum quality control program
would, at the very least, serve this goal. Even a modicum of quality control will
uncover some of the items of a product line that otherwise would enter the mar-
ketplace with manufacturing defects. Moreover, even in the extreme and un-
likely scenario in which a producer consciously chooses to implement no quality
control, it is unlikely that every item within the product line will contain manu-
facturing defects because many of those defects are caused randomly by human
errors in the production process.
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"choose" to have production defects in the finished product
would defeat the purposes of setting product specifications. Pro-
ducers therefore "choose" manufacturing defects only in the indi-
rect sense that they implement quality control procedures
knowing that a few items of the finished product line will enter
the marketplace with production flaws.4 '
In the design context, manufacturers make numerous and
complex design decisions. Some of the decisions are general,
such as the overall concept of the product;42 but most of the deci-
sions are very specific, such as the choices of color,43 strength of
component parts,44 safety features, 45 and the size of particular
pieces contained in the product.46 These choices have direct
41. In terms of risk allocation, this process is different in degree, but per-
haps not in kind, from making conscious design choices that create known risks
for product users. See Cowan, supra note 7, at 1087-92. The difference, how-
ever, is significant. In the design context, the manufacturer has chosen a specific
known risk that is inherent in every item of the product line. In the vast majority
of such cases, these design risks could be eliminated by alternative design
choices. By contrast, manufacturing defects are not chosen in any direct sense
and, in fact, are not desired. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 31. Manufacturing
defects affect only a small percentage of an entire product line, and defeat the
purposes of setting product specifications. The purposes behind product speci-
fications are defeated to a greater extent the higher the frequency with which the
manufacturing defects occur. For a discussion of manufacturing defects in this
context, see supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text. But see Owen, Moral
Foundations, supra note 17, at 503 (arguing that great majority of manufacturing
defect cases have fault basis, i.e., conscious failure to invest adequately in re-
search, production or communication); Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revisions,
supra note 3, at 1516 ("The manufacturers very knowledge that a predictable
number of flawed products will enter the marketplace and cause injury lends to
the harm an element of deliberate infliction.").
42. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) (stating initial concept to build car that weighed less than 2,000 pounds
and could sell at retail for less than $2,000).
43. Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1969) (involving manufac-
turer that chose white, rather than black, plastic for gear shift knob knowing that
white plastic posed a specific risk that black plastic did not-the risk of
deterioration).
44. Green v. Denney, 742 P.2d 639 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that roof
supports were not strong enough to protect passengers of car from forces to
which roof was subjected).
45. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (Cal. 1970) (stating that
omission of rear view mirrors on earth-moving machine kept operator from see-
ing around "blind spot" where plaintiff's decedent was standing); Turner v.
General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (holding that fail-
ure to incorporate roll bar into car roof rendered car unreasonably dangerous).
46. Richelman v. Kewanee Mach. & Conveyer Co., 375 N.E.2d 885 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978) (finding that design engineer fixed size of openings between
guard bars on farm machinery based on own large shoe size, knowing that per-
sons with shoe sizes smaller than his would also be using machinery).
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safety ramifications of which the producer is aware. 47
There are three important aspects of the design process that
furnish manufacturers direct and specific knowledge of design
risks: (1) choice of materials; (2) expertise and experience about
the interaction of the product and the user; and (3) knowledge
acquired through testing. These categories overlap to some de-
gree and there may be other categories not specifically included
within these three.48 The purpose of this examination, however,
is not to quantify all the discreet sources of manufacturer knowl-
edge of design risks. The purpose is, rather, to describe generally
the broad and direct access producers have to knowledge of de-
sign risks inherent in products and design risks that result directly
from their conscious design choices. 49 Without exaggeration,
one can confidently assert that manufacturer knowledge of design
risks is practically exclusive.
The choice of materials is a major source of a producer's
knowledge of the design risks inherent in its products. Materials
chosen for a product design must have the properties necessary
to perform the desired function(s) without presenting unneces-
sary dangers to users. Manufacturers, as experts, determine
product specifications, including the properties of the different
materials incorporated into the finished product. 50 Manufactur-
47. See Cowan, supra note 7, at 1088 ("[Mlodem mass producers allocate
risks of injury from defective products among themselves and their customers.
This allocation is deliberate."). Some design choices may present safety risks
not apparent until after testing is completed. Manufacturers often possess only
a generalized knowledge of design risks that becomes more specific and com-
plete as a result of testing. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348,
360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that Ford's own pre-marketing testing revealed
that placement of gas tank so close to rear bumper posed risk of gas tank rupture
not present on modified or reinforced test vehicles).
48. See, e.g., Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 358
N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 1976) (finding that manufacturer of aqua diver trampoline
knew, by virtue of its own tests, that interaction of user and product could result
in kind of accident that caused plaintiff's injury).
49. See Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 5, at 1258 ("Through the
processes of design, testing, inspection and collection of data on product safety
performance in the field, the manufacturer has virtually exclusive access to much
of the information necessary for effective control of dangers facing product con-
sumers"); Foley v. Clark Equipment, 523 A.2d 379, 391 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(stating that "design defects result from deliberate and documentable decisions
on the part of manufacturers").
50. See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 386-87 (N.J. 1984). The
court held the manufacturer to the standard of an expert, which included having
knowledge of "arts, materials and processes" related to production of its prod-
ucts. Id. at 386. The court also noted that the standard may require manufac-
turers to "seek out information concerning the public's use of its own product."
Id. at 387.
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ers know the properties of most materials, 51 and can test to- gain
the necessary knowledge concerning any other materials incorpo-
rated into the finished product.52 Thus, it is surprising to see
producers-knowing of the serious risks accompanying their deci-
sions-make so many seemingly inappropriate choices concern-
ing raw materials to be used in constructing their products.5 3
A manufacturer's expertise also comprises knowledge about
the interaction between its products and the users of its products.
Because products are designed for particular purposes, manufac-
turers know the circumstances under which, and the specific man-
ner in which, their products are likely to be applied.
5 4
51. See Green v. Denney, 742 P.2d 639 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (involving roof
supports that manufacturer knew were weak); First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-Am Agric.
Prod., Inc., 537 P.2d 682, 688 (N.M. Ct. App.) (finding that company knew that
eating animals fed with their grain had deleterious effect on consumers), cert.
denied, 536 P.2d 1085 (N.M. 1975); Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C.
1969) (involving manufacturer that knew of deteriorating quality of white plastic
used in gear shift knob).
52. See West v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 454
(Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986) (involving manufacturer that
should have "initiated an 'adequate appropriate testing program' after receiv-
ing numerous consumer complaints regarding product). For a discussion of
manufacturer testing of products, see infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
53. O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1446 (10th Cir.
1987) (involving tampon manufacturer that chose material with higher absor-
bency than was necessary to meet its own standards, knowing that such level of
absorbency posed serious risks of toxic shock syndrome to users); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal. 1963) (involving woodworking
machine constructed with screws that were inadequate to hold machine together
during operation, and finding that manufacturer had either actual knowledge of
risk or had inadequately tested device); McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 188 Cal.
Rptr. 542, 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that aluminum fire wall fittings on
Cessna airplane could resist flame penetration only 10 to 40 seconds, and not 15
minutes as required by federal regulations); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174
Cal. Rptr. 348, 384-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (finding ample evidence that Ford's
management made conscious choices in designing Pinto that it knew posed seri-
ous risks to users); Tetuan v. A. H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1240 (Kan. 1987)
(finding that manufacturer of intrauterine device marketed it knowing that string
attached to it could cause life-threatening infections to users); Green v. Denney,
742 P.2d 639, 642 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that auto maker chose roof sup-
ports for Ford Pinto that it knew were not strong enough); Mickle v. Blackmon,
166 S.E.2d 173, 188 (S.C. 1969) (involving auto maker that chose plastic for
gear shift knob when it knew that such knob would deteriorate in sunlight and
pose risk of serious injuries to car passengers). For a more complete examina-
tion of the intrauterine device in Tetuan and the manufacturer's design and mar-
keting choices consciously disregarding the safety of users, see MORTON MINTZ,
AT ANY COST-CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985).
54. Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Colo. 1987) (find-
ing that manufacturers are responsible for anticipating applications of products
outside of their "intended use," i.e., motor vehicle accidents, and therefore are
liable for failing to take adequate precautions to protect motorcycle passengers
from risks of accident); Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 357
(Md. 1985) (holding that producer of flannel nightgown was deemed to know
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In addition to their expertise about materials, and their ex-
pertise about the interaction of users and products, manufactur-
ers receive important information about design risks from
product testing.55 In a narrow, technical sense, product testing
that users would sometimes wear gown inside out, thus enhancing flammability
risk of protruding pockets); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., Inc., 154 N.W.2d
488, 496-98 (Minn. 1967) (finding that manufacturer of steam vaporizer, know-
ing product would be used in childrens' bedrooms, failed to seal water/steam
container to avoid accidental tipping of vaporizer by child); Micallef v. Mieble
Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 573-74 (N.Y. 1976) (involving plaintiff that was injured
when he reached into printing press to remove foreign substance, a practice
common in industry, which should have prompted manufacturer to install avail-
able safety device); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 819 (Ohio
1982) (involving plaintiff that accidentally activated foot switch on industrial
press, and holding that foot pedal could have been designed to guard against
accidental activation), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982); Lewis v. Coffing Hoist
Div., Duff-Norton Co., 528 A.2d 590 (Pa. 1987) (involving overhead crane oper-
ator who accidentally pushed wrong button on control box causing crane's load
to fall on him, and suggesting that manufacturer knew that control box could
have been designed to protect against accidental activation). But see Venezia v.
Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 190-91 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that producer
could not know, i.e., foresee, that eight-year-old child would throw beer bottle
against tree).
Manufacturers also gain knowledge of product defects by the reports re-
ceived about product usage. See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d
187, 197 (Colo. 1984) (involving manufacturer of intrauterine devices that re-
ceived reports of spontaneous septic abortions and other serious difficulties ex-
perienced by users). These reports enable manufacturers to eliminate product
risks retrospectively by redesigning their products. Id. at 218. In Palmer,
although the manufacturer knew of the dangers caused by the multi-filament
wick in its intrauterine device, it took no steps to redesign the product. Id. at
196.
55. For a discussion recognizing that manufacturers receive important de-
sign risk information through testing, see Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 5,
at 1258. This is not to say that producers always, or even frequently, use testing
results to eliminate known design risks prior to marketing products. There are
numerous instances in which manufacturers have ignored their own or industry-
wide testing that clearly revealed the existence of serious risks to users of their
products. See Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1981)
(finding that Honda's own tests indicated danger to front passengers due to
small size and inadequate strength of Honda AN 600, yet Honda still marketed
car in United States without correcting design risks in accordance with recom-
mendations made by Honda engineers), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1491 (D.NJ. 1988) (finding that
defendant's own studies and testing indicated serious health risks from smoking
but that defendant had concealed results from public); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that Ford's own
crash tests indicated danger to Pinto passengers from low-impact rear-end colli-
sion, but Ford put Pinto into marketplace without modification of dangerous
design); Palmer, 684 P.2d at 196-97 (finding that manufacturer's own testing re-
vealed risk of deadly infection inherent in design of string attached to its in-
trauterine device, but manufacturer continued to market product for almost
three years after learning of such risks); Wolmer v. Chrysler Corp., 474 So. 2d
834, 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that Chrysler conducted crash tests
that revealed danger to passengers of Plymouth Volare from low-impact rear-
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includes engineering or mechanical testing, such as testing mater-
ials for strength and other properties, 56 or testing the manner in
which particular components of the finished product will func-
tion.57 In a broader sense, testing includes, for example, studies
and reports depicting the risks of illness and disease inherent in
particular product designs. 58 Testing in its broadest sense pro-
vides with near certainty the information about design risks that
may not always be available to producers through their expertise
about materials or through their expertise about the expected in-
teraction of product and user. Altogether, these three aspects of
the design process provide manufacturers specific knowledge of
design risks unavailable to the average product user.
2. User Knowledge
In all but the exceptional case, manufacturers are aware of
and control product risks created by their conscious design
choices.5 9 By contrast, users rarely possess much, if any, knowl-
edge of design risks inherent in the products they use.60 There
end collision, yet Chrysler placed vehicle in market without modification of dan-
gerous design).
56. See Palmer, 684 P.2d at 196-97 (involving manufacturer that tested string
of intrauterine device for specific property of "wicking," i.e., whether fluid
and/or bacteria would travel up string).
57. See Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85 (discussing Ford's testing proce-
dures concerning susceptibility of Pinto gas tank to puncture and resultant com-
bustibility due to presence of gasoline with tank located at various positions in
rear of vehicle).
58. Manufacturers not only have a duty to perform their own tests and stud-
ies, but they also have a duty as experts to be aware of reports and studies per-
formed by others that are available in the world of expert knowledge. See
O'Gilvie, 821 F.2d at 1446 (finding that manufacturer of tampons was aware of
studies and medical reports indicating that its choice of material for tampons
posed risk of fatal illness to users).
59. See Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 17, at 469-70 ("In sum, the
manufacturer's initial power over product safety-risk control-is enormous; by
comparison, the consumer's initial control of product risk is almost trivial.").
60. Id.; see also 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 225, 262 (1991) [hereinafter
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY] (stating that individuals tend to underestimate
more substantial risks inherent in products, at least in part due to imperfect
product risk information); David P. Griffith, Note, Products Liability-Negligence Pre-
sumed: An Evolution, 67 TEx. L. REV. 851, 874 (1989) (explaining that product
users have no more basis to protect themselves from hidden product risks than
do intermediate sellers). One can reasonably conclude that consumers have no
more knowledge concerning manufacturing risks than they do concerning de-
sign risks. However, because this Article focuses on design risks-including the
discrepancy between consumer and producer knowledge-consumer knowl-
edge, or the lack thereof, is outside of the scope of this Article.
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are at least six reasons why consumers fail to fully appreciate such
design risks.
First, consumers are by definition product users, not design-
ers.6 1 They do not participate in the design or production of
products, and they cannot normally possess information relating
to design risks inherent in those products.62 They also do not
participate in specific manufacturing decisions, such as the choice
of materials to be utilized in each product. 63 In addition, they are
not privy to the manufacturers' expectations about product use
and the inevitable interaction between product and user.64 More-
over, they possess no information concerning product testing that
would inform them of inherent design risks.65
61. In the workplace, where a significant number of product injuries occur,
there may be a certain level of sophistication regarding the products used. This
sophistication arises either by virtue of skill and training required for particular
positions, or as a result of on-the-job experience. See ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBIL-
rry, supra note 60, at 226, 235; see afsoJAMEs E. BEASLEY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
THE UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS REQUIREMENT 88-89 (1981). Nonetheless, in
most such cases the producer, as designer of the product, has superior knowl-
edge about the product's inherent risks and therefore has superior ability to
minimize or eliminate the risks. See Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577
(N.Y. 1976).
62. The most prominent exception to the general rule that users possess no
knowledge of design risks exists in cases involving workplace injuries. See, e.g.,
Green v. Sanitary Scale Co., 431 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding that em-
ployee of supermarket assumed risk of using meat grinding machine that caused
injury). Users in the workplace have typically attained a certain level of sophisti-
cation due to special training, skill or on-the-job experience. See, e.g., Bartkewich
v. Billenger, 247 A.2d 603, 605 (Pa. 1968) (holding that employee should have
known not to reach into glass breaking machine). For a discussion of other
means to educate consumers, see infra notes 68-70.
63. For a discussion of choice of materials in product liability cases, see
supra note 51.
64. For a discussion of manufacturer knowledge, see supra notes 41-58 and
accompanying text.
65. See Thomas V. Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An Analytic Framework, 62
N.C. L. REV. 643, 675 (1984)(stating that "consumers have no . . . ability to
analyze even obvious design [defects]"). Consumers have access to information
about some products from sources other than manufacturers. Various con-
sumer reporting magazines, such as Consumer Reports, and consumer organiza-
tions, such as Public Citizen, publish general product information about selected
products-including, on occasion, results of selected tests. Nonetheless, even
the most diligent consumer, a consumer who reads all consumer product infor-
mation available in the public domain, is not able to discover a significant
amount of product information concerning design risks. Customarily, produ-
cers" do not disclose such information. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE,
AN ETHICAL STUDY 206-13 (1988) (explaining how corporations are able to hide
facts from consumers in context of Ford.Pinto case); see also Gary T. Schwartz,
The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1045-46 (1991) [herein-
after Schwartz, Pinto Case] (same).
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Second, consumers are laypersons, not experts. 66 As such,
they cannot be expected to appreciate fully design risks hidden
within the complexities of modem products.
67
The third factor underlying consumer failure to appreciate
the risks inherent in products is associated with consumers' as-
sumptions about product safety. Because product users are typi-
cally not knowledgeable about specific product risks, they tend to
assume that, in general, products are safe for normal use.68
66. Even ordinary consumers, as users of products, acquire a modicum of
expertise about ordinary products that they employ in their daily lives. This
expertise is usually limited, however, and does not ordinarily amount to a full
understanding of the risks inherent, and often hidden, in product design.
Singer v. Walker, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (involving hammer
labeled "unbreakable" that chipped and blinded infant), a d sub nom. Longines-
Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 209 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1965), and
cert. denied sub nom. Estwing Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Singer, 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
67. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Tray-
nor, J., concurring) ("The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to
investigate for himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not contained
in a sealed package. . . ."); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (N.Y.
1976). According to the Micallef court:
Advances in the technologies of materials, of processes, of operational
means have put it almost entirely out of the reach of the consumer to
comprehend why or how the article operates, and thus even farther out
of his reach to detect when there may be a defect or a danger present in
its design or manufacture.
Micallef, 348 N.E.2d at 577.
68. Consumers possess knowledge concerning gross product risks from
their common sense, i.e., consumers know that a large American car is safer than
a small Honda. See Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 655 (5th Cir.
1981). Consumers also learn through experience that particular product uses
are inherently risky, even if such risks do not render the product defective in
every instance. See Shetterly v. Crown Controls Corp., 719 F. Supp. 385 (W.D.
Pa. 1989) (stating that employees learned through training and on-the-job expe-
rience that they had to operate pallet moving trucks from side, not front, to
avoid injuries, and holding as matter of law that product was not defective), arfd,
898 F.2d 142 (3rd Cir. 1990).
There is a tendency for product users to overestimate low-probability risks,
and to underestimate the more substantial risks from product use. See ENTER-
PRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 60, at 225. However, people do not generally
condition their use and application of products on an assumption that inherent
dangers in the product are likely to injure them. While drivers generally assume
that excessive speed is dangerous and chefs generally assume that the sharpness
of knives poses a danger, neither category of user employs the product generally
assuming that serious or life-threatening inherent risks are likely to materialize.
Thus, there may be different levels of use and expectation, including more or
less information about products, that condition the risk attitudes of particular
users. See Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doc-
trine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109,
1129 (1974) (discussing effect that manufacturers' product claims have on con-
sumers' information base concerning products manufacturers are representing).
Nonetheless, each user assumes safety, not injury, within the particular environ-
ment of "normal" use.
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Courts have correctly recognized that users may, and usually do,
rely on the presence of products in the marketplace as a sign that
such products are safe.69 Advertising and consumer expectations
of governmental regulation have a tendency to provide product
users with a false sense of security and often put consumers off
their guard during product use.70
The fourth reason consumers possess relatively little knowl-
edge of design risks is that these risks are usually not apparent to
the typical non-expert user.71 If producers fail to disseminate risk
information into the marketplace, consumers are not likely to
69. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962)
("Implicit in the machine's presence on the market, however, was a representa-
tion that it would safely do the jobs for which it was built."); Rahmig v. Mosley
Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 75 (Neb. 1987) (stating that "there was justified
expectation that, with the [product's] power running and its controls in the 'up'
position, it was safe to enter the (product's] cutting chamber or discharge chute
to remove sheared metal"); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903,
907 (Pa. 1974) ("Our courts have determined that a manufacturer by marketing
and advertising his product impliedly represents that it is safe for its intended
use.").
70. See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1526-27 (D.
Minn. 1989). In Kocieraba, a physician who prescribed Searle's IUD testified that
he was misled by Searle's promotional literature that failed to alert the reader to
the possibility of pelvic inflammatory disease. Id. at 1526. This omission oc-
curred despite recommendation by the FDA advisory committee that such refer-
ence be included in Searle's literature. Id. The physician further testified that
had he known of the great risk of pelvic inflammatory disease, he would not have
prescribed the IUD for patients who had never borne children, and "probably
not [for] any women." Id.; see also Anson v. American Motors Corp., 747 P.2d
581, 587-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that plaintiffs' allegations that manu-
facturer's misrepresentations induced them to buyJeep that manufacturer knew
was dangerous and defective presented factual question forjury); Palmer v. A.H.
Robbins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 196 (Colo. 1984) (stating that physician recom-
mended defendant's intrauterine device "specifically [relying] on promotional
claims made by Robins as to the safety and effectiveness" of device); McCormack
v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Minn. 1967) (stating that consumer
specifically selected defendant's vaporizer "relying upon defendant's prior rep-
resentations contained in ... [defendant's product] booklet accompanying.
[previous vaporizer consumer had owned] that its vaporizers were safe' and
'practically foolproof,' as well as advertisements representing them to be 'tip-
proof' ").
71. O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1446 (10th Cir.
1987) (finding that high absorbency tampon fibers provided an increased risk of
contracting toxic shock syndrome); Exum v. General Elec. Co., 819 F.2d 1158
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that design of commercial deep fryer may have in-
creased risk of serious injury to user while it was being emptied); Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that gas
tank in Ford Pinto was placed in position that left it with less "crush space" than
any other American automobile); Palmer, 684 P.2d at 196 (finding that tailstring
of IUD provided pathway for bacteria into uterus and could lead to infection);
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 495 (Minn. 1967) (stating that
design of vaporizer allowed scalding water to pour out of machine when
machine was tipped); Toliver v. General Motors Corp., 482 So. 2d 213, 214
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ever obtain such information. 72
The high cost of product risk information is the fifth reason
product users know little about product risks. While design risk
information is expensive for producers, it is far more costly for
consumers. 7a Producers obtain a portion of their risk information
from tests and studies, which are often both costly and time-con-
suming. If these tests and studies are expensive for producers,
however, they are prohibitively so for consumers. 74 No consumer
can afford, in money or time, the costs of testing each consumer
product he or she uses. 75 These cost barriers essentially force
consumers to rely on the risk information conveyed to them by
the manufacturer. This fact leads directly into the sixth and final
reason underlying consumer ignorance of product design risks.
The first five reasons behind consumer ignorance of product
risks focus on the consumer rather than the manufacturer; they
explain why consumers are not likely to discover design risk infor-
mation in the public domain or on their own initiative. The sixth
and final rationale, however, implicates the manufacturer more
(Miss. 1985) (holding that gas tank in Chevrolet Vega was inadequately designed
to withstand punctures in rear-end collisions).
72. Design risk information is generally not made available to the public
until after numerous users have been injured. For further discussion concerning
consumer knowledge of design risks, see supra note 59-78 and accompanying
text.
73. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Re-
vived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683, 737, 770-71 (1993) (here-
inafter Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution] (discussing Landes and Posner
article and explaining high cost of consumer information); Jon D. Hanson &
Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An EconomicJustification for En-
terprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 174-80 (1990) (analyzing implications
of imperfect consumer information); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A
Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 544 (1985)
(arguing that high cost of obtaining information often outweighs benefit to con-
sumer); John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficacy of Tort Law, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1823-24 (1987) ("In reality.., few consumers are willing or able
to bear the high costs of fully informing themselves about all the relative safety
hazards posed by competing products."); see also W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING
PRODucTS LIABIm 64-65 (1991) (discussing consumer awareness of risk in var-
ious scenarios and concluding that "the chief inadequacy of the market is inade-
quate risk information); W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability:
Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6
YALEJ. ON REG. 65, 81-82 (1989).(discussing market incentives for product users
to obtain risk information).
74. A manufacturer's information costs are much lower than a consumer's
information costs due to a multiplicity of factors: (1) producers often retain
their own expert employees and facilities for testing; (2) producers can test their
products during the discreet design stages; and (3) producers do not need to
break a finished product into its component parts prior to testing.
75. For a discussion of consumer costs incurred in obtaining risk informa-
tion, see supra notes 73-74.
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directly. Simply stated, manufacturers often fail to share their de-
sign risk information with consumers.7 6 They frequently do not
even share such information with other relevant parties, such as
administrative agencies.77 Although this appears harsh and irre-
sponsible, producers could not remain competitive if they dis-
closed information concerning serious risks inherent in their
products.7 8 Unfortunately, this lack of communication only
serves to exacerbate the information disparity between producers
and consumers.
III. SAFETY AND CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING
A. Design Risks
Although producers know of design risks in their products,
the reality of the marketplace is that these producers consciously
leave such risks in their products. During the last several de-
cades, the marketplace has been flooded with products containing
inherent risks; these risks are a direct result of conscious design
choices by manufacturers. In almost every case, these design
choices are accompanied by producer knowledge of the specific
76. See O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1446 (10th
Cir. 1987) (finding that Playtex disregarded medical reports linking high-absor-
bency fibers and toxic shock syndrome and continued to advertise high absor-
bency of its tampons); Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska
1979) (finding that manufacturer marketed gun despite knowledge by top com-
pany officials that it was defectively designed and had injured users), overruled sub
nom. Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985). Manufacturers also
exacerbate the risk information disparity by lulling consumers into a false sense
of product safety. See Anson v. American Motors Corp., 747 P.2d 581, 587 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1987) (stating that AMC made continuing representations regarding
ruggedness and safety of theirjeep and denied presence of any defects in design
ofjeep until Federal Trade Commission required them to place warning stickers
on vehicles); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 495 (Minn. 1967)
(involving manufacturer that failed to disclose risk information concerning lack
of seal on steam container in its vaporizer despite knowledge that product would
be used in childrens' bedrooms).
77. Batteast v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 526 N.E.2d 428, 437 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(holding that Wyeth failed to warn doctors that risks such as intoxication and
death, circulatory failure and respiratory arrest, toxic synergism, and tonic and
clonic convulsions were related to use of its product), revd, 560 N.E.2d 315
(1990); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1218 (Kan. 1987) (holding
that literature provided by Robins failed to note that string attached to Dalkon
Shield could cause "wicking" infection).
78. See RussEL B. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION: SE-
CRECY, ACCESS, AND DISCLOSURE 118-19 (1980) (arguing that despite fact that
"[flirms generally have readily available all the data on product quality that
would be of interest to buyers," manufacturers keep.product information from
consumers in order to protect their competitive position in market, and markets
are not really free and open, but controlled by oligopoly maintained in large
part with assistance of consumer ignorance).
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risks that their design choices pose to users.7 9 An examination of
a variety of products will demonstrate the great frequency with
which producers make design choices in conscious disregard of
user safety.80 This examination will also show that, after making
such choices, producers consciously conceal risk information that,
if disclosed, would foster consumer safety and prevent a substan-
tial number of product related injuries.81
1. Motor Vehicles
Passenger-car, truck, school bus and motorcycle cases pro-
vide dramatic instances of design defects chosen deliberately and
consciously in disregard of user safety. 82 Design choices concern-
ing gas tank location and safety, which manufacturers knew posed
a direct threat of fire in the passenger compartment, have been
documented for several models of vehicles produced by different
manufacturers.8 3 One automobile manufacturer marketed vehi-
79. For a detailed discussion concerning manufacturer knowledge of design
defects, see supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
80. See Pawlak v. Brown, 430 So. 2d 1346, 1351 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (stating
that Honda knew driver or passenger of its ATC-90 three-wheel motorcycle
could easily and inadvertently accelerate vehicle to its maximum speed, but
failed to warn purchasers of this design problem).
81. Id.
82. For a discussion of cases documenting instances of design defects that
were deliberately and consciously disregarded by manufacturers, see infra note
83.
83. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981). In Grimshaw, the court found that Ford knew from its own pre-marketing
crash tests that Pinto drivers were likely to suffer serious injuries or death from
gas tank ruptures that commonly occurred in 20 to 30 mile-per-hour collisions.
Id. The Grimshaw court also found that Ford could have eliminated the risk of
rupture at a minimal cost-as little as $11 per car. Id. The court characterized
Ford's "institutional mentality" to be one of "callous indifference to public
safety" constituting a" 'conscious disregard' of the probability of injury" to con-
sumers. Id.; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill, 714 S.W.2d 329, 336-38 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986). In Dunrill, the court found that Ford had used the same fuel tank
system in its Mustang II that it had used in its Pinto. Dunill, 714 S.W.2d at 336-
38. Thus, Ford had the same knowledge of fuel tank risks and the same rela-
tively low cost of correcting them as in the Pinto case. Id. at 338. Rather than
correcting the problem, however, Ford chose to save more than $200,000,000
over three years by delaying modifications to the fuel tank system in the Mustang
II. Id. Although the plaintiff owned both a Pinto and a Mustang II, he received a
recall notice from Ford concerning only the problems present in the Pinto. Id.
at 337. The plaintiff inquired about the Mustang II, but was assured by the deal-
ership that the Mustang did not have the same problems as the Pinto. Id.; see also
Wolmer v. Chrysler Corp., 474 So. 2d 834, 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (find-
ing that Chrysler knew from its own crash tests that its 1977 Plymouth Volare
station wagon posed a serious risk of gas tank explosion due to two design de-
fects in fuel tank system, but that Chrysler had nonetheless marketed vehicle
without modification or warning to consumers), quashed, 499 So. 2d 823 (Fla.
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des knowing that the design of the brake system posed a high risk
of total brake failure.84 Another marketed a small, insubstantial
vehicle that its own testing indicated was rendered particularly
dangerous by specific, easy to correct design flaws.8 5 One manu-
facturer chose material for a gear shift knob that it knew would
deteriorate, thereby posing a risk of passengers being impaled on
the gear shift lever during accidents or collisions.8 6 Another
manufacturer consciously terminated a testing program on auto
roll-over protection even though it knew that at least one of its
models posed a risk of serious injury or death because of inade-
1986); Toyota Motor Co. v. Moll, 438 So. 2d 192, 194-95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (finding that Toyota knew as early as 1966 that fuel system still used in its
1973 Corona posed threat of serious injury and that by 1973 Toyota had elimi-
nated those features in every model except the Corona, yet Toyota offered no
explanation why it had not made similar changes in 1973 Corona); Foster v.
American Motors Corp., No. Civ.A. 86-1434, 1988 WL 48055 (Wash. Ct. App.
1988) (finding that AMC's own crash tests indicated serious problems with fuel
tank system in 1971 Gremlin, but AMC made no changes in system and gave no
warnings to consumers for more than five years after learning about problem),
aff'd, 423 N.W.2d 881 (Wash. 1988). A Dateline NBC broadcast indicated that
General Motors marketed trucks containing gas tanks located outside of the
frame rail despite the fact that their own safety tests showed that "in fatal fire
side collisions, the fire rates for GMC/CK pickup trucks are generally higher
than other pickup trucks." Dateline NBC. Waiting to Explode? (NBC television
broadcast, Nov. 11, 1992). The rates were actually twice as high. Id. Clarence
Ditlow, Executive Director of the Center for Auto Safety, said, "these pickups
are rolling firebombs. They're the worst fire hazard we have seen in our history
as an auto safety group." Id. In a recent case against General Motors involving
these combustible trucks, ajury awarded a plaintiff $105 million dollars. Martin
Tolchin, G.M. Pickup Case Is Taken over by the Secretary of Transportation, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 19, 1993, at A18.
84. Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 185 Cal. Rptr. 654, 661-63 (Cal. 1982), cert.
dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983). Although Ford knew of the serious brake prob-
lem present in its 1966 Lincoln Continental, and had even recalled all 1965
models for the same problem, it failed to warn owners of the problem or issue a
recall for the 1966 model, lId One of the reasons behind Ford's decision not to
inform owners was that it had been advertising the 1966 model as virtually main-
tenance free. Id. at 663. Despite Ford's concerns, a relatively simple and inex-
pensive solution was available and, in fact, was incorporated in the 1967 model
Lincoln Continental. Id. at 661.
85. Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 653-55 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). The Dorsey court stated that Honda knew from pre-
marketing crash tests that its 1971 Honda AN 600 presented specific, serious
risks to front passengers. Id. Nonetheless, Honda ignored recommendations
from an independent testing company to correct the problems before marketing
the vehicle. Id.
86. Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d 173, 187-88 (S.C. 1969). In Mickle,
Ford chose a white plastic material for the gear shift ball on its 1949 models
knowing both that the plastic would deteriorate in sunlight-exposing passen-
gers to the danger of being impaled on the gear shift-and that there was a black
material available that would not deteriorate under such conditions. Id. In fact,
Ford used the safer, more durable black material in its 1950 models. Id.
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quate roof supports. 87 General Motors was aware of a flawed
computer chip in a 1988 Chevrolet truck even before marketing
the vehicle, yet it neglected to change the chip or warn drivers of
the potential problem created by the flaw-sudden engine fail-
ure.88 Volkswagen AG designed the front seats of its 1971 Beetle
without utilizing "readily available and inexpensive technology"
that would have prevented the seats from hurling front passen-
gers into the back seat upon severe impact.89 In a case involving
allegations that Jeeps tended to roll over and were improperly
equipped with an inadequate roll bar, the court found there to be
a question of fact whether American Motors had known of the
alleged defects for more than ten years and had fraudulently con-
cealed the information from the public.90 The Chrysler Corpora-
tion ignored available, relatively inexpensive technology in
designing the frame of its 1974 Dodge Monaco; as constructed,
the frame exposed drivers to a risk of serious injury upon side
impact.9 ' A manufacturer of semi-trailers failed to provide a
mechanism for limiting the movement of meat hanging in refrig-
87. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. Ct. App.
1974). In Turner, a GM test engineer suggested that a roll-bar could be incorpo-
rated into the design of the 1969 Chevrolet Impala "hardtop sedan." Id. The
engineer stated that the safety precaution could be implemented relatively inex-
pensively, but advised the company that it could not pass on the cost to consum-
ers because it could not charge consumers for safety devices they could not see.
Id. In addition to Chevrolet's actions, there was evidence that the entire auto
industry was similarly culpable. Id. at 507.
88. General Motors Corp. v.Johnston, 592 So. 2d 1054, 1060 (Ala. 1992).
InJohnston, GM's failure to warn consumers about a faulty computer chip and its
failure to issue a recall saved approximately $42 million-600,000 vehicles at
roughly $70 per vehicle. Id at 1061. Instead of announcing a recall, GM silently
notified dealers to replace the computer chip only after customer complaints
directly implicated the chip. Id.
89. Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 591 A.2d 966, 970-71 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1991) (stating that Volkswagen also knew that wearing seatbelt would
mitigate "ejection" effect but failed to advise front passengers to wear them).
90. Anson v. American Motors Corp., 747 P.2d 581, 582, 586, 589 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1987) (involving tests and studies allegedly indicating that American
Motors knew of two defects in its Jeep CJ, but allegedly continued to represent
vehicle as rugged and safe, and never warned public of vehicle's design risks).
91. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 954, 958 (3d. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). The Monaco design featured a frame that was not
continuous along the sides. Id. at 958. Thus, the driver had no protection from
side impact. Id. Chrysler's rationale for exposing drivers to this risk was appar-
ently to reduce the car's weight by 200 to 250 pounds, and to reduce costs by
approximately $300 per vehicle. Id. Similarly, against the advice of two high-
level managers, General Motors used a "wasp-waisted" frame that created a sim-
ilar risk to passengers riding in 1958 models. RALPH NADER & WILLIAM TAYLOR,
THE BiG Boys: POWER AND POSrrION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 71 (1986). General
Motors learned of numerous serious injuries caused by the design and corrected
the defect in its 1961 models. Id at 72.
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erated trailers despite industry-wide knowledge that such trailers
were especially unstable on the highways. 92 A bus manufacturer
failed to place a handhold within reaching distance of one of the
forward-facing seats; a passenger in that seat could therefore not
secure him or herself in the event of sharp turns or sudden
stops.98 Finally, Honda's own testing-which occurred almost 10
years before a user of a Honda motorcycle was injured-indicated
the safety value of protective bars on motorcycles, yet Honda




Instances where corporate decisions have perpetuated design
risks-despite knowledge of those risks-that resulted in personal
injuries are especially flagrant in the field of intrauterine devices
(IUDs). The sad history of choices made by IUD manufacturers
despite knowledge of risks inherent in their products is docu-
mented in thousands of lawsuits.95 The majority of this litigation,
however, has been against one manufacturer-A.H. Robins Com-
92. Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139, 1143-45 (5th Cir. 1978)
(noting that defendant's expert conceded both seriousness of risk posed by un-
restricted movement of hanging meat and feasibility of restricting such
movement).
93. Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 895-99 (Cal.
1982) (finding that plaintiff's unrebutted testimony that lack of any handhold or
handrail within her reach caused her to be propelled from her seat satisfied
plaintiff's prima facie burden in strict design liability case). Contra McClellan v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 340 N.E.2d 61, 63 (I1. App. Ct. 1975) (holding that testi-
mony of passengers injured on bus lacking similar handrail was insufficient to
prove any design defect).
94. Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Colo. 1987).
Although Honda did not incorporate protective bars on motorcycles manufac-
tured and sold commercially in the United States, it did offer optional "bump-
ers" on motorcycles sold to police agencies in Japan. Id. at 1242 n.4. The
optional "bumpers" consisted of tubular steel pipes attached to the frames of
motorcycles. Id.
95. See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 196-97 (Colo. 1984) (find-
ing that manufacturer's own test revealed risk of deadly infection inherent in
design of intrauterine device, but manufacturer continued to market product
despite such knowledge); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1240 (Kan.
1987) (finding that manufacturer of intrauterine device marketed it knowing that
string attached to device could cause life-threatening infections to users because
of wicking problem). For a more complete history of the process by which the
A.H. Robins Company deliberately misled the medical profession, the FDA and
users of its Dalkon Shield, see MiNrrz, suPra note 53. Existing evidence suggests
that the Robins Company destroyed evidence that would have incriminated its
corporate officials. See Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1224, 1240 (involving associate cor-
porate counsel that testified he was ordered to destroy documents, but saved
approximately 10 for use as evidence).
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pany.96 Regarding this corporation's extensive and conscious dis-
regard for human life and safety, one court commented that no
court "has [ever] ... been presented with corporate misconduct
of such gravity and duration. '
97
Although A.H. Robins' fraud and misrepresentation are the
best known aspects of this infamous history, the conscious design
choice to utilize a life-threatening tail string demonstrates the
manufacturer's deliberate disregard for human life. 98 The A.H.
Robins Corporation (hereinafter Robins) purchased the Dalkon
Shield from its developers in June of 1970.99 Within days of the
purchase, and prior to marketing the device, Robins learned that
the tail string might have serious "wicking" problems that could
present a serious risk of cervical infection.' 00 Robins began to
market the shield in January of 1971 before conducting further
testing on the tail string.' 0 ' Between the time Robins first mar-
keted the device inJanuary of 1971 and the date it took the device
off the market in June of 1974, Robins' own testing, as well as
other reports, confirmed the "wicking" problem and the associ-
ated risk of cervical infection. 0 2 Nonetheless, Robins neither al-
tered the design of the string nor communicated to users or
physicians its knowledge of the risk presented to users.'
03
96. For a discussion of IUD litigation involving one particular defendant in
numerous lawsuits, see supra note 95.
97. Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1239.
98. Id. at 1221. The tail string, alternatively referred to as a withdrawal
string, is attached to the shield and "descends from the uterus through the cer-
vix and permits the user to ensure the device is in place." Id.
99. Palmer, 684 P.2d at 195. The Dalkon Corporation invented the shield in
1968; it retained all rights in the shield until 1970. Id.
100. Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1221-22; Palmer, 684 P.2d at 196. "Wicking" is a
term of art used to describe the movement of bacteria along the string from the
vagina into the uterus, thereby causing infection. Palmer, 684 P.2d at 196.
101. Palmer, 684 P.2d at 195. In fact, Robins claimed that the shield pre-
vented pregnancy "without producing any general effects on the body." Id at
195-96.
102. Id. at 196-97; Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1221-24.
103. Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1240. Robins continued to insist that the Dalkon
Shield was safe as late as October of 1984. Id. at 1221.
Although a majority of the IUD claims have been brought against Robins,
other IUD manufacturers have confronted similar cases. See, e.g., Adams v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 576 So. 2d 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). In Adams, the plaintiff
alleged that the manufacturer-G.D. Searle & Company-made a conscious
choice to subject its users to serious health risks rather than redesign the device
after it had learned of the problem and a corresponding viable solution. Id. at
729, 732-33. The Adams court reversed summary judgment on plaintiff's design
defect claim stating that the plaintiff's allegations presented a question for the
jury: did Searle know of the problem inherent in the withdrawal string of its
IUD at least two years before plaintiff used it? Id. at 734. The court determined
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3. Tampons
The tampon cases illustrate two significant types of manufac-
turer knowledge that were consciously ignored in the choice of
product design. 0 4  First, one manufacturer-International
Playtex Incorporated-disregarded studies and reports linking
toxic shock syndrome to high-absorbency tampon fibers, and in-
corporated extra high-absorbency fibers into its product.10 5 In
fact, International Playtex used a higher absorbency than was
even necessary for its own standard of extra effectiveness. 06
A second manufacturer-Johnson & Johnson Products, In-
corporated-chose to disregard clinical and scientific information
that it knew, as an expert, required further testing.10 7 Although
the company's initial testing indicated a clear need for further
study and research, it marketed the tampon before such addi-
that Searle knew of a safer alternative material for the string, and that Searle had
successfully used the safer material in another IUD. Id. at 732-33; see also
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1525-26, 1537 (D. Minn.
1989). In Kociemba, the court stated that Searle had misled physicians and users
of its IUD through misleading statements made to prescribing physicians and by
failing to include in its promotional literature information recommended by an
FDA advisory committee. l at 1526. Searle was fully aware of these FDA rec-
ommendations. Id. The court also ruled that the jury could have found that
"responsibility for this conduct was shared throughout defendant's corporate
hierarchy, and that the conduct continued for over ten years." Id. at 1537.
104. See O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1446 (10th
Cir. 1987) (finding that manufacturer knew of risks of toxic shock syndrome as-
sociated with high-absorbency fibers, but that defendant still used such mate-
rial); West v.Johnson &Johnson Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 443, 454 (Cal.
Ct. App.) (stating that manufacturer, as expert, knew or should have known of
strain of bacteria that posed risk of toxic shock syndrome, and that manufacturer
had received numerous reports of problems with its tampon but had failed to
test adequately for relationship between its high-absorbency tampon and toxic
shock), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986).
105. O'Gilvie, 821 F.2d at 1446 (stating that manufacturer emphasized extra
high-absorbency in its marketing to distinguish its product from those of its
competitors, even though it knew of increased risk it was creating and that its
competitors were reducing the absorbency level of their fibers for precisely
these safety reasons).
106. Id.
107. West, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 443-47. In West, the manufacturer continued to
market its tampon without any testing despite an increasing number of com-
plaints from users and physicians. Id. at 445. In addition, the company received
scientific information indicating that tampons caused increased bacterial activity
in the vagina, greater risk of infection and decreased ability of the body's natural
defence system to combat infection. Id. at 444-45. Despite this knowledge, the
company ignored both user complaints and scientific information. Id. at 447.
Moreover, the company still refused to perform any testing-testing that experts
indicated was essential and would have revealed the need to re-design the prod-
uct. Id
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tional measures were performed.' 08 Even after Johnson &John-
son received a large number of serious complaints from users, it
refused to conduct any further tests or follow-up studies to deter-
mine whether its tampons were related in any way to vaginal in-
fection. 109 The manufacturer deliberately chose to avoid
"knowing," in any precise or definitive way, what its own test re-
sults had preliminarily indicated-and what user complaints sub-
sequently confirmed-could be serious health risks posed by its
design choices."10
4. Television Sets
Corporate decision-makers have also perpetuated design
risks in less life threatening contexts. For example, Admiral Cor-
poration-a manufacturer of televisions-knew from its own pre-
marketing testing that its product posed a serious risk of ignit-
ing. "' The risk of fire was caused by improper insulating materi-
als within the televisions. Admiral had decided to utilize paper
and wax as insulation even though such materials were known to
be wholly unsuitable. 1 2 Admiral knew that the insulating materi-
als would be exposed to temperatures higher than the safe heat
level established by professional standards. 13 Nonetheless, even
after receiving numerous reports that Admiral's television sets
had ignited-including fires that occurred after sets had been
turned off and fires that occurred in retail showrooms-it contin-
ued to market the model without redesign." 14
108. Id. at 443-44, 448 (noting that initial testing was performed by Per-
sonal Products Company (PPC), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Johnson &
Johnson).
109. Id. at 445 (noting that between 1975 and 1980, Johnson & Johnson
received at least 150 complaints of "more serious" nature).
110. Id. at 448. For further discussion of the relationship between tampons
and serious health effects, see Mark B. Hutton et al., Tampons and Toxic Shock
Syndrome: Failure in Corporate Risk Management, TRIAL, Feb. 1988, at 54.
111. Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 105 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976). The risk of fire stemmed from Admiral's design of a
horizontal output transformer incorporated into its television sets. Id.
112. Id. at 105-06.
113. Id. (stating that safer insulating materials were available long before
Admiral had designed its defective sets, and that other manufacturers were us-
ing these safer materials in their sets).
114. Id. at 106-07. Both the Electronic Service Manager and Admiral Cor-
poration's President were aware of the problem but took no action of any kind to
remedy the situation. Id. at 106. Despite the existence of abundant knowledge
at the highest corporate levels, Admiral neither redesigned its sets nor warned
users. Id. This continued for more than nine years, during which time the de-
fect injured numerous consumers. Id. at 107.
1993] 1387
27
Tietz: Strict Products Liability, Design Defects and Corporate Decision-
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
ViLLANOVA LAW REVIEW
5. Flammable Fabrics
Corporate knowledge of design defects in flammable fabrics
encompasses two areas: (1) alternative feasible design; and (2)
the degree of flammability of specific fabrics. The first area of
corporate knowledge concerns the availability of a commercially
feasible safer fabric. In McCourt v. J C. Penney Co., 15 a child was
burned when the football jersey she was wearing ignited." 16 The
manufacturer denied that the child's jersey could have been made
from an alternative, available less flammable fabric." 7 The man-
ufacturer contended that because an alternative fabric was not
"wash and wear," it was not commercially feasible.' "I Pages from
the defendant's own catalogue, however, displayed clothing made
from the safer fabric and promoted therein as "wash and
wear." 19 Another manufacturer marketed children's pajamas
made of highly flammable cotton flannelette.120 A child wearing a
pair of the pajamas was severely injured when they caught fire and
quickly burned.' 2 ' Although flame retardant chemicals were
available during the relevant time period, the manufacturer had
not treated the pajamas with such retardants. 22 Moreover, testi-
mony showed that if fabric manufacturers had desired, they could
have applied flame retardants to their fabrics.' 23 In addition, evi-
dence was presented that British law had required the treatment
of cotton flannelette pajamas with flame retardants since the
1950S.124
The second area of corporate knowledge in which manufac-
turers have special knowledge of design defects concerns the de-
gree of flammability of specific fabrics. One authority notes that
while most fabrics are combustible, great differences exist in the
ease of ignition, rate of burning and intensity of flame.1
25 Most




119. Id. at 698.
120. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn.), cert. de-
nied sub noma., Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 449 U.S. 921 (1980).
121. Id.
122. Id
123. Id. at 731.
124. Id.
125. 3A Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 54.04[1][b] (1993) (noting additionally that, "nevertheless, well defined stan-
dard methods of testing and comparison for fabric flammability are established
which are recognized by law").
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consumers are understandably unaware of these differences.' 28
Manufacturers, however, cannot claim the same ignorance. The
court in Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp. 27 found that garment manu-
facturers were uniquely aware of the highly flammable nature of
cotton flannelette. s28 The manufacturer in Gryc maintained that
its fabric was not defective because it met federal flammability
standards.' 29 The court rejected this view, however, and found
that the federal flammability standard was at best a minimum re-
quirement formulated by the textile industry.'3 o In addition, the
manufacturer knew that unreasonably dangerous fabrics had
passed the federal flammability test in the past. 3 1 In fact, the de-
fendant manufacturer acknowledged in an intracompany memo
the danger of severe burn injuries created by the highly flamma-
ble nature of its cotton flannelette.1s 2 In the memo, a corporate
official conceded that the company was "sitting on top of a pow-
der keg as regards our flannelette being so flammable."' 3 3
6. Industrial/Heavy Equipment
The most common design defect in industrial equipment is a
lack of necessary safety features. The cases present a wide variety
of design defects, all of which could have been eliminated if the
manufacturer had utilized available, safer designs or safety fea-
tures that did not unduly interfere with operation of the equip-
ment. 13 4 Numerous examples of products lacking such safety
features are presented in cases involving: the lack of a rear view
126. Id. Textile fires injure thousands of consumers each year. Id. The
author notes, however, that, "[t]oday there is no excuse for this type of accident.
Despite the fact that natural and synthetic fibers, except for fiber glass asbestos
and certain metallic fibers, burn, they can generally be made into perfectly safe
fabrics." Id.
127. 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980).
128. Id. at 731, 739. In a similar case, a woman was burned when her night-
gown caught fire while she was leaning over a stove. Ellsworth v. Sherne Linge-
rie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 351 (Md. 1985). The nightgown manufacturer
contended that the nightgown's fabric was safe for use in adult sleepwear, de-
spite the fabric manufacturer's warning on its shipping invoice that the fabric did
not meet flammability standards for children's sleepwear. Id.
129. Giyc, 297 N.W.2d at 730.
130. Id. at 734.
131. Id. Interestingly, a pair of pajamas fabricated from newspaper passed
the Federal flammability test within an acceptable 48% margin of safety. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. For a discussion of cases involving design defects that could have been
eliminated had the manufacturer utilized safer, available designs or features, see
infra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
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mirror on an earth mover enabling the operator to see persons in
the "blind spot" to the rear and side of the machine; 3 5 the lack of
a shield over a sprocket and drive chain on a power mower; 136 the
lack of a siphon on a commercial deep fryer, the absence of which
significantly increased the risk of being severely burned while
emptying the fryer;1 37 the lack of a protective shield on a farm
conveyer; 38 the lack of a roll-over protection system on a piece of
earth moving equipment;' 3 9 the lack of a protective shield over
the buttons on a remote control box used to operate an overhead
crane;' 40 the lack of a barrier to prevent an industrial press opera-
tor's hands from entering a dangerous area of the press;' 4' the
lack of a foot pedal guard to prevent inadvertent tripping; 42 the
lack of safety guards on a paper shredder and conveyer system; 143
the lack of a safety latch or other safety feature on the footrest of
an X-ray table;' 44 and the lack of an interlock system on a heavy
duty scrap metal shear.145
Experts who design industrial equipment know how their
products are going to be used, and augment their expertise by
conducting on-site studies concerning the interaction between
workers and machinery.' 46 Although workers may garner some
knowledge about industrial equipment risks through work-place
135. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 232 (Cal. 1970).
136. South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 945
(Tex. Ct. App. 1967).
137. Exum v. General Elec. Co., 819 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
138. Calkins v. Sandven, 129 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Iowa 1964).
139. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 874-75 (Alaska 1979)
(involving manufacturer's failure to equip front-end loader with roll-over pro-
tection shield); Cremeans v. International Harvester Co., 452 N.E.2d 1281, 1282
(Ohio 1983) (reversing summary judgment and holding that case presented jury
question on whether crawler tractor was defective without roll over protection
that was feasible and would have added only $1,000 to tractor's cost); Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Wyo. 1983) (involving front-end
loader that had fiberglass cab with no roll-over protection structure).
140. Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton Co., 528 A.2d 590, 591 (Pa.
1987).
141. Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 819 (Ohio), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 857 (1982); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 573 (N.Y. 1976).
142. Knitz, 432 N.E.2d at 819.
143. Dart v. Weibe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 877 (Ariz. 1985).
144. Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 740 (Haw. 1983).
145. Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 64-65 (Neb. 1987) (find-
ing that safety device would have cost only $300 to $400 on machine that sold
for more than $200,000).
146. Shetterly v. Crown Controls Corp., 719 F. Supp. 385, 390 (W.D. Pa.
1989) (involving manufacturer that equipped its trucks with "coast control de-
vice" after observing that truck operators were altering braking system
themselves).
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experience,1 47 manufacturers-as experts-continue to have a
greater knowledge of design risks than the employees who oper-
ate the machinery.
148
Users of all the aforementioned products had little or no abil-
ity to know of the dangerous and deadly risks inherent in those
products. Despite some commentary to the contrary, it is clear
that most design risks consciously chosen by producers are not
obvious, or even accessible, to product users.
1 49
7. Other Consumer Products
A manufacturer's knowledge of design risks and its failure to
eliminate those risks despite the fact that it could do so at minimal
cost, is typical decision-making behavior with respect to a wide
variety of consumer products.' 50 One manufacturer marketed a
handgun that presented a danger of accidental discharge due to
defectively designed safety and loading notches.' 5 1 Despite "top
company official" knowledge of the defect and of previous inju-
ries suffered by other users, the manufacturer continued to mar-
ket the handgun without modifying the design.152 An alternative,
safer design would have cost only $1.93 per gun. 153
Similarly, an electric lawn mower manufacturer marketed its
mower without a "deadman's switch."' 54 The manufacturer knew
147. JAMES E. BEASLEY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE UNREASONABLY DAN-
GEROUS REQUIREMENT 88-89 (1981) ("Workmen gradually learn of the dangers
involved in the machinery they must use to make a living and come to 'expect'
[those] dangers."). For a discussion concerning the sophistication workers may
garner from operating industrial equipment, see supra notes 61-62, 68 and ac-
companying text.
148. See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1976) (noting that "it is often only the manufacturer who can fairly be said to
know and to understand when an article is suitably designed and safely made for
its intended purpose").
149. James A. Henderson, Jr.,Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious De-
sign Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1549 (1973) (stat-
ing that "risks generated by conscious choices, unlike those generated by
inadvertent design errors, are more likely to be obvious to users and consumers
of the products").
150. For a discussion of how corporate decision-making affects design risks
inherent in a variety of consumer products, see infra notes 151-66 and accompa-
nying text.
151. Sturm, Ruger & Co., v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 43 (Alaska 1979), modified,
615 P.2d 621 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
152. Id. at 47.
153. Id.
154. Burch v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 467 A.2d 615, 618 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983). A "deadman's switch" is a safety device that automatically turns off a
mower when the user releases the control mechanism. Id.
139119931
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that such a device could have been incorporated into the mower
at a cost of $5 per mower, but argued, inter alia, that the safety
advantages might be offset by consumers tying the control mecha-
nism in the "on" position.1 55
In Voss v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Company, 156 the plain-
tiff was injured by a power hand-saw containing a movable guard
that failed to meet even minimum Underwriters Laboratory safety
standards.1 57 The manufacturer easily could have met, or even
exceeded, the mandatory minimum design safety standards. 5 8 It
chose instead, however, to avoid cost increases at the expense of
potential injury to product users.
Another manufacturer advertised its steam vaporizers as
"safe... [and] practically foolproof."' 159 Despite this claim, how-
ever, the manufacturer knew that the vaporizer was not "tip-
proof" and if tipped would emit scalding hot water. 60 Prior to
plaintiff's injury, at least ten to twelve other children had been
badly burned in a similar manner. 16' Nonetheless, the manufac-
turer refused to redesign the vaporizer, despite the availability of
inexpensive alternative designs that would have prevented the
injuries. 162
In another case involving a consumer product, a plaintiff was
injured when a can of drain-cleaning product exploded in her
face. 163 The manufacturer was fully aware of the caustic. ingredi-
ents in its product, and also of the importance of controlling the
155. Id. at 619.
156. 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983).
157. Id. at 206.
158. Id.
159. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 495 (Minn. 1967).
160. Id.
161. Id. According to the McCormack court:
Defendant's officers realized that the vaporizers would be primarily
used in the treatment of children and usually would be unattended.
They had knowledge that the water in the jar got scalding hot; that this
water would cause third-degree burns on a small child; that the water in
the jar would gush out instantaneously if the unit were tipped over; that
the unit was not 'tip-proof; that the combination of the unsecured top
and the hot water in the jar was dangerous because of the possibility
that a child might tip it over during operation; and that, prior to plain-
tiff's injury, at least 10 to 12 children had been burned in this manner.
Id.
162. Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Suing For Safety, TRIAL, Nov. 1983, at 48, 49.
The manufacturer refused to implement the alternative feasible designs even
after there were more than one hundred similar claims pending with its insurer.
Id.
163. Moore v.Jewel Tea Co., 253 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969), afd,
263 N.E.2d 103 (Il1. 1970).
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pressure inside the can.'6 Nonetheless, the manufacturer used
the can that caused the injury without accurately determining its
properties or its capacity to withstand pressure.16 5 In addition,
the manufacturer had notice of prior explosions yet failed to warn
the public of the dangers involved in handling the product de-
spite the fact that it submitted such warnings to its own
employees.166
B. Rejecting Safety
1. Costs and Marketing
Although manufacturers are often aware of design risks in-
herent in their products, they consciously implement "risky" de-
signs over safer feasible alternatives.16 7 There appear to be two
primary reasons why manufacturers elect these riskier alternatives
in the face of such knowledge: (1) direct cost factors; and (2) mar-
keting strategies.1 68
Cost factors are an integral part of the design process that
producers must consider in performing their cost-benefit analy-
sis. 169 Because manufacturers are not held to an absolute stan-
164. Id. Defendants admitted using a flip-top lid-which would have acted
as a safety valve-on their other products both before and after the can in ques-
tion was manufactured, but failed to use it on the can containing the product
that injured plaintiff. Id. at 646.
165. Id. at 649.
166. Id.
167. For a discussion of design risks, see supra'notes 79-166. The purpose
of the immediate discussion is not to determine the amount of safety that produ-
cers are required to incorporate into their designs. See Owen, Problems in Assess-
ing Punitive Damages, supra note 5, at 34 ("[A]II we can fairly ask of management
and its engineers ... is that safety considerations not be deliberately excluded or
shunted far to the rear in deciding on the total design mix involved.").
Whatever courts (and juries) ultimately demand of producers by way of safety
accountability, determining the standard and the process by which to impose
that accountability must begin with an understanding of the nature of corporate
decision-making as it pertains to product design.
168. Marketing strategies comprise the sales corollary of the cost compo-
nents of product design, which together cohstitute two aspects of profit determi-
nation. For example, when Honda chose not to correct three defects inherent in
the design of its small sub-compact AN 600, it may have been responding arbi-
trarily to its perception of market demand for the car. Dorsey v. Honda Motor
Co., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981) (making decision not to alter design of auto-
mobile despite knowledge that there were feasible, safer alternative designs
available). If Honda had strengthened the weak, light-weight and defective com-
ponents, it would have added substantial weight to the car, thereby reducing its
gas mileage considerably. Id. Although safer designs would have entailed mini-
mal increases in Honda's production costs, the choice was not made to promote
cost savings; rather, the choice was made on the basis of beating the competition
with better gas mileage. Id.
169. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App.
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dard of liability, 170 courts expect a certain degree of calculated
risk in products that producers may justify on the basis of a cost-
benefit analysis.' 71 Far too often, however, producers readily ac-
cept unnecessary dangers in product design in an effort to lower
overall production costs. One of the most graphic examples of
this grossly culpable behavior is the cost-benefit analysis made by
the Ford Motor Company in the design of the Pinto. 172
1981). In Grimshaw, the court found that Ford's Pinto could have been made
relatively safe at an increased cost of approximately $15 per vehicle. Id. at 361.
Nonetheless, Ford deferred the corrective measures to save these minimal costs
and enhance profits. Id. Ford essentially discarded consumer safety in its cost-
benefit computation. Id; see also Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v.
Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974). In Howell, the plaintiff was in-
jured by an exploding pressure gage. Id. at 575. The court noted that the gage
could have been manufactured with shatterproof glass without compromising
the instrument's utility and at an increased cost of only one dollar per unit. Id.
at 577. In addition, the court found that the manufacturer could have con-
structed a safety shield around the gage at a cost of $2.50 per gage. Id Cases
such as Howell and Grimshaw indicate that, unfortunately, manufacturers do not
necessarily weigh consumer risks heavily in their cost-benefit calculations.
170. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or.
1974) ("No one wants absolute liability where all the article has to do is to cause
injury."); see also Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 456 (Cal. 1978) ("[W]e
believe that the test for defective design ... subjects a manufacturer to liability
... while stopping short of making the manufacturer an insurer for all injuries
.... "); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1024 (Pa. 1978) ("While
this expansion of the supplier's responsibility ... has placed the supplier in the
role of a guarantor of his product's safety, it was not intended to make him an
insurer of all injuries caused by the product.").
171. See Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1038. According to the Phillips court:
The manner of injury may be so fortuitous and the chances of injury
occurring so remote that it is reasonable to sell the product despite the
danger. In design cases the utility of the article may be so great, and
the change of design necessary to alleviate the danger in question may
so impair such utility, that it is reasonable to market the product as it is,
even though the possibility of injury exists and was realized at the time
of the sale.
Id.
172. See Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360. The design of the Ford Pinto also
presented a significant marketing dilemma not directly related to Ford's cost
analysis of the gas tank design/location problem. Id. The Pinto was a "rush"
project so that "styling preceded engineering and dictated engineering design
to a greater degree than usual." Id at 360. Ford was especially concerned about
challenging the foreign competition in the small car market. Id.; see also Dorsey
v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1981) (involving manufac-
turer of small, lightweight automobile that exported its cars to meet demand for
low-priced, economical car in spite of negative test results); FPANCIs T. CULLEN
ET AL., CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK 159-60 (1987) (discussing how Ford
moved quickly to market Pinto before Volkswagen and Japanese manufacturers
monopolized small-car market). Thus, Ford was determined to get the Pinto on
the market as soon as possible. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360. The merger of
marketing and cost factors was evident in the choice not to add protective mem-
bers around the gas tank. Id. at 361. Ford had arbitrarily determined that the
car would weigh no more than 2,000 pounds. Id. Once the car had been
34
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Ford knew from its own pre-marketing testing that the Pinto
gas tank was subject to two serious problems upon rear impact.
17 3
First, the gas tank neck was susceptible to being torn away and
causing gasoline to spill.174 Second, the gas tank was susceptible
to being propelled forward against the differential housing, where
protruding bolts could rupture the tank and cause gasoline to
spill. 175 Before Ford commenced production of the Pinto, it knew
the exact cost of several inexpensive remedies to each of the de-
sign hazards.1 76 One commentator has asserted that for a total of
$5.08 per car, Ford could have altered the Pinto's design to
render it reasonably safe.1 77
In an internal Ford memorandum ruled inadmissible during
the Grimshaw trial, Ford made cost-benefit calculations concerning
gas tank integrity in roll-over situations. 78 Using the number of
anticipated deaths and injuries that would occur over the ex-
designed-before preliminary engineering studies had been performed-adding
"fixes" to the fuel tank might have increased the weight above the arbitrary
2,000 pound limit. Id. at 360; see also Frank Camps, Warning an Auto Company
About an Unsafe Design, in WHISTLE-BLOWINGI 119, 120 (Alan F. Westin ed., 1981)
(stating that former Ford design and test engineer asserted that because of arbi-
trary 2,000 pound and $2,000 limits applied to design of Ford's Pinto, manage-
ment would not allow correction of design deficiencies revealed by testing).
173. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360; CULLEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 161.
According to Cullen, internal company documents revealed that "Ford has
crash-tested the Pinto at a top-secret site more than 40 times and... every test
made over 25 mph without special structural alteration of the car has resulted in
a ruptured fuel tank." CULLEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 161. Cullen also noted
that eight of these tests were performed prior to actual marketing of the Pinto.
Id.
174. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360; CULLEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 161
(noting that "all that was needed to ignite the fuel and to create an inferno was a
spark from steel against steel or from steel against pavement").
175. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360; CULLEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 161
(noting again that only spark was needed to ignite spilled gasoline).
176. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61. Ford had calculated what each of
the design "fixes" would cost. Id. at 361. One modification that would have
enhanced the integrity of the fuel tank system would have cost as little as $1.80,
while the most expensive single "fix" would have cost only $9.95. Id. In all
likelihood, however, one single "fix" alone would not have eliminated the
Pinto's problems. Id. Rather, a package of "fixes" costing approximately $15.30
would have made the tank safe in a 34-38 mile per hour rear end collision with a
much larger vehicle. Id. As marketed, however, the Pinto's fuel tank would not
withstand a similar collision occurring at only 20 miles per hour. Id
177. For a discussion of the costs that Ford would have incurred if it had
redesigned the Pinto to accommodate safety concerns, see CULLEN ET AL., supra
note 172, at 162 (noting that Ford knew that lining gas tank of Pinto with rubber
bladder would have cost only $5.08 per car).
178. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 840-41. The memorandum re-
lated to fuel tank integrity during situational roll-overs rather than during rear
end collisions. Id.; see also CULLEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 162-63 (including
chart, relating to leakage in fuel systems during automobile roll-over, that Ford
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pected life of the models involved, Ford calculated the total
amount of liability it expected to incur. Ford then compared that
total with the net savings that would be generated, at eleven dol-
lars per car, by not correcting the hazard. Its total savings would
have been almost ninety million dollars. 179 There was testimony
in Grimshaw that Ford made similar cost-benefit calculations re-
garding the Pinto gas tank rupturing in rear-end collisions. 80 To
reduce costs, Ford never corrected the problem until it issued a
major recall in May, 1978, at least seven years after it first learned
of the hazards. 181
Despite the dramatic illustrations provided by the memo-
randa surrounding the Pinto design, the Ford Motor Company is
not unique among auto manufacturers in failing to weigh passen-
ger safety adequately in cost-benefit calculations. 182 Nor is the
used to lobby against more stringent federal fuel-leakage standards); Schwartz,
Pinto Case, supra note 65, at 1021.
179. See CULLEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 162-63; KEETON ET AL., supra note
31, at 840-41; Schwartz, Pinto Case, supra note 65, at 1020.
180. Grinshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62 (discussing testimony suggesting
that management decided to proceed with marketing of Pinto despite knowledge
of defects in fuel tank system).
181. STUART L. HILLS, CORPORATE VIOLENCE: INJURY AND DEATH FOR
PROFIT 27 (1987) (stating that "[s]eventy or more people [would have burned]
to death in those cars every year for many years to come" if Ford had not issued
recall in 1978). For further discussion of the Ford Pinto cases, see HILLS, supra,
at 28-29; CULLEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 165-66; KEETON ET AL., supra note 31,
at 840-41; Schwartz, Pinto Case, supra note 65, at 1028-33.
182. HILLS, supra note 181, at 29 (stating that "Ford was just the only com-
pany careless enough to let such an embarrassing calculation slip into public
records"); Schwartz, Pinto Case, supra note 65, at 1028 (stating that other car
manufacturers besides Ford created same or similar fuel tank defects in their
small cars). For a discussion concerning defects in other consumer products,
see supra notes 150-66 and accompanying text.
In reviewing Ford's appeal on the award of punitive damages to the plain-
tiff, the Grimshaw court examined several corporate memoranda admitted into
evidence by the trial court. Grimrshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361. The records in-
cluded reports-such as crash test results showing the vulnerability of the
Pinto's fuel tank design-that were forwarded up the corporate chain of com-
mand. Id. Another memo reported on design changes that were needed to meet
anticipated federal standards on fuel system integrity and on the cost savings
associated with the deferral of such changes. Id. at 361-62. The court found
that one could reasonably infer that Ford deferred corrective measures to.save
money and enhance corporate profits. Id. at 370. A document called the Chiara
memorandum detailed the costs of two safer fuel tank designs, one at an esti-
mated cost of ten dollars per car, and the other at an estimated cost of five dol-
lars per car. Id. In addition, a memorandum containing arguably the most
dramatic information-the Grush Saunby report-was excluded from evidence.
Id. at 376. The Grush Saunby report documented Ford's cost-benefit analysis
based on vehicle roll-over, not on rear-end collision. Id. The report is a harsh
reminder of the starkest balancing of human lives against corporate profits. Id.
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auto industry unique among producers in general.183 Courts rec-
ognize that many, if not most, design choices require safety trade-
offs in light of cost factors.18 4 Such trade-offs and their accompa-
nying risks, however, are made unilaterally by producers. More-
over, users are not participants in the creation of product risks,
and rarely have any of the knowledge required to cope with such
risks.
Producers also create design risks by means of marketing
choices that are not, at least directly, cost-based.18 5 Ford chose a
white plastic material for a gear shift knob when it knew that such
material was subject to potentially dangerous deterioration not
readily apparent to users of the vehicle.186 It is apparent that
Ford's decision to use the white plastic was not directly cost-
driven because a black material that did not deteriorate under the
same conditions was available at an equivalent cost.'8 7 The evi-
dence produced at trial suggested that the plaintiff would have
sustained less severe injuries had the protective knob not shat-
tered. s88 Nonetheless, the court never articulated Ford's reasons
for choosing the white as opposed to black material. One can
speculate, however, that the choice was made for a reason other
than the cost of materials-most likely for marketing purposes.
Similarly, marketing pressures, having little to do with direct
cost savings, were apparently the reason why the A.H. Robins
Company decided not to conduct necessary testing and studies on
its IUDs; such pressures also drove the company's decision not to
replace the Dalkon Shield's defective tailstring prior to placing
183. See HILLS, supra note 181, at 6 (discussing other industries that have
made cost-benefit analyses similar to those made by automobile industry). For a
more detailed discussion of specific industries that have made conscious design
decisions against safety concerns, see supra notes 95-149 and accompanying text.
184. For a discussion of the effects of costs and marketing on design
choices, see supra, note 167-68 and accompanying text.
185. For a discussion of the effects of costs and marketing on design
choices, see supra note 167-68 and accompanying text.
186. Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d 173, 188 (S.C. 1969). The gear shift
knob deteriorated via gradual hairline cracks that destroyed its protective qual-
ity, thereby subjecting passengers to the risk of being impaled on the gear shift
lever during collisions. Id. Even assuming a user would notice the hairline
cracks, the court noted that he or she would not necessarily appreciate the grav-
ity of the safety hazard. Id.
187. Id. at 187-88. For reasons not apparent and unrelated to the instant
lawsuit, Ford substituted the alternative black material for the white material in
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the product on the market.' 8 9 Robins treated the marketing of
the Dalkon Shield as a rush project and decided to move ahead
quickly. 190 In the process, Robins ignored the warnings of two
company physicians that the product was not nearly as effective as
it had been reported. 191 Even after Robins' own testing verified
the "wicking" problem inherent in the tailstring and the obvious
risk of intrauterine infection, Robins' director of pharmaceutical
research determined that no alterations would be made to the
shield. 192
Competition and related marketing strategies were also the
major factors driving the Honda Motor Company's design choices
concerning its Honda AN 600.'93 The AN 600 was a small, light-
weight automobile that achieved excellent gas mileage. 194 It was
designed to meet societal demand for a low-priced, economical
car.195 Honda's marketing strategy was revealed in part by its
189. Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 730 P.2d 1210, 1217 (Kan. 1987). "[T]he
total costs for labor, overhead, materials, and freight amounted to only $.30 for
each Dalkon Shield." ld. The Shield was to be sold for $4.35 per unit. Id. Sub-
stituting a different tailstring, like the one used on other IUDs at the time, could
not conceivably have added significantly to the cost of the Dalkon Shield.
Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 195 (Colo. 1984). Of course, pre-
marketing testing and other studies could have increased the cost per IUD. Id.
Robins knew, however, exactly where to focus its research. Id. Before market-
ing its IUD, Robins knew that its tail string was a likely cause of infection in the
female reproductive system. Id. at 196. Its own data collection later verified that
the vast preponderance of septic abortions caused by reproductive infections in
all IUD users were caused by the Dalkon Shield. Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1219;
Palmer, 684 P.2d at 199-200.
190. Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1217. An intra-office memo filed by a Robins phy-
sician noted that the company taking the Dalkon Shield must act quickly and
"distribute much merchandise and really make an inroad in 'the next [eight]
months.'" Id. The physician was concerned that other manufacturers might
have been working on improvements for their intrauterine devices. Id. Three
days after the memo was filed, A.H. Robins purchased the rights to the Dalkon
Shield. Jd.
191. Id Despite the warnings from two physicians at Robins concerning
the falsity of the 1.1 % pregnancy rate asserted by the developer of the Dalkon
Shield, Robins touted the shield's pregnancy rate as 1.1 % during its entire pe-
riod on the market. Id. at 1217, 1240. In addition, neither of two intracompany
memos warning that the pregnancy rate claim was false were "revealed to those
Robins' personnel responsible for marketing the shield." Palmer, 684 P.2d at
195.
192. Palmer, 684 P.2d at 196. For a discussion of the "wicking" problem
and intrauterine infection, see supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
193. Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1981). For a
discussion of the effects of costs and marketing on design choices, see supra, note
167-68 and accompanying text.
194. Dorsey, 655 F.2d at 652.
195. Id. Plaintiff testified at trial that he had in fact chosen the Honda AN
600 because it was economical and offered exceptional gas mileage. Id. at 653.
1398 [Vol. 38: p. 1361
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posture at trial. 19 6 It argued that the purchaser of a small car can-
not "complain if he [or she] is injured as a consequence of the
design characteristic-small size-that he [or she] sought." 197
Evidence presented at trial, however, suggested several defective
aspects of the car not related to the vehicle's small size but still
related to Honda's marketing strategy. 198 Honda could have uti-
lized stronger materials in the roof-support pillars, the seat as-
sembly system and the seat belt without changing the size of the
vehicle in any manner. 199 Admittedly, however, two of these
changes presumably would have added weight to the car and re-
duced its gas mileage.200 Thus, similar to Ford's actions concern-
ing the Pinto, Honda consciously disregarded safety to further its
marketing plan.
20'
196. Id. at 654.
197. Id. The trialjudge was persuaded by this argument, at least with re-
spect to punitive damages, and granted judgment n.o.v. for Honda on the puni-
tive damages award. Id. The court of appeals disagreed, however, and found
that the record presented an adequate basis upon which the jury could find that
Honda committed a willful breach of its duty to plaintiff regarding several partic-
ular design choices other than its decision to create a small vehicle. Id. at 655,
657.
198. Id. at 655. The court ruled that there was evidence to support a find-
ing of defective seat assembly, of a weak and defective pillar separating the wind-
shield from the driver's window, and of an overly elastic and hence defective
seatbelt design. Id
199. Id. at 654-655.
200. Id. at 653. The AN 600 weighed approximately 1,356 pounds. Id.
Compare this to the weight of the Ford Pinto, which was approximately 2,000
pounds. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 360 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981). Presumably, Honda could have used stronger seat belt material without
adding any noticeable weight to the AN 600.
Honda's own pre-marketing testing revealed the hazards posed by the weak
roof-support pillar. Dorsey, 655 F.2d at 653. Despite this information, Honda
ignored the test results and an employee's recommendation to eliminate the
danger. Id. Plaintiff's experts, however, testified that it was possible to
strengthen the vehicle, as Honda's employee had recommended, without enlarg-
ing the size of the car. Id. at 654.
201. See Dorsey, 655 F.2d at 653; Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360; see aso
Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 650 P.2d 1171 (Cal. 1982). Hasson provides another
dramatic example of a situation in which a producer made marketing decisions
to the detriment of safety concerns. Id. at 1180. In Hasson, evidence indicated
that Ford was aware of serious problems with the braking on its 1966 Lincoln
Continental. Id. In addition, trial testimony indicated that Ford had adopted a
marketing strategy for the Lincoln Continental that included advertising that the
car was substantially service-free. Id. As a consequence, Ford refused both to
warn about the defect and to correct the problem by means of an available modi-
fication to the system. Id. Modifying the system would have required a recall,
which would have undermined the advertising image of a service-free vehicle.
Id. Subsequently, for the model year 1967, Ford made the modified braking
system standard equipment on the Continental. Id. at 1178. Ford had known of
the problem since at least 1965, when it issued a recall on the 1965 model in
order to make the necessary corrections. Id.
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Oldsmobile has also made safety trade-offs in favor of pursu-
ing established marketing plans.20 2 At one time, Oldsmobile
used a sharply-pointed hood ornament-the well-known Oldsmo-
bile rocket-as a company logo and source of valuable commer-
cial identification.2 03  Safety-conscious managers expressed
concerns that the ornaments were at just the right height to put
out a child's eye.20 4 Nonetheless, Oldsmobile continued to utilize
the sharp pointed object as a hood ornament on its
automobiles. 20 5 The company allegedly redesigned the ornament
only under the threat of safety legislation. 20 6
2. Resistance to Safety
Cost analyses and marketing factors are the more obvious,
and presumptively rational, reasons why producers consciously
choose product risks over design safety. In addition to these ra-
tional factors, however, there also appears to be an irrational
component driving corporate resistance to safety.20 7 Corpora-
202. For a detailed discussion concerning the safety trade-offs made by
Oldsmobile, see NADER & TAYLOR, supra note 91, at 72.
203. For further discussion of Oldsmobile's decision to utilize the rocket as
a hood ornament despite the danger it presented, see NADER & TAYLOR, supra
note 91, at 72.
204. For further discussion of the safety concerns expressed by Oldsmobile
managers, see NADER & TAYLOR, supra note 91, at 72.
205. For further discussion of Oldsmobile's refusal to mitigate the dangers
presented by its hood ornament, see NADER & TAYLOR, supra note 91, at 72.
206. For further discussion of why Oldsmobile eventually decided to alter
the design of its dangerous hood ornament, see NADER & TAYLOR, supra note 91,
at 72-73.
207. The previously discussed cases suggest that manufacturers chose
product risks over readily available, feasible, safer designs solely in order to save
production costs with little or no consideration given to avoiding reasonably
certain future liability costs. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984);
Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987); McCormack v. Hank-
scraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967). For further discussion of these cases,
see supra notes 95-103, 159-166 and accompanying text. This behavior contra-
dicts the common wisdom about manufacturer behavior that is embodied in
Judge Hand's formula set forth in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169, 173 (2d. Cir. 1947). Judge Hand's formula traditionally assumes that man-
ufacturers will invest in safety up to the point at which the incremental safety
costs equal the resulting savings of future liability costs. See James A. Hender-
son, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Ra-
tionality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 765, 766 (1983) (exploring question of whether
liability system discourages manufacturers from reaching socially optimal deci-
sions regarding product safety because such decisions expose corp orate man-
agement and their companies to greater liability than suboptimal decisions).
This arguably irrational decision-making, however, may have a rational explana-
tion. Corporate managers may believe that the so-called "reasonably certain fu-
ture liability costs" can be defeated either by the litigation process-on the
1400 [Vol. 38: p. 1361
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tions tend to view the notion of safety, separate from considera-
tions of specific safety costs, as incompatible with their quest for
profits. 208 Managers reject safety even before considering the
"larger picture. ' 20 9 There is ample evidence suggesting that cor-
porations instinctively oppose new safety devices rather than at-
tempt to incorporate them into their cost and marketing
schemes. 210 General Motors apparently tried to thwart or delay
the requirement of rear window stoplamps despite studies by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration indicating that
the lamps could sharply reduce rear-end accidents.211 General
Motors allegedly even committed "serious research funds" in an
merits or procedurally--or at least postponed long enough so that the short-
term use of funds saved is greater than the long-term inflated monetary cost of
liability obligations. For further discussion of these potential rationales, see in-
fra notes 394-96 and accompanying text.
208. See DAVID R. SIMON & D. STANLEY ErrZEN, ELITE DEVIANCE 239 (1986).
There appears to be a mentality among corporate leaders that any corporate
goals other than maximizing profits will destroy industry and society along with
it. Id. According to economist Milton Friedman: "Few trends could so thor-
oughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by
corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money
for their stockholders as possible." Id.
209. See HILLS, supra note 181, at 190-91. According to Hills: "Although
large corporations may have other goals-enhanced prestige and power, in-
creased market shares, product diversification into potentially competing indus-
tries, growth and stability, or other short-range goals-the long-run profitability
of the corporation is ultimately the most basic and over-riding goal." Id. at 190.
Alfred P. Sloan, former president of General Motors, responded to a request by
the Dupont Corporation to use safety glass in G.M. cars by stating:
I am trying to protect the interest of stockholders of General Motors
and the corporation's operating position-it is not my responsibility to
sell safety glass .... You can say perhaps that I am selfish, but business
is selfish. We are not a charitable institution-we are trying to make a
profit for our stockholders.
JAMES W. COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE 40 (1985). This statement reflects the
general corporate attitude toward safety. It is not possible to know whether Mr.
Sloan gave any thought to promoting safety by incorporating safety glass in
G.M. automobiles, but it is likely that he did not. Unfortunately, the attitude
that "safety doesn't sell" is fairly prevalent among producers. HILLS, supra note
181, at 191 (noting that this conviction has needlessly destroyed countless lives
through death and crippling injuries); see also CULLEN ET AL., supra note 172, at
158 (statement of Lee Iacocca to then President Nixon on Watergate Tapes indi-
cating that he doesn't believe public is interested in auto safety).
210. HILLS, supra note 181, at 191 (noting that "in some instances [manu-
facturers actually have] lobbied to prevent safety regulations that threatened
corporate profits"); see also CULLEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 155-59 (discussing
conversation between then President Nixon, Henry Ford II and Lee Iacocca in
which latter two auto executives attempted to persuade Mr. Nixon to support
their opposition to auto safety generally).
211. For further discussion concerning GM's attempt to prevent regula-
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attempt to disprove the efficacy of the lamps. 212 General Motors'
resistance to mandated safety is also well-documented in the de-
velopment of passenger air bags. Despite being an early leader in
air bag research and technology, General Motors steadfastly op-
posed federal airbag requirements when other manufacturers,
and safety and insurance organizations, were encouraging their
development and use.213 When the Reagan administration indi-
cated generally its hostility toward federal regulation, General
Motors discontinued its air bag development project despite ear-
lier assertions by a president of General Motors that all 1975
General Motors passenger vehicles could have been equipped
with air bags.
21 4
There is further evidence of General Motors' early opposi-
tion to automobile safety in general. In the mid 1950s, Ford de-
cided to market a safety package in its cars. General Motors not
only refused to offer its own competitive safety package, but pres-
sured Ford to cease its safety marketing. 21 5 Similarly, Ford Motor
Company successfully blocked for seven years the effective date of
a federal standard that regulated fire safety in motor vehicles dur-
ing front and rear end collisions.
21 6
Outside of the automobile manufacturing context, corporate
resistance to safety is also evident in the production of consumer
goods. For example, the Hankscraft Company strongly resisted
212. For further discussion of the steps taken by GM to disprove the effi-
cacy of rear window stoplamps, see NADER & TAYLOR, supra note 91, at 110.
213. NADER & TAYLOR, supra note 91, at 136. While General Motors was
opposing air bag deployment, three of its own internal consumer polls indicated
very strong consumer demand for air bags even though consumers were aware
of their cost. Id.
214. Id. at 137-41. H. Ross Perot, a board member of General Motors dur-
ing the air bag development era, charged that "[a]t GM board of directors meet-
ings, we never discussed safety as a safety problem. It was always discussed as a
legal problem. To hear Smith on the air-bag thing was nauseating." Id at 507.
215. MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 259
(1980) (noting that in 1956 Ford sold approximately 200,000 more automobiles
because of its optional safety package, but that General Motors successfully
pressured Ford into dropping its safety-based advertising scheme within six
months).
216. See HILLS, supra note 181, at 22-26 (examining means Ford used to
stall implementation of fire safety standard). Re-tooling the Ford Pinto to meet
the proposed standard would have cost $2,000,000. Id. at 23. Ford knew of the
problem before marketing the Pinto and also knew that inexpensive modifica-
tions to the original design would have solved the problem. Id. The original
design could have included the modifications at little additional cost. Id. For a
more detailed discussion concerning the Ford Pinto cases, see supra notes 83,
172-81 and accompanying text.
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safety recommendations concerning its steam vaporizer. 21 7
Hankscraft's liability insurance carrier suggested that it imple-
ment a simple and inexpensive redesign to its vaporizer, a prod-
uct that was obviously and dangerously defective.218 The
insurance carrier made this recommendation at a time when more
than 100 personal injury claims were pending against Hank-
scraft.2 19 Nonetheless, Hankscraft refused, the carrier eventually
canceled the coverage, and Hankscraft subsequently redesigned
the product.220
3. Accountability
Corporate resistance to safety is substantially due to the ab-
sence of a sense of social accountability. As Blackstone observed,
corporations have no souls. 2 2 1 If this is true, then perhaps it is
unreasonable to expect corporations to act as responsibly-and
be held as socially accountable-as individual persons. 222 Ac-
cording to economist Milton Friedman, the business corporation
has one and only one social responsibility: to make as much
money for shareholders as possible. 223 To be fair to Professor
217. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967).
218. Lambert, supra note 162, at 49 (stating that Hankscraft, "with icy indif-
ference to the serious risks to infant users of its household product, refused to
take its liability carrier's advice to recall and redesign its loose-lidded
vaporizer").
219. For a more detailed discussion of the grossly culpable conduct exhib-
ited by Hankscraft in regard to its steam vaporizer, see Lambert, supra note 162,
at 49.
220. Lambert, supra note 162, at 49 (stating that only after insurance com-
pany refused to continue coverage "did Hankscraft stir itself to redeem and cor-
rect the faulty design of its product"); see also Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741
P.2d 1240, 1242-43 (Colo. 1987) (stating that Honda's own testing and research
informed its engineers of simple, relatively inexpensive safety feature Honda
failed to use on its motorcycles, and that Honda asserted that obviousness of
danger superseded any obligation it had to make products reasonably safe); The
National Commission on Product Safety, 1970: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 23-89 (1970) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (final re-
port presented to President and Congress finding need for federal role in
development and execution of methods to protect American consumer).
221. RUSSELL B. STEVENSON, CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION xi (1980)
(citing BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 477 (9th ed. 1783)).
222. See William Hazlitt, On Corporate Bodies, in THE BIG Boys: POWER AND
PosrToN IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 516 (Ralph Nader & William Taylor eds.,
1986). In an essay composed in 1824, William Hazlitt stated that "[c]orporate
bodies are more corrupt and profligate than individuals, because they have more
power to do mischief, and are less amenable to disgrace or punishment. They
feel neither shame, remorse, gratitude, nor good-will." Id.
223. See SIMON & ErrZEN, supra note 208, at 239. According to Milton
Friedman:
There is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its
19931 1403
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Friedman, however, his exhortation to corporations to maximize
profits is accompanied by a caveat to observe the "rules of the
game" and to not engage in deception or fraud. 224 Nonetheless,
the "rules of the game" are frequently not observed in the con-
text of design defects. 225
Why corporations act with insufficient safety accountability
may be explained in part by the difference between individual and
corporate notions of responsibility. 226 Persons who as individuals
recognize fundamental responsibility in a particular situation
seem to have little difficulty ignoring that sense of responsibility
when they encounter the same situation as a corporate represen-
tative.2 27 The pressures on corporate decision-makers to maxi-
mize profits play a major role in their decision to engage in
behavior that they as non-corporate individuals would find repre-
hensible. 228 This "double persona" of corporate decision-makers
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so
long as it stays within the rules of the game ... [and] engages in open
and free competition, without deception or fraud .... Few trends could
so thoroughly undermine the very foundation of our free society as the
acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to
make as much money for their stockholders as possible.Id.
224. Id.
225. Because Professor Friedman's concept of the "rules of the game" in-
cludes a prohibition against deception, it would appear that when a manufac-
turer markets a product with knowledge both of its dangerous design and of the
likelihood that the user will not know or discover such danger, the manufacturer
has violated the prohibition against deception. For a discussion of numerous
design defect cases where manufacturers have violated this prohibition, see supra
notes 82-166 and accompanying text. For further discussion of Professor Fried-
man's views, see supra note 223.
226. Russell B. Stevenson, Corporations and Social Responsibility: In Search of
the Corporate Soul, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 709, 716 (1974). In testimony before a
Senate sub-committee dealing with proposed oil pollution legislation, a shipping
trade lobbyist argued that to impose liability on a shipping company for an oil
spill caused by an unmarked, submerged obstruction would violate basic notions
of fairness. id. When asked whether it would be more fair to impose these costs
on the people along nearby beaches, the lobbyist replied:
Under that set of circumstances, while I haven't an official position,
speaking personally I can understand the implications of your question
that there is some merit in requiring the ship to bear the cost of clean-
ing it up. I again qualify this by only answering your question from a
personal standpoint on the basis of pure logic and common sense
rather than what our official position is on this.
Id. The lobbyist later notified the sub-committee that the "official position" was
that the shipper should not be liable. Id.
227. Id.
- 228. HILLs, supra note 181, at 190 (noting that long-run profitability is cor-
poration's most basic and over-riding goal). Some of those pressures include
the uncertainty of competitive markets, "fluctuating sales, increasing costs for
safety and health measures, consumer and environmental concerns [and] gov-
1404 [Vol. 38: p. 1361
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may partially explain how corporate decision-makers can justify
raising the typical disingenuous defenses in tobacco and asbestos
litigation.229 One must look to corporate organization and struc-
ture in order to understand how corporate decision-makers, who
obviously are not evil in general, 2 0 rationalize such apparent and
sometimes shocking antipathy toward consumer safety.231
C. Corporate Nature and Structure
1. Fragmented Decision-Making
High level management personnel seem to operate in a
world far removed from both intra-corporate and market-place
reality, the latter characterized by injuries and deaths resulting
from defective products. Internally, managers seem to have little
knowledge of specific operating-level decisions. 232 Externally,
ernmental regulations." Id. A former president of General Motors essentially
admitted that his corporate persona sometimes makes decisions that his non-
corporate persona might regard as irresponsible. Id. at 191.
229. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1092-93 (5th
Cir. 1973). Despite ample evidence that asbestos causes serious respiratory ill-
ness and that asbestos manufacturers never performed any testing after receiv-
ing such evidence, the manufacturer in Borel took the position that it could not
have known about the dangers to industrial insulation workers and therefore
could not have warned of the risks. Id. The manufacturer in Borel then assumed
a highly inconsistent posture-implicitly refuting its earlier argument-stating
that it had no duty to warn of the dangers because they were obvious to the
plaintiff. Id. at 1093. The courts have confronted similar inconsistencies in to-
bacco litigation. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1492
(D.N.J. 1988). The tobacco companies have raised trial defenses concerning the
risks associated with smoking that are even more patently disingenuous than
arguments asserted by asbestos manufacturers. Id. Despite arguing that the in-
formation asserting a link between smoking and lung cancer is deficient, unrelia-
ble and without scientific or medical basis, tobacco companies argue that
plaintiffs are contributorily negligent for not relying on such information. Id.
The companies then argue that a plaintiff's particular type of lung cancer was
not caused by smoking even though they previously asserted that smoking
causes no type of lung cancer. Id.
230. See Alan F. Westin, What Can and Should Be Done to Protect Whistle Blowers
in Industry, in WHISTLE-BLOwERS1 131, 137 (Alan F. Westin ed., 1981). Accord-
ing to Westin: "Few business executives deliberately seek for turn out cars that
are defective .... The real problem has been the frame of reference of business
decisions and the reward structure of companies." Id. In the same context, the
editor asserts that management, too "driven by the demand for profits," will
sweep aside even serious engineering doubts about product safety. Id.
231. See Stevenson, supra note 226, at 144 (arguing that Professor Fried-
man's admonition for corporations to play by rules of game refers to both legal
rules and ethical customs, and that measured by that standard "corporations are
far too often guilty of breaches of precisely those legal and ethical norms by
which Friedman suggests they should be guided").
232. See John J. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical
View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099,
1133 (1977) (stating that some of reasons why top management is so isolated
1993] 1405
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they seem to deal only with:
financial symbols and models in abstract terms, leaving
them incapable of thinking in human terms or grasping
human conditions. They think vertically, are organized
vertically, and are so locked up in a homogenized pyra-
mid, which requires them to be infallible, that they can
never say they blew it. So they have little opportunity to
learn and grow. They are often surrounded by
sycophants. 283
Corporate managers obviously take the capitalist credo seriously
and are therefore obliged to maximize corporate profits. 2s4 Ap-
parently, however, pressures to maximize profits cause these
managers both to ignore Professor Friedman's caveat to "play by
the rules of the game," 235 and to detach themselves from the
'"consequences of their actions [that] we would expect from an
individual possessed of an ordinary conscience. 2 s86
At all levels, corporate decision-makers operate in a detached
manner, communicating effectively only with immediate subordi-
nates and superiors. Beyond the isolation that comes from the
rigid vertical organization in many corporations, 237 further isola-
from operations include "decentralized corporate structure, a hierarchical com-
mand system that required orders and responses to travel along narrow linear
channels of communication, and a technical orientation of those at operational
levels that made them inattentive to both the signs and risks of illegality"). Gen-
erally, corporate CEOs seem surprised or shocked when they learn by chance,
for example, of the harsh conditions of the migrant workers in their orange
groves or of the miners in the company mines. NADER & TAYLOR, supra note 91,
at 518-19. Many CEOs at General Motors reaped favorable publicity regarding
the General Motors Cancer Research Foundation at a time when, presumably
unknown to top management, its own wood-model shop workers were exper-
iencing a rate of cancer 507 higher than the general Detroit population. Id.
Even though both General Motors and the employee union were given this in-
formation, neither acted to investigate or study the problem until after the De-
troit News publicized it. Id.; see also HILLS, supra note 181, at 195. Hills states
that numerous small steps in the hierarchy of corporate decision-making diffuse
responsibility because high-level managers are not easily identifiable as those
persons directly responsible for short cuts in product safety. HILLS, supra note
181, at 195. Hills also notes that middle-level managers often filter information
that flows upwards to make their departments look good, and thus, top manage-
ment may have only partial information concerning the product safety decisions
made by middle- and lower-level management. Id.
233. NADER & TAYLOR, supra note 91, at 525 (quoting Sidney Harman, for-
mer Undersecretary of Commerce).
234. For a more detailed discussion concerning management efforts to
maximize profits despite safety issues, see supra note 223.
235. SIMON & ErrzEN, supra note 208, at 239.
236. Stevenson, supra note 226, at 145.
237. For a discussion of the problems created by rigid vertical organiza-
1406 [Vol. 38: p. 1361
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tion occurs as a result of selectivity in the communication process
that causes subordinates to filter out the negative and emphasize
only the positive in their reports to supervisors. 2 8 Professor Cof-
fee emphasizes that while the filtering mechanism operates within
all organizations, business corporations seem to be the only orga-
nizations that have no institutional mechanism by which to break
down informational blockages. 23 9
Despite the communication difficulties inherent in business
organizations, not all poor intra-corporate communication is in-
advertent. Much intra-corporate communication, or lack thereof,
cannot be explained merely as the result of inherent but non-in-
tentional blocking mechanisms. Corporations often make delib-
erate changes in the supervisory structure to achieve legally or
morally questionable decisions.240 Similarly, high level managers
may deliberately keep one department in the dark about product
risk information identified by another department.241 Moreover,
when management receives unfavorable product risk information,
it may not only fail to take corrective action, but may also repri-
tional structures, see supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text. Isolating cor-
porate decision-makers diffuses decision-making responsibility and results in an
inability to attribute decisions/blame to a particular individual or individuals
within the corporation. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill, 714 S.W.2d 329, 334
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (holding Ford accountable for gross negligence because
case involved complex company decisions made by Ford management that could
not be imputed to individual engineer, manager or division).
238. For further discussion of the effects of isolating corporate decision-
making, see Coffee, supra note 232, at 1131-32.
239. For further discussion concerning corporate inability to break down
internal informational impediments, see Coffee, supra 232, at 1132-33.
240. For further discussion of how corporations manipulate internal super-
visory structures, see Coffee, supra note 232, at 1134-35.
241. See Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 1981)
(finding that management of Honda ignored design engineer's warnings of de-
sign risks and did not correct defects or, presumably, did not convey informa-
tion to marketing personnel); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 195
(Colo. 1984) (involving corporate medical executive that received two intra-
company memos about Dalkon Shield's higher than reported failure risk, but
kept information from marketing personnel); Westin, supra note 230, at 10-11
(stating that development director at Firestone Tire warned top management
that tires posed safety risk at high mileage, but management failed to share in-
formation and continued to assert that their tires were "completely safe"); see
also Clayton P. Gillette &James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L.
REv. 1027, 1038 (1990) (stating that producers often do not have much informa-
tion about risk, and if they do, do not share it with consumers or employees);
Westin, supra note 230, at 11 (stating that asbestos manufacturers kept risks
from employees, discharged medical consultant who warned about such risks
and suppressed information available in 1930s and 1940s about such risks). For
a general discussion concerning the lack of communication within corporations,
see supra notes 232-40 and accompanying text.
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mand the bearer of the unpleasant information. 242 Regardless of
whether a corporation's communication barriers are intentional
or accidental, such impediments inevitably result in fragmented
decision-making to the detriment of innocent consumers.
2. Decision-Making Rationalizations
Several reasons have been offered to explain why corporate
decision-makers so consciously and willingly favor design hazards
instead of safer alternatives.243 The corporate structure frag-
ments responsibility into a hierarchy that allows an individual de-
cision-maker to rationalize his or her low-level decision-making,
even if indirectly risk-related, on the grounds that it does not di-
rectly cause any risk to materialize.2 44 High-level decision-mak-
ers, on the other hand, must resort to a different rationalization
because their decisions more directly and significantly relate to
the creation of user risk.245 Thus, high-level managers rational-
ize, or cover, their high-level decisions by indicating to lower-
level personnel that they are not interested in knowing unneces-
sary details. 246
Decision-makers also utilize several other mechanisms of ra-
tionalization to support their decisions. One rationalization tech-
nique is to deny that there are any "injuries" caused by design
choices and assert instead that there are only unfortunate, ran-
242. For reports of corporations "shooting the messenger" that bears unfa-
vorable product risk information, see generally Westin, supra note 230. Westin
discusses several reports of severe reprimands, including loss of employment,
against persons who raise honest concerns about product defects. Id. at 52.
243. In all but the rarest of cases there is at least one, safer, practicable
alternative to a hazardous design. Exceptional cases do exist, however, in which
particular design risks apparently could not have been eliminated by practicable
means. See Bernal v. Richard Wolf Medical Instruments Corp., 272 Cal. Rptr.
41, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (involving strong evidence that surgical instrument
was made with "best steel available, but had inherent dangers no human skill or
knowledge has yet been able to eliminate"); Garst v. General Motors Corp., 484
P.2d 47, 62-63 (Kan. 1971) (holding that there was no substantial competent
evidence upon which jury could find manufacturer negligent in designing brak-
ing and steering systems of earthmover because both systems were standard
with no better alternative device available).
244. See HILLS, supra note 181, at 194 (characterizing this mechanism of
rationalization as "denial of responsibility").
245. Id. at 195 ("In this bureaucratic labyrinth, it is often difficult to find
any specific individual at higher executive levels on whom to place the responsi-
bility for short-cuts in product safety . . ").
246. Id. (noting that high-level managers are often opposed to learning
true sordid details, yet simultaneously hold low-level managers responsible for
failing to meet production deadlines or profit margins).
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dom accidents.247 Decision-makers can also deny that there are
any true "victims" in a particular case.2 48 In addition, they often
shift the blame to the accusers i.e., the regulatory agencies,
249
"consumerism people," the courts or plaintiffs' lawyers.250 Fi-
nally, one must also recognize that decision-makers often appeal
to "higher loyalties." 25 1
In light of the above, the California Supreme Court aptly
noted that "[t]he technological revolution has created a society
containing dangers to the individual never before contem-
247. Id. at 196 (stating that by focusing on their lack of intent to injure
anyone, and on uncertainty and randomness surrounding "accidents," manag-
ers can rationalize their decisions on ground that injuries occur in natural order
of life and are not any one person's fault).
248. Corporate decision-makers can deny the existence of design defect
"victims" by blaming the individual victims for their own injuries. The tobacco
companies deny that cigarettes cause lung cancer, but also assert as a defense
the smoker's knowledge of the risks that the tobacco companies claim do not
exist. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D.N.J.
1988). Despite arguing that the evidence establishing a link between smoking
and lung cancer is deficient, unreliable and without scientific or medical basis,
tobacco companies argue that plaintiffs are contributorily negligent for not rely-
ing on such information. Id. The tobacco companies also argue that a plaintiff's
particular type of lung cancer was not caused by smoking even though they have
previously asserted that smoking does not cause lung cancer, period. Id. At
least one asbestos manufacturer has asserted a similar position. Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1092-93 (5th Cir. 1973). De-
spite ample evidence that asbestos causes serious respiratory illness and that
asbestos manufacturers never performed any testing of these risks after receiv-
ing such evidence, the manufacturer in Borel claimed that it could not have
known about the dangers to industrial insulation workers and therefore could
not have warned of the risks. Id. at 1093. The manufacturer in Borel then as-
sumed a highly inconsistent posture-implicitly refuting its earlier argument-
stating that it had no duty to warn of the dangers of asbestos because such dan-
gers were obvious to the plaintiff. Id. Nonetheless, the manufacturer also
claimed that because the risks of disease from exposure to asbestos were not
known, there could be no "victims" because nobody intended to cause-nor
actually did cause-lung disease in persons working with asbestos or asbestos
products. Id. These cases present an interesting line of argument to say the
least.
249. The targets of the blame are typically governmental agencies. HILLS,
supra note 181, at 198-99.
250. The blame, however, is also often shifted to safety or environmental
"crusaders," such as Ralph Nader. CULLEN Er AL., supra note 172, at 154-55
(discussing how General Motors hired detectives to investigate Nader in hopes
of discrediting him and how such investigation eventually became public, stain-
ing GM's reputation); HUBEa, THE LEGAL REvoLTrrioN, supra note 3, at 9, 12, 26
(noting that increasing ranks of plaintiff's lawyers and judicial system's propen-
sity for generous awards have led to increase of tort suits filed).
251. HILLS, supra note 181, at 199. Some corporate decision makers adhere
to the notion that the "moral superiority of [the] system of free enterprise" car-
ries with it a license to ignore other moral values while pursuing the corporate
goal-maximizing profits for shareholders. Id.
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plated." 25 2 For courts to establish the appropriate legal relation-
ship between producers and product users, they must focus more
closely on the context in which users are confronted with prod-
ucts containing dangerous defects of which they have little or no
knowledge. Both the nature of the design and marketing
processes and manufacturers' conscious choices to reject safety in
favor of risks confirm that product users require heightened pro-
tection from dangerous product design.
IV. THE NEED FOR DETERRENCE
A. Marketplace Reality
1. Mass Risks
The courts that first recognized the need to protect product
users from the new risks inherent in mass markets did not have
the benefit of numerous appellate ddcisions documenting corpo-
rate decision-making (in design defect cases) that consciously
placed the life and health of product users in serious jeopardy.253
Nonetheless, judges writing early products liability opinions un-
derstood enough about mass marketing and corporate decision-
making to recognize both that manufacturers generally could
foresee the design risks they were creating 25 4 and that consumers,
who could not appreciate those risks, needed enhanced protec-
tion from complex products in mass markets.
255
252. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457 (Cal. 1978).
253. See Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution, supra note 73, at 606-12
(presenting overview of focus of "first generation" of strict products liability ju-
rists and scholars on protecting product users from new level of risks associated
with mass product markets).
254. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y.
1916). In MacPherson, Judge Cardozo recognized that Buick, as a result of its
design and manufacture of the vehicle in question, was familiar with the vehicle's
characteristics and attributes, and therefore knew of the risks it posed to users.
Id.
255. See, e.g., Escola v.Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-43 (Cal.
1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion in Escola, Justice
Traynor emphasized the need for greater product safety, and recognized that
mass production had disrupted the balance of safety that once existed when
products were fewer, simpler, and better understood by the average consumer.
Id The post-Traynor California Supreme Court has adhered to the principles
espousedby Traynor and fashioned product liability doctrine emphasizing con-
sumer safety. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457 (Cal. 1978). In
Barker, the court stated:
The technological revolution has created a society that contains dan-
gers to the individual never before contemplated. The individual must
face the threat to life and limb not only from the car on the street or
highway but from a massive array of hazardous mechanisms and prod-
ucts. The radical change from a comparatively safe, largely agricul-
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Undoubtedly, modem consumers face product risks on an
unprecedented scale.256 These mass risks are characterized in
substantial part by the great disparity between producers and
consumers in terms of knowledge and power over product risks.
The information disparity rests primarily on the reality that man-
ufacturers are experts concerning their products. 257 In the de-
sign context, their expertise about product materials, about the
interaction between the product and user, and about product
testing alerts manufacturers to essentially all product design
risks.258 The power to eliminate, or at least mitigate, most prod-
uct risks without undue expense accompanies producer aware-
ness of those risks.259 As has been demonstrated previously,
tural, society to this industrial unsafe one has been reflected in the
decisions that formerly tied liability to the fault of a tortfeasor but now
are more concerned with the safety of the individual who suffers the
loss.
Id.; see also Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1023-24 (Pa. 1978) (stat-
ing that "sophisticated and complex industrial society with its proliferation of
new products and vast changes in the private enterprise system," including "gi-
ant corporate structures," requires that consumers be protected and that courts
need no longer protect an "emerging manufacturing industry"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1977) (stating that "the consumer of [defec-
tive products] is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone,
and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products"). Ac-
cording to comment j of § 402A:
The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the special responsibility for
the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the business
of supplying human beings with products which may endanger the
safety of their persons and property, and the forced reliance upon that
undertaking on the part of those who purchase such goods.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1977). For an expanded dis-
cussion of the "first generation's" recognition of the information gap between
consumers and producers, and producer exploitation of that gap, see generally
Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution, supra note 73.
256. Barker, 573 P.2d at 557 (noting that modem technological revolution
has forced consumers to confront increasing levels of danger).
257. For a discussion about the disparity between producer and consumer
knowledge concerning product risks, see supra notes 41-78 and accompanying
text.
258. Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 388 (N.J. 1984) (noting that
manufacturer is in superior position to know about product technology and
materials). For a discussion of the superior risk information possessed by manu-
facturers, see supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
If manufacturers fail to consider carefully the three essential elements of
product design with user safety in mind, they may not actually be aware of a
particular product risk. The point is simple: manufacturers can acquire knowl-
edge of all product design risks if they incur the costs of obtaining the informa-
tion. Consumers, on the other hand, can rarely, if ever, obtain the same amount
of product safety information without incurring far greater costs than manufac-
turers would incur. For further discussion of the relative costs of safety informa-
tion for manufacturers and consumers, see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
259. FINAL REPORT, supra note 220, at 39. According to this report:
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however, manufacturers too frequently exploit their superior risk
information and power, and fail to take reasonable steps to elimi-
nate product risks.260
There are numerous reasons why product users do not have
adequate information about product design risks.261 Aside from
the fact that consumers are generally not considered product ex-
perts-unlike manufacturers- 262they do not participate in prod-
uct design.263 Consumers assume, for better or for worse, that
products are safe and fit for reasonable use.264 Furthermore, con-
Manufacturers have it in their power to design, build, and market prod-
ucts in ways that will reduce if not eliminate most unreasonable and
unnecessary hazards. Manufacturers are best able to take the longest
strides to safety in the least time. The capacity of individual manufac-
turers to devise safety programs, without undue extra cost, has been
demonstrated repeatedly in the course of our short history: in safety
glass, double-insulated power tools, baffles on rotary mowers, noncom-
bustible TV transformers, and releases on wringer washers.
Id; see also Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 891 (Alaska 1979)
(explaining that one of three policies underlying strict products liability is to
place cost of accidents on manufacturers because they are in best position to
prevent accidents); Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, "Tort Reform" and
the Liability "Revolution" Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27
GONZ. L. REv. 251, 282-85 (1992) (discussing efficacy of changing product de-
signs, as compared to changing human behavior, in order to achieve greater
product safety).
260. For a discussion of cases involving manufacturers that failed to take
reasonable steps to eliminate product design risks, see supra notes 82-166 and
accompanying text.
261. For a discussion of additional reasons suggesting why consumers lack
adequate information concerning design risks, see supra notes 61-78 and accom-
panying text. The courts have also indicated that they recognize that consumers
do not have realistic access to product safety information. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
593 P.2d at 891 ("(R]esponsibility for placing the defective product on the mar-
ket should not be shifted to those [consumers] in no position to realistically as-
sess the danger."); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140,
149 (N.J. 1979) (citing Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 311
(N.J. 1965) (stating that doctrine of strict products liability "stems from the real-
ity of the relationship between manufacturers of products and the consuming
public" and that "the great mass of the purchasing public has neither adequate
knowledge nor sufficient opportunity to determine if articles bought or used are
defective"); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 83 (NJ. 1960)
("Under modern conditions the ordinary layman, on responding to the impor-
tuning of colorful advertising, has neither the opportunity nor the capacity to
inspect or to determine the fitness of an automobile for use."). For a general
discussion concerning consumer lack of adequate information, see Prentice &
Roszkowski, supra note 259, at 287-97.
262. For a discussion of the disparity between the levels of sophistication
between producers and consumers, see supra notes 59-60 and accompanying
text.
263. For a more detailed discussion of consumers' inherent lack of informa-
tion regarding design safety, see supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
264. For a discussion of the safety assumptions made by consumers when
they purchase and use products, see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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sumers are at a significant disadvantage because most design risks
are not obvious upon ordinary inspection,265 and the cost of risk
information is prohibitively high for ordinary consumers. 266 Fi-
nally, and perhaps most disturbing, manufacturers do not readily
or often share necessary risk information with the consuming
public.267
2. Manufacturer Accountability
As has been discussed previously, manufacturer accountabil-
ity for design risks is limited by a weak sense of responsibility ex-
hibited by corporate actors as compared to individuals acting in
their own private capacities. 268 There are several apparent expla-
nations for this moral dissonance. 269 One notable explanation is
that individual actors have little ability to avoid direct responsibil-
ity for their actions. They represent the sole entity potentially re-
sponsible for the challenged act. By contrast, the corporate actor
typically operates through a chain of responsibility and is usually
not the decision-maker with the ultimate say concerning specific
decisions. In addition, corporate individuals are rarely the named
defendants charged with responsibility for a challenged act; the
corporate entity generally assumes this role.
Corporate individuals also have the luxury and ability to rely
on "rationalizations" for their irresponsibility; individual actors
are in a different situation. 270 A corporate individual's position in
the decision-making chain allows him or her to pass his or her
moral and legal responsibility up the chain of command. 271 As
these corporate individuals respond to the pressures to become
265. For a more detailed discussion concerning whether design risks are
readily apparent to typical non-expert users, see supra notes 71-72 and accompa-
nying text.
266. For a more detailed discussion of the high cost of product risk infor-
mation, see supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
267. For a discussion of the lack of exchanging of information that occurs
between manufacturers and consumers, see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying
text.
268. For a more detailed discussion of manufacturer accountability, see
supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the disparity be-
tween corporate and individual notions of accountability, see supra notes 226-31
and accompanying text.
269. For a discussion of the explanations behind corporate dissonance, see
supra note 267.
270. For a general discussion of corporate decision-making rationaliza-
tions, see supra notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
271. For a discussion concerning how information gets filtered between
high- and low-level managers in vertical organizations, see supra notes 232-33,
239 and accompanying text.
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"team players," they can avoid both direct responsibility and a
sense of direct responsibility. 27 2 Mindful that their decisions are
always reviewed by superiors in the decision-making chain, corpo-
rate individuals can rationalize their decisions on the grounds
that they will not be the ultimate or principle cause of any unto-
ward happenings, such as product injuries.
273
3. Compensation as Second Best274
a. Many Injuries, Few Claims
Product design is plagued by a conscious disregard for con-
sumer safety. 275 Each year, more than thirty million Americans
suffer a product-related injury,276 and more than seventy-five
thousand of those accident victims die from their injuries. 277 In
fact, approximately half of all Americans incur a serious tort prob-
lem during their lifetimes. 278 The costs of these injuries are as-
272. For a discussion of how corporate pressures exacerbate the filtering of
information in vertical organizations, see supra notes 232-33 and accompanying
text.
273. For a discussion of the corporate decision-making process, see supra
notes 232-33, 239 and accompanying text.
274. This heading was suggested by the title of an article written by Peter
W. Huber. Peter W. Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985) [hereinafter Huber,
Hazards of Public Risk Management].
275. Manufacturers make design choices that create serious risks to product
users despite powerful evidence that safer alternative designs were available
"without undue extra cost." FxNAL REPORT, supra note 220, at 39. For a discus-
sion of several-among countless-instances of these "wrong" choices involving
motor vehicles, intrauterine devices, tampons, television sets, flammable fabrics,
industrial/heavy equipment and a wide variety of other consumer products, see
supra notes 82-166 and accompanying text. For another analysis of myriad prod-
ucts involving manufacturers that have made unacceptable design choices that
created unreasonable product hazards, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 220, at 10-
34.
276. Prentice & Roszowski, supra note 259, at 257. Congress' Final Report
on Product Safety, using older data, reported that 20,000,000 Americans are
injured in home accidents involving consumer products, of which 30,000 are
killed and 110,000 are permanently disabled. FINAL REPORT, supra note 220, at
37.
277. Prentice & Roszowski, supra note 259, at 257. Included in the 75,000
accident victims that die each year is the number who die specifically in automo-
bile accidents. Id. Obviously, however, many product-related injuries are not
caused by defects in the product. Nonetheless, a significant number of these
injuries and deaths could be eliminated if manufacturers paid more attention to
product hazards. FINAL REPORT, supra note 220, at 37. An examination of any
catalog of defective products reveals that a significant number of the injuries and
deaths resulting from use of those products could have been eliminated by com-
pletely reasonable design changes. For a discussion of these defective products,
see supra notes 82-166 and accompanying text.
278. Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIo ST. LJ.
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tronomical. Emergency room treatment alone, for all non-auto
product accidents, costs ten billion dollars annually.279 Auto acci-
dents, which kill more than forty-five thousand and injure 1.7 mil-
lion persons annually, cost almost forty-seven billion dollars. 280
Moreover, additional costs exist-such as long term medical care,
wage losses and individual pain and suffering-that are practically
incalculable.
Despite evidence of abundant product-related accidents each
year, only a few of those injured ever actually bring suit. As few
as three percent of all persons injured in non-work, non-auto set-
tings ever file legal claims.28 ' There is evidence that as few as
seven percent of consumers with product problems even consult
an attorney; in fact, only ten percent of consumers injured by
products each year even consider filing suit.28 2
b. Ex Post Protection
Creating incentives for safety is one of the most important
443, 447 (1987) [hereinafter Abel, Tort Crisis] (citing BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE
LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 117
(1977)). In another study reported by Abel, 44 of 1,000 persons had suffered at
least two weeks of incapacity from an injury during the preceding 12 months. Id.
Again, however, not all of these injuries were caused by defective products.
279. For further discussion concerning emergency room costs directly at-
tributed to automobile accidents, see Prentice and Roszowski, supra note 259, at
257.
280. Prentice & Roszowski, supra note 259, at 257-58 (noting also that 147o
of auto accidents involve defective vehicles); see also Owen, Moral Foundations,
supra note 17, at 461 n.131 (suggesting that consumer product injuries often
involve causal factors, such as misuse or abuse of product, other than product
defect).
281. Prentice & Roszowski, supra note 259, at 258. In the medical malprac-
tice context, there exists data indicating that fewer than 10%o of patients injured
by a physician's negligence ever bring legal claims. Id.; see also Abel, Tort Crisis,
supra note 278, at 448 (stating that one medical malpractice study indicated that
fewer than 6.7% of patients injured by physician's negligence ever bring
lawsuit).
282. Prentice & Roszowski, supra note 259, at 259. For a general discussion
of why a great proportion of potential tort claimants never initiate the recovery
processes, thus precluding the possibility of being compensated for their inju-
ries, see Abel, Tort Crisis, supra note 278, at 448-52; Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 13-18 (1983)
(discussing several reasons parties do not bring legal action including: injuries
are unperceived; gain is too low or cost is too high; parties would rather avoid
trouble by resigning or severing relations; and disputes are sometimes heard in
non-judicial fora); Prentice & Roszowski, supra note 259, at 255-59. For an in-
depth discussion of "access bias" in the judicial system that keeps plaintiffs from
pursuing injury claims, see Gillette & Krier, supra note 241, at 1044-88 (discuss-
ing access bias arising from "the interplay of legal doctrine, the structure of
litigation, and the nature of public risk").
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policies underlying strict products liability law.283 Manufacturers
are obligated to design their products for optimum safety,28 4 i.e.,
"to assurethat unnecessary risks of injury are eliminated." 285 An
injured plaintiff is only entitled to recover when a producer fails
to meet its primary duty of eliminating unnecessary product
risks.286 Thus, compensation is actually a default mechanism in
283. Prentice & Roszkowski, supra note 259, at 273; see also Howard C.
Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 177
(1976) (stating that cost distribution of enterprise liability theory is expected to
prevent tort-like losses). Of all the factors involved in creating product injuries,
human behavior is the one least susceptible to change; the factor most suscepti-
ble to correction in the direction of greater product safety is the ability of manu-
facturers to design safer products "without undue extra cost." FINAL REPORT,
supra note 220, at 39-40. According to Abel:
Tort liability is not equally powerful in shaping all behavior. It has the
greatest effect on profit-seeking enterprises engaged in repetitive activi-
ties and operating in competitive markets. Therefore, it probably has
little impact on automobile drivers, whose behavior is rarely delibera-
tive and who, in any case, tend to endanger themselves as much as
others (so that self-preservation is the strongest incentive to safety).
Richard L. Abel, The Crisis Is Injuries, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 37
(Walter Olson ed., 1988); see also H.W. HEINRICH ET AL., INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
PREVENTION: A SAFETY MANAGEMENT APPROACH 57 (5th ed. 1980) ("In the same
breath it can be truthfully said that although worker failure causes the most acci-
dents, mechanical guarding and engineering revision are nevertheless important
factors in preventing the most accidents.")
284. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) (explaining
that optimum safety can be found by utilizing risk-benefit analysis). In the de-
sign context, optimum safety is that amount of safety that results from balancing
the risk-benefit factors used by most jurisdictions to test whether a product is
defective in design. Id.; see also Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra
note 3, at 1531 ("An overwhelming consensus [ofjurisdictions] favors some sort
of risk-utility balancing test to judge the adequacy of product design and market-
ing." (footnote omitted)); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. LJ. 825, 837-38 (1973) [hereinafter Wade, Strict Tort Liability]
(listing relevant risk-benefit factors). Courts do not demand absolute safety;
they only demand safety that is technologically and economically feasible, and
that will not seriously undermine the usefulness of the product. Barker, 573 P.2d
at 455; see also Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV.
555, 559 n.3 (1985) (stating that "some risks, because of the benefits they create,
are socially acceptable").
285. FINAL REPORT, supra note 220, at 40; see also Barker, 573 P.2d at 454
(stating that manufacturer's duty is to eliminate "excessive preventable danger"
in challenged product design or, stated alternatively, to eliminate, or mitigate,
risk of danger up to point at which benefits of design outweigh risk of danger).
For further discussion of the duty imposed on manufacturers to optimize safety,
see supra note 284.
286. Because manufacturers are not obligated to eliminate all product risks,
but only those deemed not risk-beneficial, products will contain some risks that
will occasionally cause injury not legally worthy of compensation. See GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 27, 68 (1970) ("Most activities can be car-
ried out safely enough or be sufficiently reduced in frequency so that there is a
point at which their worth outweighs the costs of the accidents they cause.").
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the tort recovery system.218 7
Compensation is a "second best" mechanism for eliminating
product risks for several reasons. First, producers have the
knowledge and ability to eliminate, "without undue extra cost...
most unreasonable and unnecessary [product] hazards. ' 288 Sec-
ond, the vast majority of persons injured by defectively designed
products never invoke the tort recovery system .2 9 Third, indi-
vidual corporate actors participating in product design respond
to corporate pressures and find ways to subvert their innate sense
of moral responsibility. 290 Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
an award of compensation frustrates the primary goal of eliminat-
ing injuries caused by defectively designed products.
29 1
B. Greater Deterrence
1. The Deterrent Effect
Since the birth of strict products liability, courts have as-
sumed that the doctrine would create greater manufacturer incen-
tives to produce safe products than would ordinary negligence.
2 92
287. See Sugarman, supra note 284, at 565 (arguing that successful lawsuits
represent failure in tort system's deterrence mechanism). But see CALEBRESI,
supra note 286, at 27 (arguing that after-the-fact compensation, although second
in time, is not "secondary" in any significant sense, and that "the way we provide
for accident victims after the accident is crucially important and that the real
societal costs of accidents can be reduced as significantly here as by taking meas-
ures to avoid accidents in the first place").
288. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 220, at 39. For a more in-depth discus-
sion concerning manufacturer knowledge of design risks, see supra notes 255-67
and accompanying text.
289. For a further discussion concerning the disproportionately few
number of cases commenced by parties injured by defectively designed prod-
ucts, see supra notes 281-82.
290. For a detailed discussion of several ways in which corporate individu-
als avoid and rationalize responsibility for defectively designed products that
cause injury, see supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
291. HUBER, THE LEGAL REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 17-18. Even Peter
Huber, who ,advocates a return to contract and the elimination of tort as the
basic relationship between producer and consumer, recognizes that compensa-
tion represents a default mechanism that is triggered after manufacturers have
failed to protect against product hazards. Id.; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note
220, at 40 ("The law has tended in recent years to place full responsibility for
injuries attributable to defective products upon the manufacturer. But beyond
his liability for damages, a producer owes society-at-large the duty to assure that
unnecessary risks of injury are eliminated.").
292. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-42 (Cal.
1944). The Escola court stated that:
[E]ven if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that
responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the
market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards
19931 1417
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Generally, courts have continued to voice their commitment to
this belief.293 Some courts have explicitly recognized that a plain-
tiffs burden of proof in ordinary negligence cases frustrates man-
ufacturer safety incentives. 294 A few courts, however, have
expressed reservations concerning whether strict products liabil-
ity provides greater deterrence incentives than does negli-
gence.29 5 Although the courts are fairly consistent, there appears
and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot .... It
is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having
defects that are a menace to the public .... . It is to the public interest to
prevent injury to the public from any defective goods by the imposition
of civil liability generally.
Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
293. See, e.g., Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1196 (Alaska 1992)
(stating that it is "consistent with the purposes underlying strict products liabil-
ity that manufacturers should be deterred from marketing certain products");
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 474, 478 (Cal. 1988) (stating that one of
fundamental policies underlying strict products liability is "public interest to dis-
courage the marketing of defective products," and one of "fundamental reasons
underlying the imposition of strict liability (is] to deter manufacturers from mar-
keting products that are unsafe"); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454,
457 (Cal. 1978) (holding that emphasis in determining strict liability for design
defects is preventability of danger, and that switch from fault-based to strict lia-
bility represents new focus on "safety of the individual who suffers the loss");
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976) (noting that
"consumer of products is entitled to 'maximum of protection at the hands of
someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the prod-
ucts' ") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1973));
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 303 (N.J. 1983) (noting that manufac-
turer has duty not to place defective products on market); Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 548 (NJ. 1982) ("By imposing on manu-
facturers the costs of failure to discover hazards, we create an incentive for them
to invest more actively in safety research."); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391
A.2d 1020, 1023-24, 1027 (Pa. 1978) (noting that modem mass markets dictate
that consumer, not manufacturer, must be protected, and that "seller must pro-
vide every element necessary to make products safe for use"); Turner v. General
Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 853 (Tex. 1979) (noting that "underlying policy
and purpose of strict liability" is "public interest in human safety") (Campbell,
J., concurring); see also WALTER H. BECKHAM, JR. ET AL., TOWARDS A JURISPRU-
DENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE Jus-
TiCE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 4-3 to -8 (1984) (Special Committee on Tort
Liability System report to American Bar Association).
294. See, e.g., Phipps, 363 A.2d at 963 (stating that proof problems may
cause plaintiffs to bear loss despite fact that manufacturer is in better position to
take precautions and protect against defect); O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 303 (same);
Barker, 573 P.2d at 454-57 (same).
295. Foley v. Clark Equip. Co., 523 A.2d 379, 391 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
According to the Foley court:
[T1o the extent that a primary purpose of products liability law is to
encourage the design of safer products and thereby reduce the inci-
dence of injuries, a negligence standard that would reward the careful
manufacturer and penalize the careless is more likely to achieve that
purpose. A greater incentive to design safer products will result from a
fault system where resources devoted to careful and safe design will pay
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to be more debate among commentators and other authorities
concerning the deterrent effects of strict products liability. None-
theless, a strong preponderance of the commentary suggests that
the tort recovery system generally,296 and strict liability specifi-
dividends in the form of fewer claims and lower insurance premiums
for the manufacturer with a good design safety record.
Id. Similarly, the Phillips court stated that:
Where a defendant's product is adjudged by a jury to be dangerously
defective, imposition of liability on the manufacturer will cause him to
take some steps (or at least make calculations) to improve his product.
Although such inducement may not be any greater under a system of
strict liability than under a system of negligence recovery, it is certainly
greater than if the liability was imposed on another party simply be-
cause that other party was a better risk distributor. We suspect that, in
the final analysis, the imposition of liability has a beneficial effect on
manufacturers of defective products both in the care they take and in
the warning they give.
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (Or. 1974).
296. See generally Steven P. Croley &Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An
Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 84-
90 (1991) [hereinafter Croley & Hanson, Liability Crisis] (explaining withdrawal
of consumer products and services); Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an
Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 648 (1985) [hereinafter Epstein, Insur-
ance Market] (discussing how tort system can make certain types of risk uninsur-
able and thus certain types of products unmarketable); Anita Johnson, Products
Liability "Reform". A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C. L. REV. 677, 692 (1978) (con-
cluding that common law of products liability should continue to base liability
on fault because it maximizes incentives to design and manufacture safe prod-
ucts); Klemme, supra note 283, at 186-90 (stating that enterprise liability theory
"seeks to encourage as much prevention of tort-like losses as is economically
feasible"); Lambert, supra note 162, at 48 (stating that "one of the most practical
measures for cutting down accidents and injuries in the field of product failure is
a successful lawsuit against the supplier of the flawed product" and that "[h]ere,
as well as elsewhere in Tort law, immunity breeds irresponsibility while liability
induces the taking of preventive vigilence"); Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page,
Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CAL. L. REV. 645, 673-77 (1967) (advo-
cating more judicial involvement in controlling automobile design); Stephen P.
Teret & MichaelJacobs, Prevention and Torts: The Role of Litigation in Injury Control,
17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 17, 17-20 (1989) (emphasizing importance of
preventive effects of products liability suits and citing examples of air bag and
rear shoulder harness litigation); W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort
Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health
and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 82 (1989) ("Tort damages awards . . . create
incentives for producers to control risks. Firms can internalize damages pay-
ments as part of ... production costs. Even when firms insure against liability
risks, they have an incentive to reduce risky behavior because their insurance
premiums often reflect the long-term risks generated by their operations."). But
see FINAL REPORT, supra note 220, at 39 ("Despite its humanitarian adaptations to
meet the challenge of product-caused injuries, the common law puts no reliable
restraint upon product hazards."); HUBER, THE LEGAL REVOLUTION, supra note 3,
at 169-71 (asserting that increases in product safety are result of technological
and scientific advances and that strict liability doctrine deters rather than en-
courages safety); Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REv. 785, 806-
19, 826 (1990) [hereinafter Abel, Critique of Torts] (discussing reasons why tort
law based on fault cannot efficiently promote safety but that strict liability "en-
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cally, fosters greater product safety.297
Empirical data supports the argument that product liability
law contributes both directly and indirectly to product safety.2 98
courages research on safety"); James A. Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The
Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L.
REv. 479 (1990) (discussing changes in judicial decision-making that favor de-
fendants in products liability cases); George L. Priest, The Insurance Crisis and
Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE I.J. 1521 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, Insurance Crisis]
(describing views that tort recovery system, and especially strict product liability,
does not significantly enhance product safety); Sugarman, supra note 284, at
559-617 (arguing that costs of tort system outweigh its benefits).
297. Abel, Critique of Torts, supra note 296, at 826; Sheila L. Birnbaum, Un-
masking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to
Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1980) (noting that strict liability imposes
economic incentive on manufacturers to develop "most effective quality control
systems attainable"); Croley & Hanson, Liability Crisis, supra note 296, at 8-9;
Prentice & Roszowski, supra note 259, at 272-302 (defending strict liability in
tort for defective products because it provides strong incentive to design and
manufacture safe products). For an argument that negligence theory creates
more incentives for product safety than strict product liability, see Birnbaum,
supra, at 645; Johnson, supra note 296, at 692; Wertheimer, supra note 3, at 1186
n.8.
Assuming arguendo that negligence theory rewards greater manufacturer
due care and that strict liability doctrine effectively makes manufacturer efforts
irrelevant to a liability determination, risk-utility balancing in the design context
still preserves the theoretical negligence incentives lost under "pure" strict lia-
bility. Under risk-utility balancing, a product is defective only if the trade-offs,
including weighing the alternative designs and their incremental costs against
additional costs imposed on the product and their detrimental impact on the
product's utility, are not reasonable from a safety perspective. Hence, the man-
ufacturer's search for and implementation of greater safety may be afforded
great weight in the jury's examination of design trade-offs. Moreover, if strict
liability eases the plaintiffs' burden, manufacturers must anticipate the likelihood
that plaintiffs will prevail more frequently than they would in ordinary negli-
gence cases. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) (stating
that shifting risk-benefit burden to defendant in strict liability defective design
case makes plaintiffs burden easier still); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150
P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (noting that absent require-
ment that plaintiff prove negligence, liability is strict). Under this scenario, man-
ufacturers will have additional incentives to factor litigation costs-including
larger potential judgments-into their calculations when determining how much
to invest in safety.
298. GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPO-
RATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION vii (1983). A Rand
Corporation study concluded that "of all the various external social pressures
product liability has the greatest influence on product design decisions." Id.
Another study of automobile design safety concluded:
Our most frequent conclusion was that liability was a contributing fac-
tor in achieving safety improvements. By this we mean that liability
worked in conjunction with other factors to produce safety improve-
ments. Interestingly, our cases suggest that the indirect effect of liabil-
ity on consumer demand--operating through adverse publicity about a
product's safety and a manufacturer's reputation-is often the most sig-
nificant contribution of liability to safety. The direct financial costs of
liability are usually a relatively minor factor, at least from the perspec-
tive of large manufacturers.
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Although the manufacturing sector has made a concerted effort to
deny any such effect, the same conclusion may be drawn from in-
formation emanating directly from producers.299 There is little
doubt that product liability litigation has forced manufacturers to
withdraw numerous defectively designed products from the mar-
ket.300 In addition to actual product removal from the market-
place, products liability litigation has also compelled
manufacturers to redesign numerous products for greater
John D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety, in THE LIABILITY MAZE:
THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 120, 180-82 (Peter
Huber & Robert Litan eds., 1991).
299. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY-CASES
AND MATERIALS 1033-34 (2d ed. 1989). When risk managers of Fortune 1000
corporations were surveyed on the impact of products liability litigation and in-
surance practices, they reported, inter alia, the following: (1) over 35% had im-
proved their product warnings and/or instructions; (2) over 30% had improved
the safety of their designs; (3) almost 25% had stopped producing a product or a
service, or had recalled a product, within the previous 3 years; and (4) 657 had
established formal safety objectives. Id. In general, the report concluded that
strict products liability caused improvement in product safety, product use and
warning labels and manufacturing quality. Id. The Conference Board, which
had made the survey that was funded almost exclusively by the business commu-
nity, was apparently dissatisfied with the results of the first study. Id. Thus, the
Conference Board conducted another study surveying CEOs rather than risk
managers. Id. Not surprisingly, the second study undercut the conclusions of
the first study in several important respects. Id. Courts have also seen similar
attempts to undercut an industry insider's opinion that products liability has a
significant impact on product safety. See Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d
814 (Ohio 1982) (involving research assistant of one of judges writing per
curiam opinion that spoke with corporate employee who indicated that company
had ceased to manufacture product due to products liability lawsuits; yet counsel
for company later stated that decision had been made based more on "competi-
tive climate than on liability concerns").
300. See Tom Christoffel, The Role of Law in Reducing Injuy, 17 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 7, 12 (1989). The Corvair and Pinto automobiles, the Dalkon
Shield IUD, Playtex brand tampons, the Firestone 500 tire, three-wheeled child
size ATVs, the Bork-Shiley heart valve, hot water vaporizers and BB guns with-
out mechanisms warning that the guns are loaded are all defectively designed
products that have been forced off the market by product liability litigation and
its consequences. Id. George Priest has argued that products are forced off the
market more by uncertainties in the insurance market than by the excessively
risky nature of the products. Priest, Insurance Cisis, supra note 296, at 1564-70.
For a persuasive argument refuting Priest's assertion, see Croley & Hanson, Lia-
bility Crisis, supra note 296, at 12-111. Priest has conceded, however, that "the
prospect of liability judgments affects design and production decisions of all
manufacturers, foreign and domestic, that sell to U.S. consumers." George L.
Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND
POLICY 184, 184 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford W. Winston eds., 1988). Peter Hu-
ber has argued that technological and scientific advances, rather than product
liability doctrine and litigation, have been the cause of greater product safety.
See HUBER, THE LEGAL REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 207. For a discussion refut-
ing Huber's argument, see Prentice and Roszowski, supra note 259, at 275-85.
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safety.30 1
Strict products liability litigation also inevitably impacts other
aspects of the product design-manufacturing-marketing process.
Negative publicity concerning allegedly dangerous products
leads, even if indirectly, to safer products.30 2 The fact that juries
evaluate the profit-cost-safety tradeoffs embodied in the product's
design, in hindsight,30 3 causes manufacturers to "at least make
calculations" to improve product safety.304
Although there is little "conclusive evidence.., that a certain
number of injuries and deaths from defective products have been
averted by litigation.., it seems reasonable ... to assume that a
measure of risk deterrence is directly attributable to the effect of
product liability litigation. ' 3 0 5 Until dispositive data exists dis-
301. See, e.g., Lambert, supra note 162, at 49 (discussing redesign of hot
water vaporizers, Drano and Liquid Plumer brand drain cleaners, and Reming-
ton Mohawk 500 rifle); Prentice & Roszowski, supra note 259, at 280 (discussing
redesign of tractor gas caps); Teret & Jacobs, supra note 296, at 18-19 (discuss-
ing redesign of rear seat belt in automobile). There is also persuasive evidence
that product liability litigation has caused manufacturers to improve product use
instructions and warning labels. Lambert, supra note 162, at 48, 52-53.
302. Prentice & Roszkowski, supra note 259, at 280-81. Negative publicity
leads to safer products for several reasons: (1) it allows competitors to take ad-
vantage of a producer's safety problem; (2) it causes the producer seriously to
consider remedying the problem; (3) it provides consumers with information
concerning which products to avoid; (4) it causes an increase in the price of the
defective product, which causes sales of such product to decline; and (5) it alerts
government agencies to product risk information. lId
303. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978) ("[A] prod-
uct may be found defective in design ... if through hindsight the jury deter-
mines that the product's design embodies 'excessive preventable danger,' or, in
other words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged
design outweighs the benefits of such design.") (citation omitted).
304. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1041 (Or. 1974); see
also Prentice & Roszowski, supra note 259, at 277-79 (stating that because of
Pinto fiasco at Ford, company has instituted much closer working relationship
between safety engineers and in-house attorneys).
305. Seminar paper of Dawn Fink, third year student at Temple Law School
(1992-1993) (on file with author). One must distinguish the conclusion that
strict liability enhances product safety, on the one hand, from the conclusion-
not being made here-that strict liability enhances product safety efficiently. The
debates and comments discussing how efficiently aspects of tort compensation
operate, and whether a reformed tort compensation system or other societal
mechanism would operate more efficiently, are too extensive to explore in this
Article. For a list of articles addressing this issue, see supra note 296. According
to Richard Abel, "even a strict liability system with a one hundred percent claims
rate (an empirical impossibility) remains seriously flawed." Abel, Critique of Torts,
supra note 296, at 829; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort
Law and Governmental Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281 (1980) (proposing new
federal safety superagency with power to regulate product safety broadly);
Sugarman, supra note 284, at 269-70 (advocating elimination of tort compensa-
tion system except for intentional torts, and replacing it with combination of
compensation through social insurance and employee-benefit systems, and de-
1422 [Vol. 38: p. 1361
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proving the safety benefits of strict products liability, and/or until
an effective, public, administrative mechanism supplants the com-
mon-law solution to product injuries, courts must give preference
to prevention and regard compensation as the second best
solution.
2. Deterrence Through Process
a. Imputing Risk Knowledge
Courts can create greater deterrence in design defect cases in
several ways. The most obvious is to impute knowledge of prod-
uct risks to defendants.306 Courts have in fact done this for many
years, and continue to do so in many jurisdictions. 30 7 Some com-
terrence exclusively through administrative agencies). But see David G. Owen,
Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CAL. L. REV. 665, 675 (1985) ("Yet the
day of such major social welfare changes (i.e., separating compensation, to be
provided by a public welfare system, from deterrence, to be provided by the
public regulatory sector] in our system is, I think, a long way off.").
306. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products
Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 928-29 (1981) (stating that liability is strict to ex-
tent that knowledge of design hazards that are known at time of trial is imputed
to manufacturer) [hereinafter Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension]; Wade,
Strict Tort Liability, supra note 284, at 834-35. The knowledge that is imputed to
manufacturers is the knowledge of product danger revealed as of the time of
trial. Id. at 834-35. This knowledge is imputed back either to the time of manu-
facture or the time when the product was first placed in the stream of commerce.
Id. In either case, the imputation is said to create strict manufacturer liability
because the manufacturer may be liable without fault, i.e., without actually
knowing of the risk the product poses to consumers. IM For a detailed discus-
sion concerning the imputation of knowledge in various jurisdictions, see Wert-
heimer, supra note 3, at 1213-71 (arguing that knowledge of product risks must
be imputed back to time of manufacture for strict product liability doctrine to
remain truly strict).
307. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or.
1974). The Phillips court stated that:
A dangerously defective article would be one which a reasonable per-
son would not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its
harmful character. The test, therefore, is whether the seller would be
negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk involved. Strict liability
imposes what amounts to constructive knowledge of the condition of
the product.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The traditional authority for imputing knowledge of the
risk to the manufacturer is the scholarship of Deans Wade and Keeton, cited in
the footnotes omitted from the above quote. Id. In light of the commentaries
espoused by Deans Wade and Keeton, courts have continued to impute knowl-
edge of design risks to manufacturers. See, e.g., Robertson v. General Tire and
Rubber Co., 462 N.E.2d 706, 710 (I11. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that trial court's
instruction that defendant had to know of product's danger in strict liability de-
sign case was erroneous); Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429,
433 (Ky. 1980) ("[S]trict liability makes unnecessary proof by the plaintiff of
what a prudent manufacturer exercising ordinary care actually should have dis-
covered and foreseen as in a negligence action."); Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty
Ins. Co., 250 S.2d 754, 756 (La. 1971) (stating that when product is hazardous in
19931 1423
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mentators, on the other hand, are opposed to the imputation of
knowledge.30 8 Even Dean Wade, to whom, along with Dean Kee-
normal use, and therefore defective, "the plaintiff need not prove any particular
negligence by the maker in its manufacture or processing; for the manufacturer
is presumed to know of the vices in the things he makes, whether or not he has
actual knowledge of them"); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204,
207-08 (N.Y. 1983) ("[A] manufacturer is held liable regardless of his lack of•
actual knowledge of the condition of the product .... ); Peterson v. Safeway
Steel Scaffolds Co., 400 N.W.2d 909, 912 (S.D. 1987)("For purposes of the strict
tort claims, but not for purposes of the negligence claim, knowledge of the po-
tential risk is imputed to the manufacturer."). According to one court:
[I]n a strict liability analysis, the defendant is assumed to know of the
dangerous propensity of the product .... The question in strict liability
design-defect and warning cases is whether, assuming that the manu-
facturer knew of the defect in the product, he acted in a reasonably
prudent manner in marketing the product .... (O]nce the defendant's
knowledge of the defect is imputed, strict liability analysis becomes al-
most identical to negligence analysis ....
Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 385-86 (NJ. 1984). Similarly, another
court stated:
(I]t is assumed that this hypothetical prudent supplier knows all the
risks of the use of the product revealed at the trial .... [T]his liability is
not rested upon what he knew or should have known when the manu-
factured or sold the product; it rests on his placing into the stream of
commerce a product which is demonstrated at trial to have been dan-
gerous. The damaging event may not have been reasonably foresee-
able at the time of manufacture or sale because the dangerous factor of
the product might not then have been even reasonably knowable.
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 347, 351 (Tex. 1977); see also
Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that
"in strict liability actions... we focus not on the reasonableness of the defend-
ant's conduct but on the product, and we ... in effect impute to the manufac-
turer defendant current scientific knowledge of the risk caused by his product (as
in a risk/benefit design defect balancing case)"); Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhat-
tan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549-50 (Haw. 1987) (deciding issue of whether manufac-
turer knew of dangers inherent in allegedly defective product is irrelevant to
issue of liability, and concluding that it is not necessary to adopt fiction that
defendant is presumed to know of dangers); Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571
S.W.2d 683, 688-90 (Mo. 1978) (holding that neither negligence, knowledge or
fault of manufacturer are relevant when recovery is sought under strict liability);
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1327 n.3 (Or. 1978) ("The jury
[in a strict design defect case] is to be instructed in terms of what a reasonably
prudent manufacturer would have done had he known of the harmful character-
istics of the product."); Wertheimer, supra note 3, at 1249 (arguing that Barker v.
Lull Eng'g Co., decided by California Supreme Court in 1978, implicitly made
manufacturer knowledge of product risks irrelevant in both design and warning
cases). For a discussion of how some states have eliminated the imputation of
knowledge, see Wertheimer, supra note 3, at 1206.
308. See Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 3, at 1517.
Henderson and Twerski admit that imposing liability for unforeseeable risks
might foster greater safety investment. Id. They refuse to impute such knowl-
edge, however, because of the difficulty-or impossibility-of insuring against
unforeseeable and/or indeterminate risks and because of the manufacturer's
right to be held to a liability standard it is "capable of meeting". Id. See generally
Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension, supra note 306, passim (arguing that
courts should not impute knowledge of risk to manufacturer); Wertheimer, supra
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ton, the idea of imputing the knowledge of product risk to manu-
facturers is credited, has apparently retreated from this
position. 30 9
In the design context, imputing knowledge of product risks
to manufacturers comports with reality. Manufacturers almost al-
ways know, or easily could know, of design risks.3 10 By taking ad-
vantage of general consumer unawareness of these product
hazards, 311 manufacturers are able to, and unfortunately do, "im-
pose value choices on passive, unconsenting users, consumers,
and bystanders."3 1 2 If in design cases manufacturers do, or easily
could, have knowledge of product risks, it might seem redundant
for courts to impute such knowledge. Regardless of manufac-
turer knowledge, however, there are basic and fundamental de-
terrence reasons for imputing knowledge to manufacturers.313
note 3, at 1206 n.76 (stating that "the vast majority of commentators now op-
pose imputing knowledge of unknowable dangers").
309. John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable
Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 764 (1983) ("Indeed, I would now be
inclined to think that there is no longer any particular value in using the as-
sumed-knowledge language."). For a further discussion concerning the Wade-
Keeton views on the relevance of a manufacturer's knowledge of product
hazards, see Wertheimer, supra note 3, at 1196-97 n.46.
310. For a discussion concerning manufacturers' access to information
about product risks, see supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
311. For further discussion concerning how manufacturers take advantage
of consumer ignorance of product design hazards, see supra notes 256-60 and
accompanying text.
312. Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension, supra note 306, at 965. Pro-
fessor Henderson states that if product manufacturers are dominant and power-
ful, and consumers are passive and uninformed, then various forms of strict
products liability, including imputation of knowledge of risk to manufacturers,
are appropriate-at least on fairness grounds. Id. Henderson concedes that
consumers are "frequently misinformed as to the risks and benefits." Id. at 953
n.138. He insists, however, that consumers are the only ones who know what
they want, and that when they are well-informed they make efficient decisions
about their consumption. Id. Henderson apparently believes that the knowl-
edge/power discrepancy between manufacturers and consumers is not signifi-
cant, and that manufacturers are merely the "conduits through which the value
choices of users and consumers find expression." Id. at 965. For a discussion
concerning the nature of corporate decision-making and its affect on product
safety, see supra notes 167-252 and accompanying text.
313. See Wertheimer, supra note 3, at 1193 (arguing that imputing knowl-
edge may serve goals of simplifying litigation process, encouraging product
safety and increasing cost-spreading and fairness). This author contends that
the deterrence goal is the most important strict liability policy served by imputing
knowledge. Of course, imputing knowledge serves additional products liability
goals as well. Specifically, imputing knowledge eases the plaintiff's burden and
simplifies the overall litigation process. See Wertheimer, supra note 3, at 1193
(noting that imputing knowledge relieves plaintiff of burden of proving that
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In the typical case, where a manufacturer knows, or easily
could know, of the design risks in its product, imputing knowl-
edge of such risks eases a plaintiff's burden of proof.31 4 In such
cases, imputing knowledge creates certainty and predictability
that the manufacturer will not be able to avoid responsibility
merely because, for example, the plaintiff may have difficulty
proving the manufacturer's knowledge. Moreover, in such cases,
the manufacturer will have greater incentive to, and less excuse
not to, make safety calculations.3 15
In the unusual case, where the manufacturer does not know
of a product's design risks,316 imputing knowledge of the risk to
the manufacturer creates an incentive to seek out such risks.317
The failure to impute knowledge of product risks in design cases
can create disincentives for product safety that increase product
risks and user injuries. In Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales,
Inc. ,318 the defendant admitted that it knew of the presence of for-
maldehyde in its mobile homes.31 9 The defendant also knew of
the general risks associated with formaldehyde. 320 Nonetheless,
the Alaska Supreme Court refused to impute knowledge of the
risk of the particular kind of lung disease that the plaintiff's wife
had contracted.321
314. For a detailed discussion concerning manufacturer knowledge of de-
sign risks, see supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
315. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1040-41 (Or.
1974) (stating that imposing liability in design defect case will cause manufac-
turer to at least make safety calculations and take greater care in designing safer
products).
316. See, e.g., Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059,
1063 (Alaska 1979). In Heritage, the manufacturer admitted that it was aware
that its mobile homes contained dangerous formaldehyde fumes. Id. at 1061
n.4. There was evidence, however, that the manufacturer could not have known
of the particular risk of lung damage created by the insulating material. Id. An
expert witness testified for the defense that "exposure to the concentrations of
formaldehyde which were measured in [plaintiffs'] mobile home for the length of
time that [plaintiffs] resided there are not known scientifically to cause perma-
nent deep lung damage of the type suffered by (wife/plaintiff]." Id.
317. Courts ought to create incentives for manufacturers to conduct exten-
sive research on, for example, the materials they incorporate into their products.
Where there is any question of the toxicity of a material, such as insulating mate-
rial, manufacturers ought to have incentives to calculate the costs of utilizing a
less risky substitute. This is true even where available scientific information
does not indicate that a particular risk is extreme, as was apparently the case in
Heritage. Id. at 1063.
318. 604 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 1979).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Itd Over plaintiffs' objection, an expert testified that the specific con-
centration of formaldehyde in plaintiffs' mobile home was "not known scientifi-
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The court's failure to impute knowledge in a design case may
cause manufacturers to ignore rather than to act on general risk
information similar to that possessed by the manufacturer in Heri-
tage.322 In Heritage, the court's decision failed to create any incen-
tive for the manufacturer to discontinue use of the materials that
emitted the formaldehyde that damaged the lungs of the plain-
tiff's wife; it also failed to create any general incentive for manu-
facturers to become knowledgeable about the toxicity of materials
and to consider substituting alternative, safer materials. 323
cally to cause permanent deep lung damage of the type suffered by [plaintiff
wife]." Id.
322. The manufacturer's awareness of risk in Heritage is perhaps similar to
that of asbestos manufacturers during the period from 1930 to the early 1960s.
See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1092 (5th Cir. 1973)
(noting that defendant claimed it did not fail to warn plaintiff of possible danger
involved in asbestos inhalation because this danger was not foreseeable until
around 1968, and plaintiff had been exposed in late 1930s); Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 542-543 (N.J. 1982) (explaining that de-
fendants claimed that until 1960s they believed danger from asbestos was lim-
ited to workers in asbestos textile mills). The asbestos manufacturers claimed
that they could not have known of the risks to workers who used asbestos prod-
ucts, in contrast to the risks to workers in the asbestos industry who were con-
stantly exposed to pure asbestos while on the job. The asbestos manufacturers
took the position that the state of scientific and medical knowledge precluded
knowing about the risks to the former, although they knew about risks to asbes-
tos industry workers as early as the 1930s and 1940s. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1092
("inhere is ample evidence in the record that the danger of inhaling asbestos
... was widely recognized at least as early as the 1930's."). The New Jersey
Supreme Court refused to accept the manufacturers' argument, and refused to
allow evidence of scientific unknowability for any reason; thus, the court seem-
ingly imputed knowledge of an unknowable risk to defendants. See Beshada, 447
A.2d at 542 ("There is substantial factual dispute about what defendants knew
and when they knew it. A trial judge in the Eastern District of Texas, the forum
for numerous asbestos-related cases, has concluded that '[k]nowledge of the
danger can be attributed to the industry as early as the mid-1930's .... ');
Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 388 (N.J. 1984). The Feldman court
stated that:
We note, in passing, that, although not argued and determined in
Beshada, there were or may have been data and other information gen-
erally available, aside from scientific knowledge, that arguably could
have alerted the manufacturer at an early state in the distribution of its
product to the dangers associated with its use.
Id. From a deterrence perspective, the New Jersey court was effectively saying
that the manufacturers had enough information-even if not definitive informa-
tion about the particular risk in question-to be required to pursue more studies
and testing, and to share their own data. Id Through these processes, the man-
ufacturer almost certainly would have obtained particular risk information, be-
yond the general risk information they already had, enabling them to provide a
product warning. Id. For a spirited and persuasive defense of Beshada based on
the premise that the defendant manufacturers could not have known of the risks,
and were therefore required to do the impossible, i.e., warn about risks they
could not know, see Wertheimer, supra note 3, at 1213-27.
323. Heritage, 604 P.2d at 1063.
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The unusual cases, in which the manufacturer does not know
of a particular product risk, tend to involve chemical or toxic sub-
stances, or pharmaceutical drug products . 2 4 A majority of such
cases are raised as failure to warn claims.3 25 Several courts in
these failure to warn cases have refused to impute knowledge of
the product's risk to the manufacturer, and have instead admitted
evidence of scientific and technological unknowability of the risk
at issue.3 26 In Heritage, the Alaska Supreme Court effectively
treated the plaintiff's claim the same as those courts who have
eliminated the imputation of knowledge in failure to warn
cases.3 2
7
While courts do impute knowledge of risk to manufacturers
in design defect cases,3 28 several courts have suggested that such
324. See, e.g., id.; see also Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 17, at 462-68
(discussing how moral quality of manufacturers' choices depends on knowledge
of danger held by manufacturer and consumer); Wertheimer, supra note 3, at
1195 n.41 (discussing hindsight and rarity of unknowable product dangers at
time of manufacture).
325. Because a majority of cases involving a manufacturer that does not
know of particular product risks are brought as failure to warn claims, it was
somewhat unusual or a case like Heritage to be based on a claim of manufactur-
ing or design defect. For a discussion of Heritage, see supra notes 318-23 and
infra notes 327, 334-39.
326. See Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 550
(Cal. 1991) (concluding that state-of-the-art evidence is admissible in failure to
warn context because exclusion of such evidence would make manufacturer "vir-
tual insurer of product's safe use," which is not consonant with strict liability
policies); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (NJ. 1984) (noting that
in failure to warn context manufacturer's conduct should be measured by "sci-
entific, technological and other information available when the product was dis-
tributed"). For a more detailed discussion concerning the imputation of
knowledge in the failure to warn context, see Wertheimer, supra note 3, at 1212-
71 (arguing that refusal to impute knowledge in failure to warn context abol-
ishes strict products liability and improperly imposes loss on consumer rather
than manufacturer thereby violating basic tenet of strict products liability).
327. Heritage, 604 P.2d at 1062. In Heritage, the plaintiffs' complaint failed
to clearly distinguish between manufacturing defect and design defect, but in
any event never implied that the claim was based on failure to warn. Id. The
plaintiffs' claim, set forth in their appellate brief, was based on a manufacturing
defect only, although, as the supreme court noted, the jury instructions required
the jury to decide whether there was either a design or a manufacturing defect.
Id. The court thus viewed the claim as one based on both design and manufac-
turing defect. For further discussion concerning manufacturer awareness of
product risks, see supra notes 322, 324 and accompanying text.
328. Courts impute knowledge of risks in design defect cases because man-
ufacturers actually know of these risks. This prevents a non-issue from becom-
ing an issue in the heat of litigation. For a detailed discussion concerning
manufacturer knowledge of design risk, see supra notes 41-58 and accompanying
text. In addition, imputing knowledge of design risks promotes other goals of
strict liability, especially that of deterrence. For further discussion concerning
the goals of strict product liability, see supra notes 292-305 and accompanying
text.
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imputation may not be appropriate in failure to warn claims.3 29
Although design defects and manufacturing defects may be evalu-
ated by reference to the product itself, warning defects can be
evaluated only by reference to an alleged defect extraneous to the
risk inherent in the product itself.330 Thus, there is some basis
for regarding warning claims as the equivalent of negligence
cases.331 Another way of making the distinction between design
defect and warning claims is to view the so-called state-of-the-art
in design cases as the scientific or technological knowledge that
manufacturers usually have, or could have, and by which they
could create a safer alternative design;33 2 in warning cases, be-
cause there is usually no possibility to design the product more
safely, the only state-of-the-art evidence is the manufacturer's
329. See Feldman, 479 A.2d at 386. In Feldman, the court upheld the New
Jersey rule that assumes that manufacturers, in both design and warning cases,
know of the product risk. Id. Thereafter, however, the court stated that it would
allow evidence of scientific and technological feasibility, apparently without ref-
erence to the manufacturer's knowledge of product risks. Id. The court then
created an exception for warning cases: a manufacturer is only liable if it knew,
or should have known, of the risk at the time of distribution based on scientific
and technological information then available. Id; see also Anderson, 810 P.2d at
550, 553. The issue presented in Anderson was whether a manufacturer in a fail-
ure to warn case may present evidence that a particular risk was unknown and
unknowable, based on scientific knowledge available at the time of manufac-
ture/distribution. Id. at 550. The court ultimately stated that excluding such
evidence, "when the basis of liability is failure to warn, would make a manufacturer
the virtual insurer of its product's safe use, a result that is not consonant with
established principles underlying strict liability." Id. The Anderson court ex-
pressly refused to decide whether such evidence is admissible in design defect
cases pursued under the California rule announced in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.,
573 P.2d 243 (Cal. 1973), and applied either a consumer expectations test or the
risk/benefit analysis. Id. at 551 n.2.
330. Anderson, 810 P.2d at 558 (noting that "while manufacturing or design
defect(s] can be evaluated without reference to the conduct of the manufacturer,
the giving of a warning cannot") (citations omitted); Feldman, 479 A.2d at 386
(limiting manufacturer duty in warning cases by comment j, Restatement (Second)
of Torts, which requires warnings only if manufacturer knew, or should have
known, of product risks).
331. Feldman, 479 A.2d at 386 ("Under this standard negligence and strict
liability in warning cases may be deemed to be functional equivalents."); Carter
v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 557 F. Supp 1317, 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1983) (stating
that to require that danger be reasonably foreseeable so that prudent manufac-
turer would not have marketed product with knowledge of such danger "is to
render the test for whether a product is defective and unreasonably dangerous
due to lack of adequate warning indistinguishable from a negligence test").
332. In design cases, courts can impute knowledge of a product's risk and
then, without reference to the manufacturer's knowledge, allow evidence of
state-of-the-art, i.e., whether scientific and technological knowledge would allow
a safer redesign of the product, relative to the risk-benefit factors. For discus-
sion concerning how the risk-benefit analysis is used to determine the optimum
level of safety for products, see supra note 275.
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knowledge of the product's risk.333
Heritage not only undermined the important deterrent effects
of strict products liability in design defect cases, but also effec-
tively eliminated strict liability altogether.33 4 The court appar-
ently confused what the manufacturer did not know about the
particular risk, on the one hand, with the manufacturer's scientific
and technological ability to eliminate the known risk by creating a
safer design, i.e., the ability to use an insulating product that does
not contain formaldehyde, on the other.335
Therefore, the Heritage court's conclusion that failure to al-
low evidence of the manufacturer's lack of knowledge concerning
the specific risk "would effectively mean absolute liability" is erro-
neous for two reasons.33 6 First, the manufacturer admitted that it
knew of the general risk associated with formaldehyde products,
and had the wherewithal to substitute a non-formaldehyde insu-
lating product 3 37 Second, under the risk-benefit balancing test
for design defect, the liability is strict because liability is imposed
if a product's risks-whether known or not at the time of manu-
facturer-outweigh the product's benefits. 338 Thus, the liability is
not absolute even if the manufacturer does not know of the risks
because liability attaches only after the product is determined, on
balance, to be defective.3 39
333. Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 n.1 (Haw.
1987) (stating that "state-of-the-art" refers to ability to discover products' dan-
gers when it is marketed due to scientific or technological knowledge available at
that time); Feldman, 479 A.2d at 386 ("[T]he state of the art refers not only to the
common practice and standards in the industry but also to the other design al-
ternatives within practical and technological limits at the time of distribution.")
(citing Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 405 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1981)).
In Heritage, although the court analyzed the design defect claim as if it were a
warning claim, the circumstances were more like those of the typical design
claim. Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Alaska
1979). In fact, the manufacturer could have redesigned the mobile home using
materials that did not emit any formaldehyde. Id.
334. For a discussion of the Heritage decision, see supra notes 318-23 and
accompanying text.
335. Heritage, 604 P.2d at 1063-64 ("Thus, we think that 'scientific
knowability' of the injurious nature of the product should be considered be-
cause, otherwise, imposition of liability for a design defect would effectively
mean absolute liability, even though there is no alternative way for the manufac-
turer to discover the risk and remedy it.").
336. Id at 1063.
337. Id. at 1061 n.4.
338. For a brief discussion of the imputation of knowledge, see supra note
326 and accompanying text.
339. In effect, Heritage ignores the negligence-like balancing that occurs
when courts subject design defects to the risk-benefit analysis. Risk-benefit bal-
ancing under Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., the test adopted by the Alaska court, occurs
1430 [Vol. 38: p. 1361
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Courts can create additional safety incentives in design cases,
without unfairly burdening manufacturers, by limiting use of so-
called state-of-the-art evidence in two ways.3 40 First, courts can
disallow evidence of mere industry custom. Second, courts can
limit the application of evidence respecting a practicable, safer,
alternative design to the relevant risk-benefit factors such that this
evidence would be neither a defense per se for the manufacturer
nor an element per se of plaintiff's prima facie case.3 4'
With respect to whether there is a practicable, safer, alterna-
tive design, courts can create significant deterrence by distin-
guishing mere industry custom evidence from evidence of
in hindsight. Heritage, 604 P.2d at 1063. The factors to be balanced include,
among others, the magnitude of the risk, the likely incidence of the risk,
mechanical and financial feasibility of a safer alternative, and the alternative de-
sign's impact on the product and on users. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573
P.2d 443,455-57 (Cal. 1978). Although liability may be imposed without fault-
e.g., when a manufacturer knowingly places a dangerous product into the stream
of commerce-the liability is not absolute because it is created only when the
product is found to be more dangerous than is reasonable under the circum-
stances, given its inherent risks and benefits. This standard is certainly closer to
a reasonableness standard, on the liability spectrum, than to absolute liability.
Many courts, including the Heritage court, have voiced concern over absolute
liability, but this author is aware of no decision that actually imposes an absolute
liability standard. Nor is it clear that the jury in Heritage would have found the
product defective even had knowledge of the risk been imputed to the manufac-
turer. Given the dispute over whether the particular risk to plaintiff was foresee-
able, the jury could have attributed substantial weight to the testimony that
suggested a small likelihood of injury and found the mobile home to be, on
balance, safe. See Heritage, 604 P.2d at 1063.
340. Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 3, at 1517. The
assertion that a "manufacturer's right to be held to a liability standard which it is
capable of meeting," implies that there are significant product risks that manu-
facturers cannot know and eliminate. Id. At least in the design context, this
assertion is not valid. For a discussion concerning why this assertion is not valid,
see supra notes 237-42 and accompanying text. Furthermore, because consum-
ers have rights as extensive and important as those of manufacturers, should not
those of consumers sometimes take precedence? For example, where consumer
and manufacturer rights conflict and, in the exceptional case, where the manu-
facturer has no knowledge of the risks, who should prevail? Arguably, the con-
sumer should prevail. After all, even in the exceptional case in which
manufacturers are unaware of a product's risk, consumers are also completely
unaware. Considering that most products are fungible so that consumers could
choose a safer one if they were aware of risks inherent in a particular brand, only
the manufacturer benefits from sales that injure some consumers. Thus, in this
context, fairness seems to point in the direction of protecting consumers, not
manufacturers.
341. For a discussion proposing that courts shift the burden to manufactur-
ers to prove, by evidence relevant to the risk-benefit factors, that the product is
on balance safe, see infra notes 392-467.
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scientific and technological feasibility.3 42 The failure to do so can
create major disincentives for manufacturers to seek out safer de-
signs. Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey343 is a prime example of
this error. 44 In Boatland, the plaintiffs' decedent was thrown out
of his fishing boat when the boat collided with a submerged ob-
ject.345 Thereafter, the plaintiffs' decedent was killed by the pro-
peller when the boat circled back toward him.3 46 The plaintiffs
alleged, inter alia, that the boat was defective because it failed to
automatically turn off when the plaintiffs' decedent was thrown
from the boat.3 47 A central issue at trial, in the intermediate ap-
pellate court and in the supreme court, was whether evidence of
commercial unavailability of an automatic shut-off switch was ad-
missible in a strict liability design case.3 48 The trial court allowed
the evidence, and the jury found that the boat was not defectively
designed.3 49 The appellate court reversed based on this issue and
the supreme court reversed the appellate court based on the same
issue. 350
In a narrow evidentiary sense, the Boatland court was correct
in asserting that the evidence of commercial unavailability was
relevant to determining the feasibility of installing a safety switch
on the boat.351 If, at the time the boat in question was con-
structed, all manufacturers failed to incorporate such a safety
switch into their boats, that industry-wide custom would have
some, however slight, probative value of the infeasibility of doing
so.3 5 2 The weak relevance of this evidence is underscored, how-
342. A majority of jurisdictions have allowed evidence of industry custom
relevant to determinations of defect under a risk-benefit analysis. David A. Ur-
ban, Custom's Proper Role in Strict Products Liability Actions Based on Design Defect, 38
UCLA L. REv. 439, 442 (1990). These jurisdictions, however, have not made
such decisions with adequate regard for the role of deterrence in strict products
liability.
343. 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
344. Id. at 748 (discussing distinction between industry "custom" and
"state of the art").
345. Id. at 745.
346. Id at 745. The facts of the case were unclear as to whether the propel-
ler struck the plaintiff's decedent when he was first thrown out of the boat or
after the boat circled back towards him. Id.
347. Id. The plaintiffs also alleged that the seating arrangement was inade-
quate and that the steering and throttle designs were unsafe. Id.
348. Id. at 745-48.
349. Id. at 745.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 748-49.
352. The automobile industry epitomizes industry-wide practices of with-
holding safety equipment from products without a valid financial or technologi-
cal reason. See, e.g., Horn v. General Motors Corp., 551 P.2d 398, 401-02 (Cal.
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ever, by the undisputed evidence that riacing boats had such de-
vices for over thirty years,3 53 and by the lack of evidence that the
device would have been expensive or technologically difficult.3 54
Even given its relevance, however, the prejudicial effect cre-
ated by evidence of industry custom subverts any serious incen-
tives for manufacturers to apply existing technology for optimum
design safety. Although the defendant in Boatland was actually the
retailer of the boat, the manufacturer testified on its behalf.3 55
The manufacturer's testimony echoed that of several other wit-
nesses: no safety switch was commercially available at the time
this boat was manufactured, and it first became aware of such de-
vices a year or two after the date of manufacture.3 56
Despite the fact that technology for the safety switch was
available,35 7 that need for such devices was well-known in the
boating world, 358 and that the defendant offered no evidence of
infeasibility-such as inadequate time for application and imple-
mentation or inordinate cost or impairment of the boat's useful-
ness- 3 59the court effectively allowed the defendant manufacturer
to argue that it had no duty to incorporate a feasible safety device
into its product merely because such a device was not available
"off the shelf" in the commercial market.360 Evidence was
presented that an independent inventor, rather than a boat manu-
facturer, obtained the first patent for a safety switch that he began
1976) (raising defense of industry practice when cheap screw would have cor-
rected defect in horn ring); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 290 A.2d 281, 285-86
(NJ. 1972) (holding that evidence showing entire power press industry sold
products without safety guards was no defense, and jury could find that manu-
facturer failed to incorporate adequate safety into its own presses).
353. Boatand of Houston, Inc., 609 S.W.2d at 747.
354. Id. at 746-48. In addition, homemade crash throttles, serving the
same purpose as safety switches, had been in use for a long time prior to the
death of plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 747.
355. Id. at 746-47.
356. Id. at 747.
357. The safety switches on racing boats and homemade crash throttles on
other boats had both been around for many years before the boat in question
was built. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id at 748-49.
360. The plaintiff in Boatland failed to offer any evidence that similar boats
actually utilized the safety switch, and therefore implied that the industry custom
was to manufacture similar boats without such safety devices. Allowing the evi-
dence of industry custom, of course, is not equivalent to allowing a per se de-
fense based on industry custom. For a discussion of why allowing evidence of
industry custom is not equivalent to allowing a per se defense based on industry
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to manufacture for commercial availability approximately one
year after the boat in question was built.36' Given the back-
ground of available technology and general awareness of the
risk,362 any manufacturer with minimal incentive to eliminate the
risk could have engineered a safety switch that most likely would
have prevented the death of plaintiffs' decedent.
Appel v. Standex International Corp.363 provides another illustra-
tion of how courts have undermined deterrence by applying a
mechanical state-of-the-art defense. In Appel, the plaintiff-a
nurse-injured her back while turning a patient in a hospital bed
containing wheel brakes that failed to hold in the locked posi-
tion.3 6 4 The plaintiff's evidence consisted, in part, of two video-
taped reenactments of the incident: one depicting the type of
wheel brakes utilized on the bed when she was injured, and one
depicting differently designed brakes.3 65 Because the plaintiff
could not produce evidence that the substitute brakes were com-
mercially available when the bed was manufactured, the evidence
was ruled inadmissible.36 6 Despite evidence that the alternative
brake design was technically feasible at all relevant times, 3 67 the
court held that a jury could not find that the alternative brakes
were practicable without evidence of commercial availability.3 68
The Appel court, like the Boatland court, gave substantial
weight to the fact that the manufacturer chose to rely on a compo-
861. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 609 S.W.2d at 746-47. The inventor of the
safety switch, who began developing the idea two years earlier, kept it to himself
until he obtained the patent. IM.
362. For a discussion of the background of available technology and gen-
eral manufacturer awareness of the risk in Boatland, see supra notes 343-60 and
accompanying text.
363. 660 P.2d 686 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
364. Id at 687.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 687-88.
367. Id. at 688. Plaintiff's expert testified that the scientific principles in-
volved in the alternative brake design were known when the bed was manufac-
tured. Id. This evidence apparently was not contradicted by defendant.
368. Id. According to the Appel court:
There was no evidence that the alternative design was practicable in the
sense that wheel brakes of that design were commercially available
when the bed was manufactured.
... Use of the alternative safer design cannot be said to be 'practi-
cable' if the defendant is not in the business of manufacturing the com-
ponent part, and if a part ificorporating the allegedly safer design is not
available for purchase.
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nent part manufacturer for the allegedly defective part.8 69 This
implies that manufacturers can consciously limit their liability by
manufacturing fewer components themselves, and instead buying
more component parts from independent third parties. 370 It is
hard to believe that courts allow such a delegation of responsibil-
ity when manufacturers of a finished/final product are generally
liable for defects in parts supplied by component parts
manufacturers 371
When courts fail to create reasonable safety incentives by not
reasonably limiting evidence of common industry practice, manu-
facturers will probably avoid seeking out, engineering and incor-
porating important safety devices into their products.3 72
Allowing evidence of industry custom in these circumstances en-
courages juries to find that an industry's actions were reasonable
despite clear evidence that the industry as a whole, or any given
manufacturer, reasonably could have provided greater safety that
would have prevented the plaintiff's injury.378 This situation
369. Id. ("Use of the alternative design cannot be said to be 'practicable' if
the defendant is not in the business of manufacturing the component part
:.. "). In Boatland, the court emphasized the evidence of commercial unavaila-
bility in the market of a switch that would have prevented the death of plaintiffs'
decedent. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 609 S.W.2d at 747-49. This seems to assume
that the failure of a component parts supplier to make that product is an excuse
for defendant's failure to correct the defect, a correction the evidence demon-
strated could have been done with relative ease. Id. Not surprisingly, this ap-
proach allows a jury to render exactly the same erroneous conclusion at trial.
370. In Boatland, rather than incorporating a defective safety device as in
Appel, neither the defendant retailer nor the non-defendant manufacturer had
purchased a component part safety device from another manufacturer because
such devices were commercially unavailable. Boatland of Houston, Inc., 609
S.W.2d at 746-48. Thus, the Boatland decision implies that a seller may rely on
market failures, including those of component part manufacturers, to not seek
out, develop or employ existing technology.
371. See, e.g., Lee v. Butcher Boy, 215 Cal. Rptr. 195, 199 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) ("We have found no case in which a component part manufacturer who
had no role in designing the finished product and who supplied a non-defective
component part, was held liable for the defective design of the finished
product.").
372. See Urban, supra note 342, at 480. In an article on custom evidence in
design defect cases, David Urban argues that evidence of industry custom serves
several important purposes, while conceding that such evidence tends to under-
cut the deterrence goal of strict liability. Id. Urban also criticizes courts that do
not allow evidence of industry custom in design cases for basing those rulings on
the assumption that consumers know little or nothing about product safety fea-
tures. Id. at 486. The reality is, however, that in the context of design defects,
this assumption is valid. For a discussion of why this assumption is valid in the
context of design defect, see supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text.
373. For a discussion of why allowing evidence of industry custom encour-
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comes perilously close to allowing an industry to set its own stan-
dards of liability. 74
Courts can also create incentives for manufacturers to design
safety into products by limiting the significance of state-of-the-art
evidence in the risk-benefit balancing test.375 State-of-the-art evi-
dence is the basis upon which a jury effectively determines
whether there is a safer alternative design that the defendant
manufacturer ought to have incorporated into its product.376 A
few courts make state-of-the-art evidence, in the form of a safer,
feasible, alternative design, a specific prerequisite to a determina-
tion of product defect.8 77 In fact, one suggested revision of sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes exactly the
same proposal.8 78 The better approach, however, is to regard ev-
374. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 449 n.4 (Cal. 1978) (stating
that trial court had instructed jury that "an industry cannot set its own
standards").
375. State-of-the-art generally refers to the scientific and technological
knowledge that is available to make a product safer. The technological "envi-
ronment" surrounding a particular product includes not only scientific and tech-
nological knowledge, but also the economic feasibility and the practicalities of
implementing a safer design. See, e.g., Boatland of Houston, Inc., 609 S.W.2d at
748. This technological "environment" is incorporated into the risk-benefit
analysis, under Barker, in the factors regarding "the mechanical feasibility of a
safer alternative design, [and] the financial cost of an improved design." Barker,
573 P.2d at 455. Under Dean Wade's risk-benefit analysis, the technological
"environment" is incorporated in the factors regarding "(t]he availability of a
substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe...
[and] [t]he manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the prod-
uct without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its
utility." Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 284, at 837.
376. For a discussion concerning why manufacturers must eliminate prod-
uct risks by incorporating safer design alternatives, see supra notes 253-91 and
accompanying text.
377. See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 579 P.2d 1287, 1287 (Or.
1978) ("In our original opinion in this products liability case we held that a
prima facie case of design defect must include evidence which would permit a
finding that a safer design would have been practicable."). Compare this state-
ment with an earlier statement made by the Wilson court:
There might be cases in which the jury would be permitted to hold the
defendant liable on account of a dangerous design feature even though
no safer design was feasible (or there was no evidence of a safer practi-
cable alternative). If. for example, the danger was relatively severe and
the product had only limited utility, the court might properly conclude
that the jury could find that a reasonable manufacturer would not have
introduced such a product into the stream of commerce.
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (Or. 1978).
378. Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 3, at 1514 (propos-
ing as black letter rule of § 402A that liability for design defects may be found
"only if the foreseeable risks of harm presented by the product, when and as
marketed, could have been reduced at reasonable cost by the seller's adoption of
a safer design").
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idence of safer, feasible, alternative design as information that a
jury may consider-but to which a jury need not necessarily attri-
bute much weight-in determining whether a product is
defective.3
79
An obvious reason for not requiring evidence of a safer de-
sign as a prerequisite to liability is to create a kind of macro deter-
rence. When a product contains exceptional design dangers,
courts have recognized that manufacturers ought to keep the
product off the market if the product has limited utility and there
is no safer alternative design that will minimize or eliminate such
risks. °80 Manufacturers need not concern themselves unduly with
this "sanction," however, because it will occur infrequently at
best. Two reasons support this assertion. 8 First, as has been
demonstrated, manufacturers can make most defective designs
safer with reasonable effort and cost-i.e., safer designs are usu-
379. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139, 1143-44 (5th Cir.
1978) (rejecting defendant's argument that under Texas law proof of feasible
alternative design is essential part of concept of unreasonably dangerous prod-
uct); Bernal v. Richard Wolf Medical Instruments Corp., 272 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that in California where burden of proving that
design is risk-beneficially safe shifts to defendant, plaintiff has no burden to
prove that reasonable alternative design was feasible); Seward v. Griffin, 452
N.E.2d 558, 571 (IlL. App. Ct. 1983). In Seward, the court stated that:
[Tihe rule of law in Illinois is that evidence of alternative design feasi-
bility is relevant and admissible in a design defect case, but it is not an
essential element of such a case if the finder of fact can be persuaded in
the absence of such evidence that the defect in design rendered the
product unreasonably dangerous.
Id.; see also Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 80-82 (Neb. 1987)
(relying in part on O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983) for
holding that plaintiff need not prove feasibility or reasonable alternative design);
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983) ("To establish sufficient
proof to compel submission of the issue to the jury for appropriate fact-finding
under risk-utility analysis it [is] not necessary for [a] plaintiff to prove the exist-
ence of alternative, safer designs.").
380. Wilson, 577 P.2d at 1322 n.5; Rahmig, 412 N.W.2d at 80 ("[W]here
danger from a product is relatively severe and the product has limited utility, a
jury may find the manufacturer liable, although no safer design was feasible.");
O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 306. In O'Brien, the court stated that:
[O]ther products, including some for which no alternative exists, are so
dangerous and of such little use that under the risk-utility analysis, a
manufacturer would bear the cost of liability of harm to others. That
cost might dissuade a manufacturer from placing the product on the
market, even if the product has been made as safely as possible.
Id. But see NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(a)(1) (West 1990) (conditioning liability
on finding of "practical and technically feasible alternative design that would
have prevented the harm without substantially impairing the reasonably antici-
pated or intended function of the product").
381. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(b) (West 1990). For further discussion of
this statute, see supra note 380.
19931 1437
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ally quite feasible. 82 Second, some of the relatively few danger-
ous designs that cannot be made safe are not unreasonably
dangerous.8 8 3
Even with respect to products that are not exceptionally dan-
gerous, however, limiting state-of-the-art evidence serves impor-
tant safety goals. Making state-of-the-art an "absolute" defense
rather than mere evidence tending to prove the impossibility of
creating a practicable, safer, alternative design effectively under-
cuts the imputation of knowledge and its inherent safety incen-
tives. 8 4 Furthermore, establishing state-of-the-art as a defense
undercuts incentives for safety even more than admitting evi-
dence of mere industry custom evidence.38 5 Admitting evidence
of industry custom in the form of "commercial availability"38 6
sometimes distorts the risk-benefit balancing by causing juries to
attribute undue weight to how much safety was actually in the
marketplace, rather than how much could have been available.38 7
Merely admitting such evidence, however, does not preclude a
382. For a discussion concerning the ability of manufacturers to make most
product designs safer, see supra notes 253-67 and accompanying text.
383. See Bernal, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 41. In Bernal, the jury found the surgical
instrument not defective in design, but the appellate court reversed because of
error in the jury instructions. Id The court stated that the instrument was made
of the best steel available but "had inherent dangers no human skill or knowl-
edge has yet been able to eliminate." Id. at 46. Thus, despite evidence of risk
inherent in the design, the product was reasonably safe for its use and, but for
the error in instructions, the court would have approved the verdict. Id.
384. For a discussion concerning why allowing state-of-the-art as an abso-
lute defense undercuts the imputation of knowledge, see supra notes 322-39 and
accompanying text.
385. For a discussion of why state-of-the-art evidence undercuts safety in-
centives more than evidence of industry custom, see supra notes 340-68 and ac-
companying text. Even the Boatland court-which, under the circumstances of
that case, erroneously approved the admission of industry custom evidence in
the form of "commercial availability"- recognized the importance of limiting
state-of-the-art as mere evidence, and not allowing it to be raised as a defense.
Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 749 n.3 (Tex. 1980) ("This
opinion, insofar as it holds that certain evidence of the state of the art is admissi-
ble on the issue of defectiveness in product design cases, is not intended to sug-
gest that such evidence constitutes a defense, such as do misuse and assumption
of the risk . . . ."). The most extreme view of state-of-the-art as a defense is
taken by the American Insurance Association. It would make a defense of "any
substantial body of actual practice, no matter what the dominant of preferred
opinion." Johnson, supra note 296, at 680 (quoting AMERICAN INSURANCE Asso-
CIATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE: STATUTES DESIGNED TO IM-
PROVE THE FAIRNESS AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW 24
(Revised Draft, Mar. 1977)).
386. Boaland of Houston, Inc., 609 S.W.2d at 748 (discussing availability of
kill switch at time of manufacture of boat to establish feasibility of more safely
designed boat).
387. For a discussion of how admission of industry custom in the form of
1438 [Vol. 38: p. 1361
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jury from attributing more weight to the product's risks and
thereby finding the manufacturer liable. On the other hand,
when state-of-the-art is a defense, a finding of "commercial avail-
ability" or some other distorted notion of state-of-the-art pre-
cludes risk-benefit balancing, thereby protecting both excessively
dangerous products for which there is no alternative design and
other dangerous products for which an alternative design was
available upon reasonable effort.3 8
8
Additionally, where state-of-the-art is a defense and its appli-
cation is heavily influenced by existing standards, whether indus-
try, professional or governmental, such standards tend to be
minimum standards only.389 These standards frequently reflect
industry influence and bias, and upon close scrutiny demonstrate
that safety is commonly a secondary consideration.390 Attributing
such weight to suspect standards as the basis for a state-of-the-art
defense encourages manufacturers to avoid seeking and utilizing
safer design alternatives.39 1
"commercial availability" distorts risk-benefit balancing, see supra notes 351-62,
372-74 and accompanying text.
388. For a discussion of why state-of-the-art as a defense protects manufac-
turers of dangerous products, see infra notes 384-85.
389. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1324-25, 1328 (Or.
1978) (noting that FAA standards are minimum standards). Although the Wilson
court said that FAA approval of airplane design is not a defense to a design
defect claim, it effectively said the opposite by making practicable, safer, alterna-
tive design a prerequisite to the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 1328. The court relied
heavily on FAA approval of the design in determining that plaintiff's claim was
insufficient: "it is proper to take into consideration, in determining whether
plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence of defect to go to the jury, the fact
that the regulatory agency has approved the very design of which they complain
after considering the dangers involved." Id. The court also was impressed that,
at that time, 80-90% of all small planes used carburetor engines. Id. at 1327.
But plaintiffs had introduced evidence that a fuel injected engine, unlike the ap-
proved carburetor engine in question, was far less subject to icing-the condi-
tion that caused the crash and resulting deaths. Id. The availability and
additional safety of the alternative engine apparently were not disputed by de-
fendant manufacturer. Despite this evidence, however, the court said that the
plaintiffs' claim failed for lack of sufficient evidence of practicability, i.e., reason-
able cost, reasonable maintenance and no detrimental impact on product per-
formance and safety characteristics. Id. at 1328. The court could have
preserved safety incentives without distorting the realities of knowledge and
control of product safety, by shifting to the manufacturer the burden to prove
that, on balance, the reasonable safety of the carburetor engine as compared to
the fuel injected engine. For a detailed discussion concerning shifting the risk-
benefit burden to manufacturers, see infra notes 392-467 and accompanying
text.
390. For a discussion of the influence of industry standards, see Johnson,
supra note 296, at 681-82 n.28.
391. In Wilson v. PiperAircraft Corp., undisputed evidence suggested that had
manufacturers of small aircraft asked the FAA to approve the safer fuel injected
19931 1439
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c. Shifting the Risk-Benefit Burden
A final procedural device courts ought to utilize in encourag-
ing greater product design safety is that of shifting the risk-benefit
burden to defendants.3 92 While it appears that there are several
variations of the burden shift,3 9 3 the most persuasive rationale for
the shift is to place the burden on the party with the greatest in-
formation about product risks.3 94 Although some courts have ar-
engine, it would have. Wilson, 577 P.2d at 1327. No evidence was offered to
explain why the manufacturers had not requested FAA approval for the fuel in-
jected engine. Id. at 1327-28. A logical inference is that courts had not given
the industry incentives for this kind of airplane safety. As Appel and Boatland
both demonstrate, distorted notions of "feasibility" allow manufacturers to
avoid responsibility even in situations where the alternative was readily available
to a manufacturer willing to actively seek design safety. Appel v. Standex Int'l
Corp., 660 P.2d 686, 688 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that alternative wheel
brake could allegedly have been engineered); Boadand of Houston, Inc. v. Bai-
ley, 609 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980) (stating that safety shut-off switch could
have been easily engineered). The liability standards created by these distorted
applications of state-of-the-art are equal to, or perhaps even weaker than, ordi-
nary negligence. These cases demonstrate, in the guise of attempts at fairness to
manufacturers, a new doctrine of strict products non-liability.
392. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 452 (Cal. 1978). In
Barker, the court stated that:
[I]n design defect cases, a court may properly instruct a jury that a
product is defective in design if. . . the plaintiff proves that the prod-
uct's design proximately caused injury and the defendant fails to prove,
in light of the relevant factors, that on balance the benefits of the chal-
lenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the product.
Id.
393. In Barker, the shift is greater than in any of the other variations be-
cause the plaintiff's prima facie case consists merely of showing that some aspect
of the product's design proximately caused plaintiff's injury. Id. at 453-56. The
important omission from plaintiff's burden is the element of defect. Accord Cat-
erpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 886 (Alaska 1979) (applying same
jury instructions as Barker). Under the O'Brien v. Muskin Corp. approach, the
plaintiff bears the burden of going forward with risk-benefit evidence from
which the product may be found to be defective on balance, even without evi-
dence of a feasible, safer, alternative design. 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983).
The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that the product is not defec-
tive by offering state-of-the-art evidence, not as a defense, but as a means of
persuading the jury to give compliance with state-of-the-art such weight so as to
re-shift the risk-benefit balance, i.e., by finding that the product is, on balance,
safe. Id. at 305. In Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hospital, Inc., the court purported to
follow Barker but then indicated that the plaintiff would have to prove that the
product was "dangerously defective" as an element of its prima facie case before
the burden would shift. 659 P.2d 734, 740 (Haw. 1983).
394. E.g., Beck, 593 P.2d at 886 (stating that "this allocation puts the bur-
den of producing the relevant complex and technical evidence on the party who
has the most access to and is the most familiar with such evidence"); Barker, 573
P.2d at 455 (stating that most evidence relevant to risk-benefit analysis is similar
to "technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufacturer").
For further discussion concerning manufacturer knowledge of design risks, see
supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text. Courts have made the argument,
against the presumption of corporate control of information, that plaintiffs can
80
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gued that modern discovery rules undercut this rationale for the
shift,3 95 such an argument appears weak when compared to even
a sampling of scenarios in which corporations manipulated infor-
mation against plaintiffs' interests.8 9
6
An ultimate goal of deterrence is to encourage corporations
to seek out and employ safe designs, within reasonable limits,
particularly when safety designs and devices are readily accessi-
ble.3 97 If corporations had the burden of justifying their failures
to pursue and apply readily accessible safety precautions, they
would have greater incentives to make reasonable increases in
product safety. Several cases discussed previously illustrate this
point. In Wilson, where the plaintiff alleged that an airplane's car-
obtain all the necessary risk-benefit facts "through liberalized modem discov-
ery." Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 185 (Mich. 1984); see also Foley
v. Clark Equip. Co., 523 P.2d 379, 391 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (stating that mod-
em liberalized discovery is reason not to apply strict liability to design defect
cases because plaintiff can obtain necessary facts about defendant's fault in de-
sign process).
395. Foley, 523 P.2d at 391 (stating that liberalized discovery undercuts ra-
tionale behind shifting burden).
396. That manufacturers are willing to manipulate their control of product
defect information is evident from even a small sample of corporate activities
designed to keep necessary information from plaintiffs.
. For cases involving corporations that have withheld evidence from discov-
ery, see Rozier v. Ford, 573 F.2d 1332, 1339-40 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that
defendant kept important cost-benefit documents from plaintiff); West v. John-
son & Johnson Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 462-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(involving manufacturer that allegedly withheld research books), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 824 (1986); NADER & TAYLOR, supra note 91, at 72 (stating that Chevrolet
kept Corvair documents from discovery); Westin, supra note 230, at 119-21 (stat-
ing that Ford representatives lied under oath).
For cases involving corporations that have sanitized their files, see Westin,
supra note 230, at 2, 3, 10, 83-84, 139, 151.
For cases involving corporations that have destroyed records, see Palmer v.
A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984) (involving destruction of informa-
tion concerning Dalkon Shield); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210
(Kan. 1987) (involving destruction of information concerning intrauterine de-
vice); Johnson, supra note 296, at 683 n.33 (stating that General Motors threw
out customer complaints concerning Corvair); NADER AND TAYLOR, supra note
91, at 73-74 (stating that General Motors destroyed important air bag and motor
mount information); Stevenson, supra note 226, at 717 (stating that General Mo-
tors destroyed incriminating records).
For cases involving corporations that have suppressed scientific studies, see
Alix M. Freedman & Laurie P. Cohen, Smoke and Mirrors: How Cigarette Makers
Keep Question 'Open' Year after Year, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1993, at Al, A6.
For cases involving corporations that have generally controlled information
against future discovery, see Pierce, supra note 305, at 1295-96 (stating that
plaintiffs could not obtain information to prove defectiveness of MERJ/29, but
later obtained clear evidence of criminal activity that resulted in criminal charges
to which defendant's agents pled nolo contendere).
397. For a discussion of two rare cases in which design risks could not have
been eliminated by safety devices, see supra note 243.
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buretor engine was defectively designed because it was suscepti-
ble to icing, there was undisputed evidence that a fuel injected
engine was available that did not have the same dangerous sus-
ceptibility. 398 The Wilson court held that the plaintiff had failed to
make a prima facie case of design defect because the plaintiff had
offered no evidence of the alternative engine's impact on cost,
economy of operation, maintenance, overall performance or gen-
eral safety aspects.8 99 This missing evidence, however, consisted
of facts that would have been in the manufacturer's possession
had it given reasonable consideration to using the safer engine.
Imposing the burden of producing such information on the man-
ufacturer would create greater incentives to obtain the informa-
tion and, thus, there would be a greater incentive to "take some
steps (or at least make calculations) to improve [its] product. '400
Shifting the risk-benefit burden to manufacturers, however,
is no guarantee that they will act reasonably to eliminate design
risks. Even assuming that corporate managers have adequate and
necessary information about inherent design risks, there are still
factors in corporate structure and function that create incentives
to minimize safety.40' Managers that feel pressure to increase
398. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Or. 1978). For
further discussion of the Wilson case, see supra notes 389 & 391 anid accompany-
ing text.
399. Wilson, 577 P.2d at 1327.
400. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1041 (Or. 1974). The
burden shift includes not only the burden of producing evidence of risk-benefi-
cial safety, but also ultimately of persuading the jury on that issue. See Barker v.
Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) (stating that "the defendant's
burden is one affecting the burden of proof, rather than simply the burden of
producing evidence"). Boatland and Appel illustrate equally well the unfortunate
effects of judicial failure to create deterrence by shifting the burden. Boatland
of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); Appel v. Standex Int'l
Corp., 660 P.2d 686 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). In Boatland, the court allowed the jury
to focus on, and apparently give inappropriate weight to, the fact that although a
safety device was available by minimal application of mechanical skill, no such
device was actually "commercially available." Boatland, 609 S.W.2d at 746-48.
If the manufacturer had the burden on the design defect issue, then it would
have had to explain why it did not adapt either the racing boat device, available
for more than 30 years, or the homemade "crash throttle" that had also been in
use for a long time. Id. Having full awareness of its burden of production and
persuasion, and given the accessibility of a safety device, the manufacturer prob-
ably would have recognized that it could not justify its failure to make the adap-
tation and to incorporate the device into its boats. In Appel, had the bed
manufacturer known that it had the burden of proof, it easily could have seen
the ready accessibility, despite a lack commercial availability, of an effective lock-
ing mechanism on the hospital bed's wheels. Appel, 660 P.2d at 688.
401. For a discussion of the lack of information available to managers due
to the vertical organizational structure of corporations, see supra notes 232-42
and accompanying text.
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short-term profits will have little incentive to increase current
costs in order to achieve long-term liability cost savings.40 2 In ad-
dition, future liability is discounted by managers who are aware of
the likelihood of moving on to other employment, or who appre-
ciate the time barriers to liability claims. 403 Moreover, managers
who are aware that corporate law allows them to ignore the per-
sonal threat of tort liability claims sometimes believe that avoid-
ing safety costs increases the corporation's competitiveness in
relevant markets.40 4
Nonetheless, burden-shifting does create pressure to focus
on design risks and their ensuing costs. If plaintiffs experience
difficulty proving that a product is defectively designed,40 5 it is at
least as difficult to rebut the presumption of design defect created
by the burden shift.40 6 Offering evidence of risk-beneficial safety
that persuades ajury is certainly more difficult than merely having
to defend against a claim by chipping away at the plaintiff's
proofs.40 7 One would expect that if manufacturers were charged
402. Gillette & Krier, supra note 241, at 1040 ("Even managers who extend
the time horizon by plotting the value of their remaining careers can be ex-
pected to discount, perhaps even disregard, risks with long latency periods.").
Compare the observations made by Gillette and Krier with manufacturer ability
to factor in safety early in the design process with reasonably small or no cost
increases, as discussed in supra notes 167-206 and accompanying text.
403. Gillette & Krier, supra note 241, at 1040 ("The lag between cause and
effect shelters managers from the consequences of their decisions: evidence dis-
appears, or the managers do.").
404. Siliciano, supra note 73, at 1840-53 (discussing how producers who re-
duce accident costs to socially efficient level will prevail over rivals who spend
too much or too little on product safety).
405. See James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Prod-
ucts Liability Frontier: The Reection of Liability without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1263, 1313 (1991) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier]
("Proving that a product is defectively designed ... is not an easy task.").
406. Some commentators have suggested that corporate defense counsel
believe that juries will not accept an arguably optimum cost-utility analysis as a
defense to a design defect claim. Schwartz, Pinto Case, supra note 65, at 1038. In
cases where that is true, of course, the manufacturer's burden is even more diffi-
cult. Id.
407. Manufacturers can defend against a claim in which a plaintiff has the
risk-benefit burden without presenting any defect rebuttal evidence-i.e., evi-
dence of risk-beneficial safety-at least theoretically, by defeating the plaintiff's
proximate cause element or affirmatively proving the plaintiff's own causal re-
sponsibility. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 448-49 (Cal. 1978). A
defendant may also offer limited risk-benefit evidence, e.g., that an alternative
design would have "adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer."
Id. at 455. In Barker, the manufacturer's expert witness testified, inter alia, that
seat belts on a high lift loader-the lack of which allegedly made the loader de-
fective-'would have increased the danger of the loader by impairing the opera-
tor's ability to leave the vehicle quickly in case of an emergency." Id. at 448; see
also Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton Co., 528 A.2d 590, 592 (Pa. 1987).
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with the affirmative risk-benefit burden, they would make their
cost-benefit analyses with more emphasis on risk elimination to
preserve a more viable risk-benefit case. There are several as-
pects of the design process a manufacturer may utilize in order to
satisfy itself that its safety trade-offs are reasonable.408
The shifted burden may well give manufacturers an en-
hanced incentive to conduct pre- and post-marketing tests and
studies. While producers generally know-either from their ex-
pertise or from the choices they make during the design develop-
ment process-that particular design configurations are risky,
they may not know precisely, without tests or studies, either the
magnitude of particular risks or the incidence with which those
risks are likely to occur.40 9 Knowing that they have the affirmative
burden to prove risk-beneficial design, manufacturers have a
greater incentive to become especially knowledgeable about the
incidence and magnitude of design risks.410
Producers who fail to perform adequate pre-design or pre-
marketing tests may become aware of the incidence and magni-
In Lewis, the manufacturer's evidence in defense of an allegedly defective control
box used to operate an overhead crane was limited to testimony by defendant's
expert-employee that the alternative design suggested by plaintiff's expert
"presented a greater risk of accidental activation than the defendant's." Id. The
Lewis court barred defendant's only other risk-benefit evidence-evidence that
the manufacturer of an alternatively designed control box also made a model
identical to the defendant's design. Id.
Where the burden shifts to the manufacturer, with an effective presumption
that the product is defective, and the plaintiff offers "defect" evidence in his or
her case, the manufacturer begins its case in a one-down position. That is, the
manufacturer has an affirmative burden and is forced to present its case by de-
fending against plaintiff's affirmative evidence. The manufacturer's case is thus
not only more difficult than the traditional case in which one chips away at the
plaintiff's case, but is also more difficult than the plaintiff's case in which the
burden has not shifted and the plaintiffs evidence is the first on the record.
408. See Barker, 573 P.2d at 456 (stating that manufacturer's burden is to
"establish that because of the complexity of, and trade-offs implicit in, the de-
sign process, an injury-producing product should nevertheless not be found
defective").
409. For discussion concerning a manufacturer's knowledge and choices re-
garding design risks, see supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
410. The incidence and magnitude of a particular risk are two of the specifi-
cally enumerated risk-benefit factors. Barker, 573 P.2d at 455 (listing several of
such factors including "the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged de-
sign, [and] the likelihood that such danger would occur"). Although juries may
be skeptical of risk-benefit trade-offs where the risks have a high magnitude, one
would expect them to be more accepting of a lower incidence of injury, espe-
cially where the costs of eliminating the risk are relatively great. For a discussion
of jury skepticism concerning risk-benefit trade-offs, see Schwartz, Pinto Case,
supra note 65.
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tude of design risks from product accidents.4 "1 Given their af-
firmative burden to prove risk-beneficial safety, manufacturers
can be expected to have the same enhanced incentive to acquire
the same particularized and complete incidence and magnitude of
risk information that they would have had from pre-marketing
tests. One way to acquire this information is to conduct post-acci-
dent tests, which may either support their affirmative case for risk-
beneficial design or at least tell them definitively how to redesign
the allegedly defective product.
Shifting the risk-utility burden may also create incentives for
better corporate communication. 41 2 If shifting the burden creates
an incentive for corporate managers to give more consideration
to eliminating design risks, a likely by-product of this incentive is
a need for better internal corporate communication. High-level
managers will presumably have more reason to hear the safety
"bad news," and they will understand that preserving those
records and sharing their information will serve the corporate in-
terest better than destroying such records. 4 is Moreover, by docu-
menting the risk-utility trade-offs in the design process, they will
presumably make it easier for manufacturers to meet their affirm-
ative risk-utility burdens. 4 14
Opposition to shifting the risk-utility burden to manufactur-
411. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 754, 756
(D.C. Cir. 1977). The court stated that General Motors' pre-marketing tests
greatly underestimated the incidence of risk involving carburetor fires. Id. n.4.
General Motors first learned of the much higher incidence from risks material-
izing during product use. Id. at 758-59. Nonetheless, they continued to down-
play the incidence of such risk in defense of an action to force recall of its
defective carburetors. Id.
412. As discussed previously, channels of communication within corpora-
tions are often quite limited, especially where safety information is concerned.
For a discussion of why this lack of communication often results in a "shoot the
messenger" mentality, or the sending of a message that undesirable safety infor-
mation must not be sent up the chain of responsibility, see supra notes 232-42
and accompanying text. Perhaps the more typical corporate response is to ig-
nore the safety warnings from technical personnel, and to introduce a product
into the market without eliminating or modifying the design risks. For a more
detailed discussion of corporate managerial responses, seesupra notes 181, 191-
93 and accompanying text.
413. For a discussion concerning manufacturer manipulation of defect in-
formation, see supra note 396 and accompanying text.
414. Better communication and record-keeping, however, will probably
cause the design process to result in more risk-beneficial-i.e., safer-products.
In turn, these safer products will result in fewer injuries and fewer claims than
would have occurred if corporate decision-makers knew they could defend un-
reasonably unsafe designs merely by chipping away at plaintiffs' proofs. For a
discussion of how manufacturers defend unreasonably unsafe designs by chip-
ping away at a plaintiff's proofs, see supra note 407 and accompanying text.
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ers has taken two forms. First, opponents of shifting the burden
assert that courts would have no basis to screen cases as a matter
of law and could therefore rarely, if ever, grant directed ver-
dicts. 415 Second, opponents assert that shifting the burden inap-
propriately forces the manufacturer to prove a negative.416
Neither of these criticisms, however, deserves to be given much
weight.
Regarding judicial screening under the burden shift, Dean
Wade indicated in an early article that the policy issues in strict
liability design defect cases dictate that courts screen those cases
more severely than they would ordinary negligence cases. 417
There is no reason to believe that the policy reasons in these
cases are less important merely because the burden shifts to the
defendant.
418
415. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 579 P.2d 1287, 1287 (Or. 1978) (not-
ing that under Barker "a design defect case will always go to the jury if only the
plaintiff can show that the product caused the injury"); Richard A. Epstein, Prod-
ucts Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. REV. 643, 651 (1978)
[hereinafter Epstein, Middle Ground] ("With this distribution of burden, the
plaintiff can always show some way in which the product might have been
changed in order to avert the accident, as it is always possible to generate some
improvement at some price."); James A. Henderson, RenewedJudicial Controversy
Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63
MINN. L. REV. 773, 784-85, 787 (1979) [hereinafter Henderson, Controversy] (not-
ing that Barker's lower prima fade burden for plaintiffs means that "plaintiffs
should succeed in establishing a prima facie case in virtually every instance");
Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435,
470 (1979) ("Under Barker, however, once the burden of proof has been shifted
by the plaintiffis limited showing, only in a few cases will the manufacturer be
able to offer the kind of unmistakable evidence that overcomes the defect pre-
sumption as a matter of law.").
416. Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 405, at 1293 (not-
ing that parties should not be required to prove negatives); Schwartz, Foreword,
supra note 415, at 468, 471 (same). Variations of this criticism suggest that the
burden is inordinately expensive and difficult. See Epstein, Middle Ground, supra
note 415, at 651 (noting that under Barker test manufacturer must, at great ex-
pense, routinely justify each feature of its product as best it can); Henderson,
Controversy, supra note 415, at 792 (same); Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Fron-
tier, supra note 405, at 1293 (same). But see Birnbaum, supra note 297, at 607
(calling attention to "fact that shifting the burden of proof not only does not
necessarily increase defendant's burden, but its impact on plaintiff's burden
might also be de minimis"). Another criticism of burden-shifting is that it im-
poses absolute liability on manufacturers. See Henderson & Twerski, Closing the
Frontier, supra note 405, at 1292; see also Pietrone v. American Honda Motor Co.,
235 Cal. Rptr. 137, 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (Roth, J., dissenting) ("Absent
[plaintiff's having to prove an alternative, safer design], the defendant becomes
an absolute insurer of the product.").
417. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 284, at 838-39 ("Court control
ofjury action is more extensive [in the product liability arena] than in the ordi-
nary negligence action.").
418. Courts may even be too ready to grant directed verdicts where the
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As a threshold matter, courts can grant directed verdicts
when a product is not used in a reasonably foreseeable man-
ner.419 This screening mechanism supports the policy of not ex-
tending manufacturers' liability beyond all reasonably expected
applications of their products. Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co.420 is di-
rectly on point. In Garcia, the plaintiff claimed that some defec-
tive aspect of the design allowed a sword blade to pierce his
fencing mask, a mask that was designed and manufactured by the
defendant. 421 The plaintiff's own expert testified that this was an
extremely rare occurrence. 422 The plaintiff's expert also testified
that: (1) the mask's mesh was penetrated by a sharp-edged or
tipped sabre; (2) a sabre with sharp corners could penetrate any
fencing mask; (3) the mask was designed to have a standard
"round tipped and ended object" slide off it; and (4) when used
with button or round-tipped sabres, the mask in question was
comparable to other masks in perforation resistance. 423 Another
expert testified that it was "inconceivable how a legal, standard
weapon could have penetrated the mask." 424 In addition, the
court noted that neither party presented testimony to suggest that
risk-utility burden has shifted to the defendant. See, e.g., Campbell v. General
Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 227-33 (Cal. 1982). In Campbell, the Supreme
Court of California reversed the trial court's grant of a directed verdict in favor
of the defendant bus manufacturer. Id. at 233. The court held that the plaintiff
had produced prima facie evidence that a design feature, the absence of a re-
straining bar or pole on the bus, was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
Id. at 228-30; see also Meyering v. General Motors Corp., 275 Cal. Rptr. 346, 347,
352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (reversing trial court decision upholding defendant's
demurrer where plaintiff had claimed that design features of Chevrolet Corvette
roof had caused injuries sustained by plaintiff when juveniles threw chunk of
concrete from overpass); Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 148 Cal. Rptr. 843, 845
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (affirming directed verdict for fencing mask manufacturer
where plaintiff had presented claim that design of mask caused plaintiffs injuries
when sabre pierced mask during fencing competition).
419. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457 (Cal. 1978) ("We
hold that a trial judge may properly instruct a jury that a product is defective in
design ... if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner. . . ." (emphasis added)).
420. 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
421. Id at 845. The fencing mask had been purchased approximately one
month before the accident. Id.
422. Id. at 848. The plaintiffs expert testified that the occurrence was a
one in a million happening, although the trial court did not take the assertion as
a literal expression of probabilities. Id.
423. Id. at 849. After the accident, one of the plaintiff's coaches deter-
mined that the tip of the blade was thinner than normal, but another coach de-
termined that it complied with regulations. Id at 845. The blade, however, was
placed in a team bag and its identity was thereby lost. Id.
424. Id. at 847.
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the mask's vertical reinforcing bar would have any negative effect
on performance when proper sabre blades-i.e., those with but-
ton- or round-tipped ends as required by fencing competition
rules-were used.425 Moreover, the undisputed testimony sug-
gested that a competition participant would never deliberately
use an illegally sharpened sabre like the one that penetrated
plaintiff's mask.4 26 Thus, the manufacturer could not reasonably
have foreseen that the mask would be used in conjunction with
illegal blades.427 The California Court of Appeals relied on this
finding and affirmed the lower court's grant of a directed verdict
for the defendant.4 28 In essence, the court found that it was not
reasonably foreseeable that an individual wearing the mask in
competition would encounter a sabre with a point sharp enough
to penetrate mesh that was, indisputably, sufficient to prevent
penetration by legal sabres. Consistent with Dean Wade's admo-
nition, the court screened the claim so that the design defect lia-
bility, even where the risk-benefit burden shifted, "stop[ped]
somewhere short of the freakish and the fantastic.1429
When the Supreme Court of California adopted burden-
shifting in design defect cases, it expressly included in the plain-
tiff's burden in the consumer expectations prong-but not in the
risk-benefit, burden-shifting prong-proof that the product was
used "in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner." 430 The
Garcia court concluded, however, that Barker implicitly intended
that the use limitation should apply to the risk-utility, burden-
shifting prong as well.4 3 1 Garcia correctly pointed out that Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.43 2 had explicitly included an in-
tended use element in the plaintiff's strict liability claim of either
manufacturing or design defect.4 33 The California Supreme
Court recognized soon after Greenman that intended use must in-
clude reasonably foreseeable uses, and continued to apply the
foreseeability of use limitation to both manufacturing and design
425. Id. at 849-50.
426. Id. at 848-50.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 850.
429. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 27 (1953).
430. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457 (Cal. 1978).
431. Garcia, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
432. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
433. Garcia, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 848. Garcia cited the Greenman test, which
stated that to present a prima facie case plaintiff must prove "that he was injured
while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a
defect in design and manufacture." Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901.
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defects.43 4 As Garcia noted, however, the Barker court did not
purport to overrule previous California strict liability deci-
sions.435 Rather, it sought to approve the two tests-the con-
sumer expectations test and the risk-benefit test-that the lower
courts had theretofore applied to strict manufacturer liability. 436
Garcia persuasively argued that the Barker decision did not
change a plaintiff's prima facie burden other than to shift the bur-
den of the risk-benefit proof of defect to the defendant. 437
There are additional reasons why the Garcia construction of
Barker is persuasive. Barker expressly reaffirmed the Cronin re-
quirement that "the adequacy of a product must be determined in
light of its reasonably foreseeable use."43 8 In addition, the court
expressly stated that the consumer expectations prong repre-
sented only the minimum standard of liability.43 9 Thus, "even if
[a product] satisfies ordinary consumer expectations," it may still
be found defective under the risk-benefit, burden-shifting
prong.440 Because Barker clearly intended that both the consumer
expectation and the risk-benefit tests could apply to design de-
fects,441 it is difficult to imagine that the court would require that
a product be used in a reasonably foreseeable manner as a condi-
tion of manufacturer liability under one test, but not under the
other.442
434. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1972)
(stating that "strict liability should not be imposed upon a manufacturer when
injury results from a use of its product that is not reasonably foreseeable").
435. Garcia, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 849 n.3.
436. Id. at 848 ("Barker reiterated the elements established in [other deci-
sions] necessary in a products liability case."); see also Barker, 573 P.2d at 454
(noting that previous cases established consumer expectations and risk-benefit
tests).
437. Garcia, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 848 (stating that "Barker ... shifted to the
defendant the burden of proof with respect to the 'risk-benefit' standard").
438. Barker, 573 P.2d at 452 n.9 (citing Cronin, 501 P.2d at 1157).
439. Id. at 451 n.7.
440. Id. at 454.
441. Id. at 457. The Barker court stated that:
We hold that a trial judge may properly instruct the jury that a product
is defective in design (1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the
plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused his injury
and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors dis-
cussed above, that on balance the benefits of the challenged design out-
weigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
Id. (emphasis added).
442. See Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 232 (Cal. 1982)
("Where the plaintiff in a strict liability action introduces evidence that she was
injured while using the product in an intended or reasonably foreseeable man-
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Even where the threshold reasonable use limitation does not
apply to screen particular cases, courts in burden-shifting juris-
dictions can nonetheless screen cases and grant directed verdicts.
Assume a plaintiff claims that a particular kitchen knife, sharper
than any the plaintiff had used previously, proximately caused the
plaintiff's severe injuries. Theoretically, the burden should shift
to defendant to prove the knife's risk-beneficial safety, and the
plaintiff's claim should get to the jury.443 The defendant might
offer evidence that the knife is very sharp, which is why it was such
a popular brand. The defendant might also offer evidence that
the design of the blade and handle, and its balance of weight be-
tween handle and blade, are all standard when compared to
kitchen knives of that type. If the plaintiff could not rebut defend-
ant's proofs with evidence of faulty design, the court would have
to grant a directed verdict because the knife's design would not
have proximately caused the plaintiff's injury as a matter of law.
The court could properly grant the directed verdict by imposing a
policy limit on manufacturer liability. While there is clearly some
causal connection between the sharpness of the knife and plain-
tiff's injury, traditional use of the proximate cause concept to limit
defendant's liability would have logical application in this in-
stance.444 In addition, there is no reason to believe that burden-
shifting courts would not apply the proximate cause concept in a
strict liability case in the same manner in which they have applied
ner and an attempt to avoid injury was frustrated by the absence of a particular
safety device ....").
443. Because the plaintiff was using the knife in the kitchen to cut food, one
cannot argue that the knife was being used in a manner not reasonably
foreseeable.
444. Whitner v. Lojeski, 263 A.2d 889, 893 (Pa. 1970). According to the
Whitner court:
One could wish that the pronouncements of this Court on [proximate
cause] over the years had been more lucid, forthright; had distin-
guished between cause in a factual or 'philosophic' sense and proxi-
mate or legal cause; had acknowledged that the concept, like that of
negligence itself, was designed not only to permit recovery for a wrong,
but to place limits upon liability as are deemed socially or economically
desirable from time to time.
Id.; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 492 (stating that "the proximate
cause concept has been used by the courts to extend or restrict liability");
Linda Lipput, Pennsylvania Strict Products Liability Law and Comparative Causation:
Answer to a Doctrinal Dilemma, 13 (1992) (citing E.J. Stewart v. Aitken Prods., Inc.,
607 F. Supp. 883, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1985)) (stating that proximate cause requires
determination that nexus between defect and injury sustained is of such nature
that it is socially and economically desirable to hold defendant liable) (student
paper on file with author).
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it in traditional negligence cases. 445
While the directed verdict in the knife hypothetical is obvi-
ously appropriate, it does not provide the avoidance of trial ex-
pense and inconvenience that is warranted in such a case. In
order to create this efficiency, the court must be able to screen the
frivolous or even insufficient case at an earlier stage of the pro-
ceedings, i.e., by means of summary judgment. Would such a
judgment be appropriate in the knife hypothetical? Arguably, it
would. The manufacturer's motion for summary judgement
would be supported by an expert affidavit to the effect that the
sole purpose of knives is to cut, that in order to do so they must
be sharp, and that all knife users know or should know this fact.
445. There is no indication that burden-shifting courts intended lower
court judges to abandon their common sense, or intended proximate cause in
the risk-benefit prong to have any meaning other than the traditional one. An
early criticism of Barker was that the two-pronged test would require more of the
proximate cause concept than it could provide, and gave the following hypothet-
ical in support thereof: a driver traveling 75 miles per hour is injured when she
is unable to stop her car upon encountering an obstacle 275 feet ahead on the
highway (for example, a stalled semi-trailer truck). To rephrase the hypotheti-
cal, the car's design allows speeds of 75 miles per hour, but its brakes do not
enable it to stop within 275 feet when it attains such speeds. Schwartz, Foreword,
supra note 415, at 466-67. In this hypothetical, the plaintiff has prima facie
demonstrated that the design of the car caused her injuries, at least in part. Id.
Under Barker, the burden would shift to the defendant. Id. After the defendant
presents evidence to prove that the car's design was risk-beneficial, the court
ought to submit this case to the jury, who will undoubtedly give special attention
to: (1) the feasibility of designing brakes that will stop a car within 275 feet from
a speed of 75 miles per hour; and (2) the plaintiff's comparative fault. Professor
Schwartz accurately suggests that Barker has effectively created a presumption of
defect because courts will almost always find that the design proximately caused
plaintiff's injury. Id. However, one has difficulty finding a proximate cause di-
lemma in this instance. Defendants consciously choose risky designs knowing
that safer ones are available in almost every case. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 361 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (discussing how Ford
knew of defects in Pinto, but deferred corrective measures to save costs and
enhance profits). A rebuttable presumption of design defect is warranted except
in cases where the product has not been used in a reasonably foreseeable man-
ner, or where, for policy reasons, manufacturer liability ought to be limited.
Thus, in the unusual but appropriate case, a defendant may effectively shift the
burden back to the plaintiff. In the previous hypothetical, assume that defend-
ant offered the following unrebutted evidence: (1) that no passenger vehicle can
stop within 275 feet from 75 miles per hour because existing technology did not
allow that design without adding $5,000 of additional costs to the vehicle, and
without adding required maintenance every 1,000 miles; (2) that every jurisdic-
tion requires drivers to know auto stopping distances, including the fact that the
average vehicle requires 500 feet to stop from 75 miles per hour; and (3) that the
legal speed limit at the time and place of the accident was 55 miles per hour.
Based on these facts, a Barker court following Garda could well grant a directed
verdict for the defendant. See Garst v. General Motors Corp., 484 P.2d 47 (Kan.
1971) (holding that there was no substantial evidence upon which jury could
find design of braking and steering system to be negligent).
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The argument in support of the manufacturer's motion is that an
injury from the knife resulted either from a use that, as a legal
matter, cannot be reasonably foreseeable-unless courts are go-
ing to hold the manufacturer responsible for all injuries resulting
from a product performing exactly as planned-or, the injury was
proximately caused, as a matter of law, not by the product's de-
sign, but by the plaintiff's misapplication of the product.
The plaintiff's responsive affidavit probably could not offer
facts sufficient to meet its summary judgment burden. The plain-
tiff's most likely successful responses would have to be based on
facts going beyond the sharpness of knives or the particular de-
signs and configurations of their blades and handles. 446 Courts
should not, nor is it likely that they would, abandon the proximate
cause policy limitations of manufacturer liability in the summary
judgment context by allowing a claim involving a'simple knife to
proceed beyond the summary judgment stage.
447
446. The plaintiff's responses would have to focus on facts beyond the
sharpness and design of the knives, such as: (1) that the handle was defective
and broke during use, and thereby caused plaintiff's hand to slip and misapply
the blade; or (2) that the handle was made of a new, space-age, synthetic mate-
rial unknown to consumers and that was 10 times more slippery than any plastic
or other material of which knife handles were then made, and that the unusual
slipperiness caused plaintiff's hand to slip, with a causal chain similar to that of
the previous example.
447. For a discussion of why courts would not abandon the proximate
cause limitations, see supra notes 444-45 and accompanying text. Some com-
mentators argue that judges, for policy reasons, would ordinarily be expected to
keep the hypothetical knife case from the jury by means of a directed verdict.
Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 284, at 838-39. Even in a burden-shifting
jurisdiction, however, there is no reason why the same case could not be decided
by summary judgment. Because the standard for granting summary judgment
"mirrors the standard for a directed verdict," courts should have no procedural
difficulty granting summary judgment in the knife case after the defendant
presents the factual affidavit of the knife's ordinary blade and handle. See Celo-
tex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Unless the plaintiff responds
with facts about extraordinary design, e.g., a defective handle that breaks or is
made of material ten times more slippery than any consumer could possibly
know, the court will find that there is no genuine issue as to whether the design
of the knife proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. This result is consistent, on
the one hand, with the inherent nature of knives and the risk knowledge of users
and, on the other, with the traditional proximate cause principle of limiting tort
and strict products liability short of the absurd. See Prosser, supra note 429, at 27
(stating that "liability must stop somewhere short of the freakish and the fantas-
tic"); see also Kahn v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963)
(granting summary judgment for automobile manufacturer because there was no
genuine issue as to its duty to design cars that are safe for small children who
ride their bicycles into them while they are legally parked). If courts should
grant summary judgment because of policy limitations on a manufacturer's duty
in designing cars by not affording protection to children who accidentally ride
their bicycles into parked cars, then courts should also grant summary judgment
because of similar proximate cause policy limitations in cases where consumers
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Pursuing the hypothetical case further, assume a child brings
a claim against an automobile manufacturer for a head injury in-
curred when the child stumbled on a sidewalk and fell against the
side of a parked vehicle. 448 The threshold question is whether the
child's "use" of the vehicle is reasonably foreseeable. The court
would likely rule that the accident lay outside the expectancy obli-
gations of the manufacturer. This result is consistent with limita-
tions that courts have generally placed on motor vehicle
manufacturer liability in similar circumstances. 449 Absent highly
unusual circumstances, a product use totally unrelated to the cen-
tral, essential and only reasonable purposes for which the product
is intended should not be reasonably foreseeable as a matter of
law and policy. 45 0 Thus, pedestrians who come into contact with
cut themselves on ordinary kitchen knives, irrespective of whether there is a bur-
den shift after, and if plaintiff presents a genuine issue of material fact on a chal-
lenged element of her claim.
448. See Henderson, Controversy, supra note 415, at 793-97. Professor Hen-
derson argues that a court applying the Barker burden-shifting analysis would
inappropriately send the following hypothetical case to the jury: a child trips on
the sidewalk, falls and lacerates her face on a sharp panel of a car-parked le-
gally adjacent to the sidewalk-when a more rounded panel would have pre-
vented much, or all, of the child's injury. Id.
449. See, e.g., Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir.
1968) (stating that car was not being used for its intended purpose because "it is
overstraining a manufacturer's duty to foresee that individuals would allow their
eye to come in contact with the glass edge of a wing vent window on a parked
automobile"); Kahn, 221 F. Supp. at 679. According to the Kahn court:
The duty of the automobile manufacturer extends to the ordinary use
of the vehicle, and may even be such as to cover certain situations when
the automobile is being negligently used. But the manufacturer has no
obligation to so design his automobile that it will be safe for a child to
ride his bicycle into it while it is parked.
Id.; see also Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 329 P.2d 605, 606-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958)
(stating that manufacturer has no duty as matter of law to six year old who
walked into radiator ornament of parked car, ultimately losing eye as result). But
see Green v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 485 F.2d 430, 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1973)
(vacating summary judgment in favor of defendant where 11 year old severed
finger in side vents of parked vehicle). Courts have distinguished parked vehicle
cases from moving or "run-away" vehicles because moving vehicles are gener-
ally being used in a reasonably foreseeable manner. See, e.g., Preissman v. Ford
Motor Co., 82 Cal. Rptr. 108, 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (allowing jury to deter-
mine whether parked car that subsequently rolled down incline, due to defect in
transmission's "park" gear, and injured parking lot attendant was "being used in
a manner which was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer"); Mitchell v.
Miller, 214 A.2d 694, 699 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965) (overruling demurrer of car
manufacturer where plaintiff's decedent was killed when defect in transmission's
"park" gear allowed parked car to roll onto fairway where plaintiff's decedent
was playing golf).
450. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1972)
("Strict liability should not be imposed upon a manufacturer when injury results
from a use of its product that is not reasonably foreseeable.").
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parked vehicles. usually should be considered as having "used"
the vehicle in an unforeseeable manner. Alternatively, courts
ought to find that the injury was not proximately caused by the
design of the vehicle. Failing to place limits on manufacturer lia-
bility in either of the two ways suggested means that manufactur-
ers will be strictly liable for virtually all injuries suffered by any
person who comes into contact with a motor vehicle at any time
and in any manner. There is no indication in any reasonable con-
struction of the language in Barker, or of other burden-shifting
cases, that the courts intended for manufacturer liability to ex-
tend so far. No California decision since Barker has construed
Barker in such an extreme fashion.451
The directed verdict result-as well as the avoidance of trial
costs and inconvenience-of the last hypothetical can be achieved
by means of summary judgment as well. 45 2 There is no significant
difference between a court limiting a manufacturer's duty by not
extending it, as a matter of law and policy, to protect particular
categories of persons injured by a product (e.g., children who
ride their bicycles into parked cars), and a court limiting proxi-
451. A California appellate decision indicates how straight-forward the risk-
benefit prong of Barker is, although defense counsel appears to have misread it.
See Pietrone v. American Honda Motor Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 137 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987). *In Pietrone, the plaintiff, whose foot became lodged in a motorcycle
wheel, presented a bare prima facie case of design defect by offering evidence
that the unprotected spokes of the wheel allowed her foot to become entangled
in it, eventually requiring amputation of her lower leg. Id at 138. When the
plaintiff rested, having offered no specific evidence of design defect or any other
evidence pursuant to Barker's risk-benefit factors, the defendant rested and
moved for a directed verdict. Id. at 138-39. The court denied the motion, and
allowed the jury to decide ultimately in the plaintiff's favor. Id. at 139-40. The
verdict was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 140-41. There is little doubt that the
plaintiff's manner of use of the vehicle was reasonably foreseeable because man-
ufacturers are generally held to foresee accidents and mishaps with motor vehi-
cles. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968)
(noting that automobile mishaps are foreseeable by manufacturer and are statis-
tically inevitable). In Pierone, the plaintiff obviously offered evidence adequate
to shift to defendant the burden of proving that the wheel design was risk-bene-
ficial. 235 Cal. Rptr. at 139. Had the defendant offered such evidence, it is
doubtful whether the court would have granted a directed verdict. Barker does
not directly delineate the circumstances under which a court may direct a verdict
under the risk-benefit, burden-shifting prong. In pre-Barker products liability
cases, however, courts did grant directed verdicts in design defect cases. See
Garst, 484 P.2d at 54-56, 62-63 (involving expert's opinion that earth-mover's
design was defective in several respects, but he could neither specify how to
correct defects nor how to correct proposed alternative designs that severely
interfered with scraper's functioning). There is no basis to assume that risk-
benefit burden-shifting requires a different result.
452. For a discussion of why summary judgment is a viable judicial alterna-
tive, see supra note 447 and accompanying text.
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mate cause in cases where as a matter of law and policy a victim's
own behavior rather than a design feature of the challenged prod-
uct was the cause of her injury (e.g., where a child's careless rid-
ing of her bicycle into a car, and not the car's design, was the
proximate cause of her injury). The court in the latter instance is
not stretching the proximate cause concept any more than the
court in the former is arbitrarily and artificially limiting the duty
concept. 45
3
Commentators have also faulted burden-shifting for requir-
ing manufacturers to prove a negative.454 Some commentators
argue that this burden is inordinately expensive and difficult.
45 5
Others have suggested that burden-shifting imposes absolute lia-
bility on manufacturers. 456 Conceding that the burden-shift
comes close to creating a rebuttable presumption of defective de-
453. If Barker-type burden-shifting demands more of the proximate cause
concept than it can provide, then courts appear routinely-in negligence and
also in non-burden-shifting strict product liability cases-to be demanding more
of the duty concept than it can provide. See Schwartz, Foreword, supra note 415.
For a more detailed discussion of Professor Schwartz's views, see supra note 445
and accompanying text. In either case, courts appear to be arbitrarily imposing
limitations on manufacturer liability without a clear or easily identifiable stan-
dard. But courts have been successfully applying these limitations to the reach
of defendants' liability at least since Palsgraf. See Prosser, supra note 429, at 8-12
(noting that Restatement and various cases cite to Palgraff to limit liability). If a
plaintiff cannot meet his or her production burden at an early stage of the pro-
ceedings, there is no reason why fundamental liability-limiting tort principles
should not apply equally to cases sounding in negligence or strict products lia-
bility, or to cases applying a burden-shifting analysis.
454. For a discussion concerning arguments that burden-shifting requires
proof of a negative, see supra note 416 and accompanying text; Henderson &
Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 405, at 1293; Schwartz, Foreword, supra
note 415, at 468, 471.
455. For a discussion of arguments that the burden is too difficult and ex-
pensive, see supra note 408 and accompanying text. See Henderson, Controversy,
supra note 415, at 792 (noting that traditionally plaintiff bears burden of produc-
ing sufficient evidence to put design defect issue in reasonable doubt, but that
under Barker test, defendant is forced "to rely on speculative, hypothetical testi-
mony to support the reasonableness of its design choices"); Henderson & Twer-
ski, Reflections, supra note 2, at 1293 ("[S]hifting the burden of proof to the
defendant makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a defendant to defend itself
from liability."). But see Birnbaum, supra note 297, at 607 ("MacPherson calls
attention to the fact that shifting the burden of proof not only does not necessar-
ily increase the defendant's burden, but its impact on the plaintiff's burden
might also be de minimis.").
456. Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 405, at 1292
(claiming that burden-shifting "smacks of defect-free liability"); see also Pietrone
v. American Honda Motor Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 1137, 1144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(Roth, J., dissenting) ("Absent [plaintiff's having to prove an alternative, safer
design], the defendant becomes an absolute insurer of the product."). For a
discussion providing at least a partial answer to charges of absolute liability, see
supra notes 336, 339 and accompanying text.
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sign, how can defendants rebut the presumption and how difficult
is it?
Once a plaintiff has proved that a manner of use is reasonably
foreseeable, the plaintiff may cause the burden to shift by simply
offering evidence that some aspect of the product's design proxi-
mately caused the plaintiff's injury.457 In proving that the chal-
lenged design is risk-beneficially safe, defendants will want to
offer risk-benefit evidence concerning the safety of the actual de-
sign, as well as evidence of the lack of risk-beneficial safety of de-
sign alternatives that the defendants considered and rejected. In
this regard, the defendant's evidence will be both affirmative and
negative in nature. The manufacturer will offer testing evidence
demonstrating, for example, that the incidence and magnitude of
the risk are extremely small. 458 The defendant may also have to
prove the unavailability or infeasibility of alternative designs, or
that severe impairment to the product will result if the defendant
utilized alternative designs.4 59 To the extent that some of these
proofs are "negative," they are little different from the proofs
manufacturers are required to offer in negligent design cases, in
which they defend the reasonableness of their design choices and
of their rejection of, or failure to consider, alternative choices.460
457. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) (noting that
once plaintiff shows proximate cause burden shifts to defendant).
458. In cases where manufacturers have actually considered safety in devel-
oping a product's design, they may be able to show affirmatively that the chal-
lenged design is reasonably safe. See Bernal v. Richard Wolf Medical
Instruments Corp., 272 Cal. Rptr. 41, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). In Bernal, a strict
liability design case, the defendant manufacturer presented "evidence (that] the
surgical instrument was made with the best steel available and was reasonably
safe for its intended use, but had inherent dangers no human skill or knowledge
has yet been able to eliminate." Id. Apparently persuaded by defendant's risk-
benefit evidence, the jury awarded a verdict to the defendant. Id. The appellate
court would have affirmed on the risk-benefit evidence, but reversed due to erro-
neous jury instructions. Id. at 46-49.
459. lId (stating that "the defense may show any alternate design would
entail unreasonable costs, be uneconomic or impractical, interfere with the
product's performance, or create other increased risks").
460. For another example of how defendants can present such a defense,
see Garst v. General Motors Corp., 484 P.2d 47 (Kan. 1971). The Garst court
reversed the plaintiff's verdict as a matter of law because the plaintiff could not
demonstrate that the challenged design could have been replaced by one that
was risk-beneficial. Id. at 62-63. The defendant was able to show that the alter-
natives suggested by plaintiff's expert were either not technologically feasible or
not practicable, i.e., that the alternatives would severely impair the usefulness or
add prohibitive cost to the machine. Id. at 55-62. Although Garst involved a
negligent design claim, the defendant's proofs were essentially identical to those
it would have offered in a strict liability design action. See, e.g., Bernal, 272 Cal.
Rptr. at 46 (suggesting proofs that alternative design is not feasible or
practicable).
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In a case similar to Grimshaw,461 the manufacturer would
need to present evidence that the actual design-and design al-
ternatives that it had considered and rejected or that the plaintiff
had offered in its case-in-chief- 462of the Pinto's gas tank location
and protective features relating to rear-end collision were risk-
beneficial. 463 The risk-benefit proofs required of defendants with
the affirmative burden are not significantly different from, or
more difficult or expensive than, those required of plaintiffs in
nonburden-shifting jurisdictions. In fact, if the defendants have
factored safety into the design process, they will have access to
the design trade-offs and related data, which makes it cheaper and
easier for defendants to present the necessary risk-benefit evi-
dence.4 " Even where the defendants have not done their home-
work, they still often have the easier task of gathering data
because of their established facilities, available personnel and
product design experience.
Where the burden does not shift, plaintiffs have to prove that
461. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
For a detailed discussion of the Grimshaw case, see supra notes 169-81 and ac-
companying text.
462. Plaintiffs will likely offer evidence of desipn defect and of safer alterna-
tive designs at some point in the trial, either in their cases-in-chief or in a rebut-
tal case. See Pietrone v. American Honda Motor Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 137, 138-39
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that plaintiff presented prima fade case that "open,
exposed, rotating wheel" on motorcycle proximately caused plaintiffs injury,
and further advised court that plaintiff was prepared to offer additional evidence
to rebut any evidence presented by defendant in meeting its risk-benefit
burden).
463. The manufacturer would ideally want to offer the following evidence:
(1) that the magnitude of the risk is low, i.e., minor rather than life-threatening;
(2) that in any event the probability of the risk materializing was low; (3) that a
safer design was not technologically feasible; (4) that if a safer design was tech-
nologically feasible its cost was prohibitively expensive relative to the cost of the
vehicle; and (5) that the alternative design, if feasible, would severely impair the
utility of the vehicle. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443,455 (Cal. 1978)
(noting that above factors may be considered byjury). In Cimshaw, Ford had no
effective risk-benefit defense. Gimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358-62. After it had
stood the design process on its head by arbitrarily setting the price and weight of
the vehicle before design began, and by failing to factor in engineering and
safety considerations until after the over-all design had been configured, it then
rejected "fixes" that would have mitigated the risks created by the original de-
sign. Id. Ford could hardly argue that its reasons for rejecting post-marketing
design modifications were reasonable. It rejected a package of gas tank modifi-
cations costing only four to eight dollars per vehicle. Id at 359-61. It did so for
two reasons. Id. First, Ford rejected the modifications because it did not want to
increase the sales price beyond the arbitrary $2,000 established even before the
design process had begun. Id. Second, Ford rejected the modifications because
it was not willing to absorb the cost and resulting loss of profits. Id. at 370.
464. For a discussion of the information to which manufacturers have ac-
cess, see supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
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the challenged design is not risk-beneficially safe, either by offer-
ing evidence of safer, alternative designs, or by proving that the
challenged design was so unsafe as to be defective. These proofs
are little different from those the defendant would offer to prove
that the design is risk-beneficially safe.
To argue that the overall risk-benefit burden is a negative
one, no matter to whom the burden is assigned, is a mere seman-
tic posture. 465 More importantly, however, plaintiffs in burden-
shifting jurisdictions often must assume a burden only slightly
less onerous than that of a defendant manufacturer.4 66 In most
cases, a plaintiff's best trial strategy is to offer evidence challeng-
ing the actual design as well as evidence of safer, alternative de-
signs, even when the defendant bears the risk-benefit burden. In
order to make these proofs, a plaintiff will offer the same kind of
evidence, including expert testimony, required of the defendant
to meet its risk-benefit burden.467 The plaintiff will likely incur
more expense than the defendant in making the same or similar
proofs. The plaintiff will also experience at least as much diffi-
culty as the defendant in making these proofs-including the diffi-
culties inherent in meeting negative burdens-even when the
risk-benefit burden has shifted.
465. One may characterize defendant's burden either affirmatively or nega-
tively. See Barker, 573 P.2d at 455, 456 (characterizing defendant's burden as
having to prove that product is "not defective" and that "benefits of the chal-
lenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in [the] design"). Note that
Barker expressly directs lower courts to instruct juries in a manner that states a
defendant's burden more affirmatively than negatively. Id. Trial judges may in-
struct juries that a product may be defective "if the plaintiff proves that the
product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove,
in light of the relevant factors... that on balance the benefits outweigh the risk
of danger inherent in the design." Id. at 457-58. No matter how the burden is
characterized, however, the defendant's evidence and burden in proving that the
product is on balance risk-beneficially safe are the same.
466. Often times, plaintiffs must incur the expense of hiring experts to in-
vestigate risk factors and even perform -product or materials testing. E.g.,
Schleininger v. Questor Corp., 200 Cal. Rptr. 634, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(noting that plaintiff retained several experts in preparation for trial, including
one who performed crash tests on allegedly defective infant car seat).
467. If manufacturers have factored safety into their designs, their burden
will be significantly easier and less costly. Presumably, manufacturers test their
designs, and take other steps to factor safety into the design process, before
production and/or marketing. If this assumption is correct, those costs are fac-
tored into the price of the product. If manufacturers have not done their home-
work, however, they may be forced to incur significant expense-substantially
more than if they had factored safety into the process appropriately. Holding
manufacturers accountable in this fashion is hardly the same as imposing an in-
ordinate expense upon them.
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It may be unrealistic to believe that common-law courts will
be able to work out the difficult issues surrounding product de-
sign liability. Political pressures are quite strong and continue to
grow.468 Large financial interests have increasingly attempted to
shape the debate, and in the process have attempted to influence
courts and legislatures. 46 9 Suggestions for reform may not reflect
either the direction in which courts are moving the law or realistic
considerations of marketplace dynamics. To the extent that these
forces exert greater influence over the development process of
strict products liability, courts will have less chance to shape the
doctrine in order to create necessary product safety in the
marketplace.
Massive interference with common-law development, how-
ever well-intentioned, may do more harm than good if product
safety is not given adequate consideration in the process. 470 If
the redrafting of section 402A is but a clarification for manufac-
turers in order to protect them from a supposed confusion about
the definition of product defect, 47 1 it is hard to justify some of the
suggested "clarifications. ' 472 It is surely time to recognize both
the reality of the marketplace and the special expertise of com-
mon-law courts. Common-law courts have demonstrated a great
deal of wisdom over the ages. Moreover, their common-law rule-
making has been eminently sound.473 There is no reason to be-
lieve, despite the clamor of the "reformers," 474 that the common-
468. See CivilJustice Reform, supra note 1, at 1245-49 nn.2, 8, 19, 28 (discuss-
ing political pressures to expand scope of tort reform).
469. Id. at 1246 n.5. For a more detailed discussion of industry attempts to
create the impression that products liability law is economically counter-produc-
tive, see supra notes 298-300; John W. Wade, Strict Products Liability, 19 THE
BRIEF 8, 56 (1989) [hereinafter Wade, Strict Products Liability] (stating that legisla-
tive tort reform "should be classed as special-interest legislation").
470. For a discussion concerning one proposal to revise the law of strict
liability, see supra note 378 and accompanying text.
471. See generally Henderson & Twerski, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1261-67
(discussing several issues in products liability in which new Restatement could
provide desperately needed clarification).
472. For a discussion of the suggested clarifications to § 402A, see Hender-
son & Twerski, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1261-67. For a discussion of how the
"clarification" of making a safer alternative design a prerequisite to manufac-
turer design liability may be nothing more than a not-so-subtle shift of the risk
from the manufacturer to the unknowing consumer, all at the expense of acci-
dent prevention, see supra notes 355-74 and accompanying text.
473. See Henderson & Twerski, Reflections, supra note 2, at 1261 ("The actual
holdings of the courts have by and large been eminently sensible.").
474. See generally Civil Justice Reform, supra note 1.
1993] 1459
99
Tietz: Strict Products Liability, Design Defects and Corporate Decision-
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
1460 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38: p. 1361
law courts cannot continue to resolve the outstanding strict liabil-
ity issues and create a consensus. 475 In the process, those who
have not factored the grossly unequal relationship between pro-
ducers and consumers into design defect doctrine must begin to
do so in order to give appropriate consideration to deterrence.
475. See Wade, Strict Products Liability, supra note 469, at 56 ("[flt appears
that the judicially created law of the various states has been gradually coming
closer to a consensus. The problems are capable of being resolved, and it may
be that the best way to handle them is to leave them in the hands of the state
appellate courts.").
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